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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970's, Islamic fundamentalism and violence has spread
from the Middle East to as far away as Algeria in West Africa and
Mindanao, an island in the Philippines. If a government falls to the
fundamentalists, some form of Islamic law (Shari'a) is always imposed,
completely erasing Western law. Although it may be difficult for a
Westerner to understand, in an Islamic state, the government, religion, and
law are inseparable.
In an Islamic state, all law is based on the Qu'ran and any laws
contrary to the express word of the Qu'ran are void. In a Western country
such as the United States, government and law are separated from the
Christian religion, although many of our most basic laws are drawn from
the Bible. In fact, the First Amendment to the Constitution requires that
there shall be no established religion. In an Islamic state however, Islam
and the Qu 'ran are inseparable from law and government. For example, in
many of the most conservative Islamic countries, religious leaders are often
*
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the most powerful political leaders as well. In fact, virtually every Muslim
country, no matter how liberal, has established Islam as the state religion.
In a legal context, perhaps the Qu'ran could be seen as the equivalent of
the United States Constitution in that both are the highest laws of the land
in their respective spheres and thus, both negate any other laws contrary to
their meaning.
In the world today, it appears that all states with Muslim majorities
can be categorized into four groups based on their legal systems. The first
is the secular state, in which religion is separated from law in virtually all
areas. A good example is Turkey, where despite some recent inroads,
there has been almost a complete separation of law and religion since the
1920's.
A second group of Muslim states are those that apply Western law in
all areas with only a few limited exceptions. In these states, Islamic courts
exist but generally only have jurisdiction over consenting Muslims who
have family or inheritance law disputes. Examples include Malaysia,
Indonesia, Jordan, Oman, Ethiopia (except in the Oromo region), Tunisia,
and Morocco. Djibouti was once in this category but now appears to be
moving toward a stricter form of Islamic law due to their crackdown on
alcohol in order to gain favor with the money-rich Saudi Arabians.
Somalia was once in this category as well (at least in the Somalian cities) 1
but now has moved to the strictest form of Islamic law.
A third group, are those states that apply Islamic law universally
except in one or more specific areas, such as certain forms of capital
punishment and/or certain areas of the Shari'a that regulate business
activities. Examples include Pakistan, Kuwait, The United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Qatar, Yemen, and Libya. Iraq was once in category two,
relegating Islamic law to family law matters; but should now be considered
part of this group due to Iraq's amputations for thievery in accordance with
strict Islamic law.2
The fourth and final group are those states that apply strict Islamic law
with no exceptions. States in this category include Iran (although there are
hints of a possible future moderation), Saudi Arabia, and more recently,
the Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
The purpose of this note is to determine how extensive the application
of Islamic law has become in the Sudan, in relation to other states that
apply Islamic law.

1.

WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, LAW AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF NATIONS

(Charles S. Rhyne ed., 1978).
Iraqi Leader Orders Amputation for Theft, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 6, 1994.
2.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUDAN
In order to understand the legal system of the Sudan, it is imperative
to understand the history of the Sudan. However, history that has little or
no legal implications will be omitted.
In 1877, Charles George Gordon, a British officer, took control of
most of the Sudan, weakened the slave trade there, and became Governor
General of the Sudan. 3 In 1881, Islamic fundamentalists, led by the
Mahdi, began to unify the tribes of northern Sudan and by 1885, they
captured Khartoum and killed Charles Gordon.4 Shari'a courts were
immediately established and full-fledged Islamic law was practiced
throughout the area.5 In 1896, Lord Kitchener launched a campaign to
reconquer the Sudan and by 1898, Khartoum and most of the rest of the
country was again part of the British Empire.6
Fearful of another Islamic uprising in northern Sudan, the British
wrote the Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance of 1902 which
allowed Sudanese Muslims to use the Shari'a courts in matters dealing with
family law, gifts, and inheritances. 7 In southern Sudan, most of the
inhabitants practiced tribal religions unrelated to Islam. In that part of the
country the British closed off the region from the Islamic north,
encouraged Christian missionary education, and denied any development
which was reserved to the North. "In 1947, only eight years before
independence, the separatist policy was officially reversed." 8 Despite the
vast differences between the two regions in terms of both human and
physical geography, the British forced the regions together and granted
independence to a unified Sudan on January 1, 1956. The Christian and
animist South immediately revolted from the Islamic North due to southern
resentment of northern domination. The war continued until 1972, with the
signing of the Addis Ababa Accords. 9
Since independence, the basic structure of the legal system remained
the same.' ° Family, gift, and inheritance law disputes between Muslims
were covered by the Shari'a courts while all other matters were resolved
through the English common law.
All of this changed in 1983 when Sudan's dictator, Colonel Jaafar
Nimeiri, imposed full-fledged Islamic law (the Shari'a) and declared an
3.

RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SUDAN:

A COUNTRY STUDY 17 (Helen

Chapinmetz ed. 1992).
4.

U.S. ST. DEP'T., BACKGROUND NOTES-SUDAN 2 (1991).

5.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,

6.
7.

Id. at 23.
MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA,

supra note

3, at 21.
100.33, 100.51 (Kenneth Redden ed.,

1984).
8.

FRANCIS M. DENG, WAR OF VISIONS (1995).

9.

Id.

10.

CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE SUDAN xii (1987).
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Islamic state." The vast majority of those who live in southern Sudan are
Christians or Animists, consequently they once again took up arms against
the government due to their fear of the harsh punishments which always
accompany violations of Islamic law. Indeed, the imposition of Islamic
law was the main reason for the resumption of the war,' 2 which continues
to this day. In addition, Southerners felt discriminated against because
Shari'a court proceedings are conducted in Arabic, a language most
southern Sudanese do not understand. 3
On April 6, 1985 a group of military officers, led by Lieutenant
General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab overthrew Nimeiri. Despite
the change in leadership, the civil war continued because Dhahab refused
to repeal the institution of Islamic law. 14
In 1986, a general election was held in all regions of Sudan except for
thirty-seven southern districts afflicted by the civil war. A series of fragile
coalition governments were formed and dissolved during the next three
years. Various members of these coalition governments attempted to
abolish the imposition of Islamic law but were unable to do so due to the
opposition of the National Islamic Front (NIF) Party, led by Hassan alTurabi who, as Attorney General of the Sudan in 1983, convinced Nimeiri
to impose Islamic law which was not done since the nineteenth century.15
Thus, in 1989 the civil war continued to drag on and it was observed that
"[t]he main obstacle [to ending the war] for the past three years has been
the refusal of the civilian government to back down from the imposition of
Islamic law."' 6 Finally, the existing coalition government expelled the NIF
from the coalition, replacing it with several other smaller parties whose
platforms included making peace with the Southerners. The resulting
coalition government was weaker than it had been previously and before a
peace treaty could be signed to end the civil war, a coup brought the NIF
and Doctor Turabi back into power.' 7 Turabi's partner, Colonel Umar
Hassan Ahmad al Bashir led the coup against the coalition government on
June 30, 1989 and established the Revolutionary Command Council for

11.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DENYING THE HONOR OF LIVING:
RIGHTS DISASTER 16 (Africa Watch Committee, 1990).

SUDAN,

A HUMAN

12.
ABDULLAHI A. AN-NA'IM & PETER N. KOK, FUNDAMENTALISM AND MILITARISM:
A REPORT ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SUDAN 9 (1991).

13. Interview with George Colvin, Jr., U.S. ST. DEP'T. Official (formerly stationed in
the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, now closed), June 1995.
14.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 3, at 50.

15.
16.

Id. at 52-3.
Jay O'Brien, Sudan's Killing Fields, MIDDLE EAST REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 32,

17.

Islam's Star, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1992, at 43.

35.
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National Salvation which was committed to18imposing Islamic law on the
non-Muslim South through military conquest.
It has become evident that the coup was fully backed and perhaps
inspired by the political organization of the Sudanese Islamic
Fundamentalists, the National Islamic Front (NIF). The NIF
wants an Islamic state in Sudan and full implementation of
Shari'a, or Islamic law. The NIF has pushed other parties to take
public stands in favor of implementing Shari'a, and labels those
who call for a secular government 'athiests' or 'anti-Islamic.' 1 9
The leader of the NIF is Hassan al-Turabi, who, almost all Sudanese
and diplomats agree, is the real president of Sudan. 2° Turabi, who has a
master's degree in law from the University of London and a Doctorate in
law from the Sorbonne, wants to spread Islamic fundamentalism, and thus
Islamic law throughout East Africa.
'Islam is on the march,' he said proudly. 'There is a collapse of
socialism and the bankruptcy of Western liberal and socialistic
regimes.' He is confident that Islam will emerge as the world's
major political force. '...whatever the West does, Islam will still
overcome it' he said. 'I feel very confident that Islam cannot be
stopped.' Eventually, Turabi foresees much of the Horn of
Africa will be one Islamic community-Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Eritrea... It will happen naturally, Turabi is sure, because a
devotion to Islam will unite the people...Turabi wants a revival,
or resurgence,
of Islam-a return to the glory of the Islamic
21
Empire.

In late 1991, former President Jimmy Carter went to Sudan to try to
broker a peace accord between the Islamic government and the
Christian/Animist rebels but "Again the issue of Shari'a led to the collapse
of the meeting."' "The regime's claim to exempt the South from Islamic
laws cannot be taken seriously: in the event of conflict between national
and regional laws, the supreme law of the land, Shari'a, would prevail. 23

18.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 3, at 53.

19.

Martha Wenger, Politics and Society in Sudan, a Merip Primer, MIDDLE EAST REP.,

Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 3, 6.

20.
21.

Raymond Bonner, Letter From Sudan, THE NEw YORKER, July 13, 1992, at 70, 72.
Id. at 73-4.

22. Benaiah Yongo-Bure, Sudan's Deepening Crisis, MIDDLE EAST REP., Sept.-Oct.
1991, at 8, 12.

23.

Id. at 12.
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As one might expect, the NIF traditionally has had strong ties to the
Iranian theocratic leadership. "The party is funded by wealthy local
businessmen, Saudi interests opposed to leftist tendencies, and the Iranian
government." It has unusually close connections with the Iranian-inspired
El Jihad el Islami movement, whose leader, Hassan Haj Ali, is actually a
NIF member.24 In December of 1991, Iran and Sudan signed a mutual
defense pact and according to CIA analysts, Iran has built and operated
bases throughout Sudan in order to facilitate the training of Islamic
militants for "terrorist" actions throughout Africa.'
In January of 1992, the Sudanese government declared a jihad (holy
war) against the Christian/Animist rebels. 6 One scholar defines jihad as a
form of political struggle designed "...to disarm the enemy so that Islam is
allowed to apply its shari'a unhindered by the oppressive power of
idolatrous tyrannies. "27
Sudan is also attempting to export its Islamic revolution (and thus
Islamic law) to Egypt, Algeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda.u Perhaps
most vulnerable to Sudan's efforts is Ethiopia's Oromo region; which, if it
secedes from the rest of Ethiopia, "...fits in with Turabi's vision of a chain
of Islamic states across Africa."29 Already, secessionist tendencies are
starting to appear in Ethiopia's Oromo region:
One evening last year, officials in the Muslin-controlled Oromo
region of southern Ethiopia raided the area's largest evangelical
Christian church and arrested most of its congregants. Many
churchgoers died in jail and denied proper burial and left to be
scavenged by nearby wildlife. Saving special treatment for the
church's minister, the authorities permitted him to live as an
ironically visible symbol, but only after torturing him and
plucking out his eyes. 30

24. Bernard Schecterman & Bradford R. McGinn, Linkages Between Sunni and Shi'i
Radical Fundamentalist Organizations, in VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 136, 138 (Bernard
Schecterman & Marin Slann eds., 1991).
25. Peter J. Schraeder, U.S. Intervention in the Horn of Africa Amidst the End of the
Cold War, AFRICA TODAY, 2d quarter, 1993, at 24.
26.

AMNESTY INT'L., SUDAN: THE RAVAGES OF WAR 7 (1993).

27.

YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 137 (1990).

28.

Herman J. Cohen,

29.

JOHN PRENDERGAST,

U.S. Policy Toward Africa, FOREIGN SERVICE J., June 1995, at

38.
SUDANESE REBELS AT A CROSSROADS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR

BUILDING PEACE IN A SHATTERED LAND 19 (1994).

30. Michael Horowitz, New IntoleranceBetween Crescent and Cross, WALL ST. J., July
5, 1995, at 1.
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Sudan is even spreading its tendrils as far as the Islamic Republic of
the Comoros Islands in the Indian Ocean where weekly flights have been
landing from Khartoum 3 with possible shipments of military hardware.
Even General Aideed, the infamous late Somali warlord has flown to
Khartoum, seeking aid from Turabi.
Finally, on August 12, 1993,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in accordance with section 60) of
the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j), put Sudan on the
international terrorism list.
By 1995, the civil war was into its thirteenth year with over 1.3
million southern Sudanese killed. 32 By October of 1995, the rebels made
their largest advance since 1991 and in 1997 it began to appear that the
Sudanese rebels, like their brethren in the former Zaire, might take over
the whole country.3 3 However in the winter dry season, the Sudanese
government will be able to utilize their Soviet tanks and probably retake
some of the captured territory. The chances of peace are not great.
III. CRIMINAL LAW IN SUDAN
There are three categories of crimes in Islamic law: Hudud, Quesas,
and Ta'azir crimes. Except for the Hudud crime of fornification, all other
Hudud crimes and all Quesas crimes require that there be two male
witnesses who have witnessed the crime in order for there to be a
conviction.34 One of the major differences between the three categories of
crimes is that. punishment by the State for Hudud crimes is mandatory,
punishment by the State for Ta'azir crimes is discretionary, and the type of
punishment
for Quesas crimes is largely left up to the victim or the victim's
35
family.
A.

Hudud Crimes
Hudud crimes are punishable by a Hadd, a penalty fixed by the
Qu'ran. Because Hadd penalties are quite drastic, how strictly a state
enforces the Hudud crimes is perhaps the best indicator in determining
whether a state follows a strict interpretation of Islamic law or a watereddown, more moderate version. As we shall see, Sudan punishes all Hudud
crimes exactly as the Qu'ran outlines. This puts Sudan in company with
only a few other states/areas: Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
Other conservative Islamic states either substitute jail terms for all Hadd
31.

Sudan Airways in Moroni, THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER, May 6, 1995, at 7.

32.
MILLARD BURR, A WORKING DOCUMENT:
SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1983-1993 at 2 (1993).

33.

QUANTIFYING GENOCIDE IN THE

Sudan Rebels Break Peace, Capture Town, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 28, 1995,

at 3.
34. Taymour Kamel, The Principle of Legality and Its Application in Islamic Criminal
Justice, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 153, 164 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).
35.

A. MAUDIDI, ISLAMIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION 24 (1967).
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penalties or only carry out some of the Hadd penalties while refusing to
carry out others.
Examples abound throughout the Islamic world.
In 1979, the
Pakistani government promulgated the Hadood Ordinances which provide
Hadd penalties in accordance with the Qu'ran, including stoning to death
for adultery. However, these penalties have never been carried out,
because prison terms were given instead.36 In Libya, General Qadhafi
"criticized the leniency of judicial punishments, recommending legislation
to mandate amputation for thievery and public whipping for adulterers."
There was no evidence that these recommendations were enacted into
law. 37 Even if they were, Libya would still not be using some of the more
drastic Hadd penalties as required by the Qu'ran. In Qatar, the death
penalty is used in accordance with Islamic law but amputations are
prohibited by the government.38 In another Persian Gulf state, the United
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), the "Federal Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that
Shari'a punishment may not be imposed on non-Muslims." 39 In addition,
no amputation sentences have ever been known to be carried out, even on
Muslims.'
Finally, even in the increasingly conservative country of
Yemen, the Yemeni Supreme Court has refused to confirm order by the
lower courts requiring amputations and has ordered jail sentences instead.41
There are six Hudud crimes. They are: 1) fornication and false
accusation of fornication; 2) drinking alcoholic beverages; 3) theft; 4)
brigandage or highway robbery; 5) apostasy; and 6) rebellion or
transgression against the legitimate authority.
1. Fornication and False Accusation of Fornication
The Qu'ran provides that fornication by an unmarried person is
punishable by 100 lashes, "flog each of them with a hundred stripes. Let
not compassion move you in their case; in a matter prescribed by God, if
ye believe in God and the last day, and let a party of the believers witness
their punishment."42 As for fornication of a married person (adultery),
"During his life the Prophet [Mohammad] ordered the stoning to death of a
man and a woman found guilty of adultery" and stated "As for a woman
and a man guilty of adultery, flog them with 100 stripes and stone them."'43
36.

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

1372 (1994).
37. Id. at 1245.
38. Id. at 1270.
39. Id. at 1302.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1308.
Surat al-Tur LII:2.

43.

Aly Aly Mansour, Hudud Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 195,

199 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).
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In strict accordance with the Qu'ran, Sudan's 1991 Criminal Act
requires death by stoning for adulterers."
However, convictions of
fornification between unmarried persons are rare for three reasons. First,
it is physically impossible45 for the average unmarried woman in northern
Sudan to commit fornication due to operations performed on over 90% of
adolescent northern Sudanese girls.4 6 Upon marriage, the operation is
reversed 7 and thus, fornication (adultery) is more common among married
women in Sudan. As a result, there have been convictions for adultery in
Sudan.48 Second, in order to convict a person of fornication, there must be
four male witnesses to the act which is an extremely difficult burden to
pass.4 9 Third, people rarely bring accusations of fornication because if the
accuser does not bring forth four male witnesses, the accuser himself is
guilty of the second Hudud crime, false accusation of fornication, and is
subjected to eighty lashes. The Qu'ran states, "[a]nd those who accuse
honorable women but bring not four witnesses, scourge them with eighty
stripes. "50
Most other Muslim states do not punish adulterers, but as mentioned
earlier, General Qadhafi recommended legislation requiring public
whippings for adulterers. 5' In Saudi Arabia, adultery is punished by
execution through stoning52 which is the same punishment required by the
Pakistani Hadood Ordinances of 1979 although this punishment has never
been carried out in Pakistan. 53 Finally, in Hargeisa, Somalia, "[flive
women su spected of prostitution were stoned to death, after having been
buried up to the neck."'
2. The Drinking of Alcoholic Beverages
The second Hudud crime is the drinking of alcoholic beverages.
Mohammed said, "He who drinks wine, whip him. " " Sudan's 1991
44.

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 278.

45.

Professor Bret Wallach, Lecture at the University of Oklahoma (Fall 1991).

46.

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 284.

47.

Wallach, supra note 45.

48.
Carey N. Gordon, 'he Islamic Legal Revolution: The Case of Sudan, 19 INT'L L.
793, 806 (1985).
49.
Ma'amoun M. Salama, General Principles of Criminal Evidence in Islamic
Jurisprudence, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 109, 116 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,

1982).
50.

Surat al-Nur XXIV: 4.

51.

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 1245.

52.

Id. at 1275.

53.

Id. at 1372.

54.

AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1994, at 264 (1994).

55.

Mansour, supra note 43, at 200.
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Criminal Act requires that persons who consume or brew alcohol shall be
subjected to forty lashes and the Sudanese government has enforced this
law by routinely lashing persons convicted of brewing or consuming
alcohol. 56 In mid-1994, Khartoum authorities charged 657 people, many of
whom were later flogged, with alcohol-related offenses; among those
charged were poor women who were brewing a mild, local alcoholic drink
in order to make a living.5 7
Most other Muslim states allow their citizens to drink alcohol although
the tide is slowly turning. For example, in Djibouti the government closed
down more than eighty alchohol-related establishments. However, it is
thought that this action was not due to religious fervor, but rather a ploy to
acquire more financial aid from Saudi Arabia. It is quite probable that part
of the reason for the spread of Islamic Law is the desire of destitute
Muslim countries to please wealthy Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, in
the hope of garnering more aid from their oil-rich coffers.
"Many
Sudanese openly admit that the higher profile given to the Arab identity has
been influenced by Sudan's need for Arab financial support, which has
enhanced by a combination of the Arab petrodollar
boom of the 1970's and
58
the increasing poverty of Sudan and of Africa."
In Saudi Arabia, drunkenness is punishable by flogging with a cane.59
The Saudi Arabian religious police (Mutawwa), without a warrant,
regularly force their way into homes looking for alcohol and other evidence
of non-Islamic behavior.
In 1987, Saudi Arabia's ulema (Islamic
theologians) decided to extend the punishment of beheading to drug
smugglers. 6
In 1993, Saudi Arabian authorities beheaded eighty-five
people, many of whom were convicted of drug smuggling.'
All
beheadings are performed in public town squares63 in order to serve as a
deterrent to others. Beheadings for drug smugglers continued into 1 9 9 5 .6'
Unlike Pakistan's coastal plain, Islamic law is more strictly applied in
Pakistan's northern interior, where "[elven foreigners are not allowed to
drink alcohol."'
56.

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., SUDAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 5 (1995).

57.

AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 1995,

58.

DENG, supra note 8, at 741.

272 (1995).

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 1275.
60. Caryle Murphy, Saudi Arabia's New Political Reformers, WASH. POST NAT'L
WEEKLY, Dec. 28, 1992-Jan. 3, 1993, at 18.
61. Drug Smugglers Beheaded, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 28, 1995, at 4.
62. UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 1275.
63. Caryle Murphy, In Saudi Arabia, No News Isn't Necessarily Good News, WASH.
POST NAT'L WEEKLY, Jan. 4-10, 1993, at 19
64. Stiff Penalty, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 30, 1995, at 5.
65. Great Railway Journeys: Karachi to the Khyber Pass (PBS television broadcast,
Nov. 22, 1994).
59.

19981
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Amazingly, in brutally conservative Somalia, most males are stoned
on "khat, a leaf with narcotic qualities that when chewed gives a
marijuana-like high."' Likewise, in Yemen's 1994 civil war, conservative
northern Yemenese troops destroyed Yemen's only brewery67 despite the
fact that khat is chewed in Sana (North Yemen's capital) by women and
men twice a day, one third of Yemen's purchases are khat, and (for such
an impoverished country) "the fields are planted with khat, not corn."'
3. Theft
The fourth Hudud crime is theft. The Qu'ran states, "[a]s for the
thief, both male and female, cut off their hands; it is the reward for their
own deeds, an exemplary punishment from Allah." 69 Like all Hudud
crimes, the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt through the testimony of at least two reasonable
male witnesses and the penalty must be carried out in public in order for
the penalty to serve as an example. 7° In Sudan, "Sudanese courts handed
down several sentences involving amputations in 1994, of which at least
one was carried out."71
Again, although most Muslim states do not amputate limbs for theft,
the list of states/areas that use the punishment is growing. In Somalia,
which has ceased to exist as a state since 1991, popular new Islamic courts
have sprung up which have carried out cross-amputation (amputation of the
right hand and left foot) on petty thieves.'
However, according to a
United States State Department official, the amputations are not carried out
on thieves who have connections or influence.'
In Iraq, in an effort to
combat that countryls soaring crime rate, Saddam Hussein has ordered that
first offender thieves will lose a hand and second-time offenders will lose
their left foot while thieves found carrying a weapon will be executed.74 In
Libya, General Qadhafi recommended legislation requiring amputation for
theft but there is no way of knowing if these recommendations have been
carried out because the United States does not maintain an embassy in
Libya "...and because the regime strictly limits access to information."'
Somalia's Continuing Violence, AFRICAN RECORDER, Dec. 17-31, 1991, at 8551.
Yemeni Rebels Vow to Fight, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 9, 1994, at 6.
Legendary Trails (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 20, 1994).
Surat al-Maeda, V:38.
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DEP'T. in Washington, D.C. (Summer 1995).
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The small Persian Gulf states are generally more liberal than their
neighbors. For example, Qatar does not allow amputation76 while in the
U.A.E.; higher authorities have pardoned all amputation sentences imposed
by lower U.A.E. courts. 7 As one might expect, Saudi Arabia rigorously
observes the Qu'ranic requirements of amputation for theft.78 It appears
that in Saudi Arabia, amputations as well as beheadings are carried out on
a weekly basis.7 9 Finally, Pakistan's 1979 Hadood Ordinances require
amputation of limbs for theft but these punishments have never been
carried out in Pakistan.'
4. Brigandage
The fifth Hudud crime is brigandage, otherwise known as highway
robbery. The Qu'ran states that the "...reward for those who wage war
upon Allah and His Messenger, and strive after corruption in the land, will
be that they will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet on
alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled out of the land.",8 As with other
Hudud crimes, the Sudan carries out the Qu'ranic prescription for the
punishment of brigandage. In late January of 1992, "[a] court in Darfur,
the country's [Sudan's] westernmost province, sentenced four men who
had been found guilty of killing four villagers during an armed robbery to
be hanged and then crucified."8 2 The only other country in the world that
crucifies dead criminals is Saudi Arabia.8 3 However, the Sudan goes even
further by prescribing death by crucifixion. Sudan's 1991 Criminal Code
requires amputations, death by stoning, lashings, and death by crucifixion
depending on the crime committed.' A reporter who traveled throughout
Sudan wrote, "[a]nd, on occasion children as young as seven are
crucified."8 5 If this is true, Sudan has gone beyond any other country in
the world where the harshness of its Islamic penalties is concerned.
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Id. at 1275.
Stiff Penalty, supra note 64.
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5. Apostasy
is
apostasy which is defined as the turning
crime
The fifth Hudud
away from7 Islam after once having embraced it.86 Apostasy is punishable
by death.1
On January 18, 1985, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, the leader of 8a
Sudanese political opposition party, was executed for apostasy.
According to a Roman Catholic bishop, four Arab Christians were whipped
and then crucified for refusing to reconvert to Islam which they had left
twenty years ago.8 9 However, a United States State Department official
stated that this report has not been confirmed.'
Other Muslim countries are more forgiving of Muslims who change
their religion. The Persian Gulf island state of Bahrain, for example,
allows its citizens to convert from Islam to other religions without
penalty, 9' which is also the policy in Jordan.' However, Egypt, which is
liberal in most respects, imprisons Muslims that convert to other
This is the case in Morocco as well, despite the fact that
religions.'
is
even
more secular than Egypt.
Morocco
Some states' Islamic punishment laws have more "bark than bite."
For example in Iran, a Christian convert from Islam was sentenced to death
in 1983, but due to heavy pressure from international human rights groups
the defendant was not executed and was finally released from prison in
1994. 94 Another example is Qatar, where apostasy is a capital offense, but
"no one is known to have been executed for it. "'
In Saudi Arabia, apostasy is punishable by death, but no one has been
punished for this crime in the past several years.' However, in a related
vein, a Saudi Arabian court sentenced an Egyptian national to 1,000 lashes
for blasphemy, 500 of which were administered before he was deported. 97
In Yemen, a teacher has been in prison since 1992 for apostasy 98 and in the
86.
87.
88.

Kanel, supra note 34, at 165.
Id. at 166.
DENG, supra note 8, at 725.

89.

Four Christians Crucified, Bishop Says, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 6, 1994, at

5.
90. Interview with Joseph Fishbein, Sudan Desk Officer-U.S.
Washington, D.C. (June 1995).
UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 1159.
91.
92. Id. at 1219.
93. Id. at 1171.
94. Id. at 1180.
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U.A.E. six Indian expatriates were imprisoned in 1993 for performing a
play critical of Islam.' Even in the tranquil Maldive Islands, apostasy is
punishable by loss of citizenship, ". . . although law enforcement
authorities say this provision of the law has never been applied." 1"
Pakistan's blasphemy law has received the most press. It stipulates
that anyone speaking or acting against the prophet Mohammed must be
punished by death.' 0'
In 1986 legislation was passed inserting Section 295(c) into the
Pakistan Penal Code, making blaspheming the Prophet
Muhammad a capital offense. The law was apparently aimed at
Ahmadis but has increasingly been used against Christians and
Muslims as well. In 1992 the Senate unanimously adopted a bill
to amend the blasphemy law so that the death penalty is
mandatory in cases of conviction. 102
Early in 1995, a Christian boy and his uncle were sentenced to hang
for writing anti-Islamic slogans on a mosque. 0 3 However, this sentence
was overturned by the Lahore High Court but hundreds of Muslims vowed
revenge."° In summary, although a few Muslim states' laws require death
for apostasy, in the past several years, only Sudan has actually executed
anyone for the crime.
6. Transgression
The sixth and final Hudud crime is transgression or rebellion against
the legitimate authority. Most Islamic jurists agree that a transgression
must be "by force" and the legitimate authority himself, must not be a
transgressor of Islam in order for the rebel to be punished."' "Those who
are unable to fight or those who surrender or are arrested should not be
punished by Had, but may be punished by Ta'azir [a less severe penalty].
Those who fight until subdued are subject to the death penalty as a Had.""°
The problem with this crime is who determines who is the legitimate
authority? In reality, this Hudud crime provides an excuse for states like
Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq to execute coup plotters or even peaceful
opposition leaders.
99. Id. at 1303.
100. Id. at 1358.
101.

Horowitz, supra note 30, at 1.

UNITED STATES ST. DEP'T., supra note 36, at 1377.
103. PakistaniNon-Muslims Live in Fear, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 24, 1995, at 1.
102.

104.
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106. Id.
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Quesas Crimes

Quesas crimes (murder, manslaughter, assault and battery) are
specifically listed in the Qu'ran, but specific punishments are not
prescribed; instead, the victim or the victim's family may choose monetary
compensation or retaliation in kind."°7 The Qu'ran states, "The life for the
life, and eye for the eye, and the nose for the nose, and the ear for the ear,
and the tooth for the tooth, and for wounds retaliation."" 8 The Qu'ran
also states that "[r]etaliation is prescribed for you in the manner of the
murdered. "109

The punishment and procedure for Quesas crimes in Sudan can best be
understood from the following four paragraphs, published in the Sudan

Democratic Gazette, an opposition newsletter published in London.
Meanwhile, the only state security agent ever to be successfully
accused of murder, charged and convicted by a court of law, was
set free by the regime. Major Abdel Hafiz El Bashir had
confessed to killing engineer Abubaker Mohi El Din Rasikh,
whom he confronted on the street and shot in cold blood in
October 1992. The regime was pressed by the family of the
deceased to bring the matter to trial and despite repeated nonshowings of the major for various court hearings, he was
eventually brought before a court of law and convicted. The
regime then sought to win a reprieve for the major by the
applying the Islamic code of blood money, whereby the death
penalty can be commuted on the payment of a sum of money to
the deceased's family. The regime was taken aback by the
family's insistence on the death penalty.
The death penalty was handed down to the major by a court of
law in February of this year. The regime offered the family of
engineer Ababaker the sum of 250,000 Sudanese pounds, a mere
$500 United States dollars, as recompense for the loss of their
son. The family refused, insisting that Islamic law allowed for
the death penalty to be carried out.
The case was then taken to the regime's supreme court which
reinterpreted the Islamic law and ruled that the family of the
deceased had no choice but to accept the $500 being offered as
blood money. The court further ruled that upon payment of the

107. ABDULLAHI AN-NA'IM, TOwARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION, ch. 5 (1990).
108. Surat al-Maeda V:45.
109. Surat al-Baqara 11:178.
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money, Major Abdel Hafiz need only serve a term of one year's
imprisonment for carrying out the murder.' 10
Besides Sudan, Quesas retaliation in kind is found in very few places,
even in the Islamic world. For example, in Saudi Arabia relatives of a
murder victim can demand a beheading of the perpetrator, but this
punishment would be carried out by the government and not by the victim's
family. 1 ' However, like in Sudan, the victim's family can waive the
punishment in exchange for a payment of blood money from the
perpetrator. 112
There have been, however, several reports of Quesas retaliation in
kind in war-torn Afghanistan. For instance, there have been at least two
cases where commanders of various military factions allowed a relative of
a murder victim to kill the "...convicted murderer, using a knife, in a socalled 'Qisas' (revenge) ritual,""' in one well-publicized case in the
northern Helmand province of Afghanistan, the wife of a murder victim
carried out the sentence; this was believed to be the first case of a 'Qisas'
killing by a woman.114
C.

Ta 'azir Crimes
The third type of crime under Islamic law is the Ta'azir crime; crimes
left undetermined by religious law. Ta'azir penalties are always less
severe than Hudud penalties and are usually rehabilitative, retribution is not
the guiding principle." 5 Penalties available at the judge's discretion are
reprimand, reparation, imprisonment, flagellation, and banishment. 116 In
Sudan, the Ta'azir was imposed when women who failed to cover their
hair have been dragged off the street, taken to court, and subjected to forty
to seventy lashes upon which one girl passed out after thirty lashes." 7
In a few other states, Ta'azir punishments are given for similar
offenses. For example, in Saudi Arabia, a woman caught driving a car
was run off the road, held for three days, and beaten." 8
110.
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IV. RIBA, INTEREST OR USURY?
A final indication of a state's commitment to strict Islamic law is its
laws restricting Riba. "What constitutes Riba has long been the subject of
debate amongst Islamic scholars. Some believe that Riba refers to usury,
whereas others believe that all interest is Riba." H9 Generally, more
conservative Islamic states believe that all interest is Riba while more
moderate Muslim states believe that Riba only refers to usury. All of the
confusion stems from the fact that Mohammed prohibited Riba but he never
gave it any precise definition." 2° Whatever Riba is, it is banned by the
Quran.121
Those who devour Riba will not stand except as he stands who has
been driven to madness by the touch of Satan.. .0 ye who believe!
Fear God, and give up what remains of your demand for Riba, if
you are indeed believers. If you do not, take notice of war from
God and His Apostle ....
122
Interestingly, the Bible has a similar provision. The Bible states, "[i]f
thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be
to him as a usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury."2
If one interprets the following quotation literally, it appears that the
Bible also prohibits interest, "Take thou no usury of him or increase: but
fear thy God . ..."24 Despite the similarities between the quotations from
the Bible and the Qu'ran, the two religions diverged in this area in the
sixteenth century. "...when Protestantism arose, its support, especially the
support of Calvinism, came chiefly from the rich middle class, who were
lenders rather than borrowers. Accordingly, first Calvin, then other
Protestants, and finally the Catholic Church, sanctioned 'usury'.""
Thus, during Europe's colonization of the Islamic world, interest and
usury (Riba) was allowed even in the most conservative, Islamic areas. It
was not until the independence movements of the 1950's and 1960's, that
the theory of Islamic banking emerged when macroeconomic models of
interest-free economies were developed and some ideas were given on how
interest-free banking could work at the microeconomic level."

119. David Baldwin & Rodney Wilson, Islamic Finance in Principle and Practice, in
ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 172 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).
120.

S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 266 (1991).

121.

Id. at 268.

122. Surat al-Baqara 11:275-80.
123. Exodus 22:25.
124.
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125. RAYNER, supra note 120, at 271.
126.
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Still, a state's prohibition of Riba is an indication of that state's
commitment to full-fledged Islamic law due to the fact that an interest-free
economy operates at a disadvantage to economies that allow interest. A
well-known Islamic jurist, Abd ar-Razzaq as-Sahuri, stated that Riba is a
"major impediment to the evolution of Islamic jurisprudence coming into
line with the requirements of modern life."127
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage to an interest-free society is the
damage done to its banking system. Since depositors are not allowed to
collect interest on their deposits, there is no incentive for prospective
depositors to deposit funds into a bank."2 Thus, in Sudan (which as will
see, completely prohibits Riba), most people do not make cash deposits
into banks but rather buy more land or jewelry with their excess capital.
This is economically inefficient because the banks have less capital to loan
to entrepreneurs in order to start businesses or expand production. Thus,
the Sudanese government has attempted to attract reluctant depositors by
granting complete exemption from all taxes for those who put deposits in
the Faisal Islamic Bank.129 However, this exemption was terminated in
1984.
In August of 1993, the Governor of the bank of Sudan set up a
committee to provide ideas on how Sudan's ailing banking system could be
rescued.130 The committee's recommendations, which were implemented in
July of 1994, included reducing financial and investment risk, establishing
Islamic inspection units to make sure that banks are complying with the
Shari'a, and enhancing "sales promotion methods to attract more
customers."' 3 ' The Islamic inspection units are usually composed of NIF
supporters who are appointed to a bank's board of directors and often
receive more compensation than other members of the board due to
government pressure. 3 2 It appears that these banking reforms were not
successful in attracting more customers because in June of 1995, the
Sudanese 33government was again forced to exempt savings accounts from
taxation. 1
The Pakistani government has had more success with its Islamization
Since July 1, 1985, the Pakistani government has
of its economy.

127.

Nabil A. Saleh, Financial Transactions.and the Islamic Theory of Obligations and
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prohibited all interest-bearing deposits in Pakistani banks. 134 Due to
imaginative substitutes for interest (such as depositor ownership of
companies that the bank invests in), "The effect of Islamization on deposits
and the levels of savings has been positive. Bank deposits have continued
to expand."135 However, Pakistan's success appears to be the exception
rather than the rule.
Another disadvantage of an interest-free society is that "there can be
no certainty in financial negotiations where there is any question of the
Shari'a law being applicable. " 136 This is especially true for international
business transactions conducted between interest free societies and societies
that allow interest. For example, in 1984, Saudi Arabia became a party to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. Pursuant to the convention's public policy exception
(Article V; paragraph 2(b)), Saudi Arabia refuses to enforce arbitrated
awards if they are found to be contrary to the Shari'a. 137 Thus, if an
arbitrated award includes interest, part of or all of the award will not be
enforced.
A third disadvantage of an interest-free society is that "[e]ntrepreneurs
with good profit expectations may prefer financing their projects on the
basis of fixed interest so that they do not have to share the expected profits
with someone else." 138 In an Islamic state that prohibits Riba, one of the
ways a bank can get a return on its loan is by becoming a partner in the
debtor's business, and thus receiving a percentage of the debtor's profits. 131
In Pakistan, this is known as a Musharika, where "Profits are shared
according to a pre-agreed formula but losses, if any, are shared in
proportion to the funds contributed by each party."' 4
However, as
mentioned earlier, an entrepreneur may rather pay interest than give up a
predetermined percentage of his profits if he expects his business to
succeed while the bank may prefer interest payments if the chance of the
business earning a profit is slight.
Thus, despite all of the disadvantages of an interest-free society,
Sudan has completely outlawed Riba. Islamic law states that Riba is a
Ta'azir crime, punishable by lashing. ''

134. THE WORLD BANK, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1988 STAFF APPRAISAL REP.
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Section 281 of the C.T.A. [Civil Transactions Act, 1984]
provides that where a loan agreement contains a provision which
would require the borrower to pay back to the lender funds over
and above the principal amount of the loan (e.g., interest), such
provision shall4 2be void, but the balance of the loan contract shall
remain valid. 1
As a result, "[i]n the commercial sphere the 'Islamic legal revolution'
which promulgated the Civil Procedure Act in the Sudan in 1983,
prohibited Riba transactions ... .
In order to enforce this law, Sudan
has made it a criminal offense to charge interest. The first case to
prosecute a defendant for Riba was The State v. Laleet Raiinlahl Shah
(1984), in which a non-Muslim resident was convicted of lending money
and charging interest.'"
Most other Muslim states are much more lenient where the question of
Riba is concerned.45 Iraq, Egypt, and Qatar all recognize contracts
containing interest.
In Oman, provided that interest is charged at a rate that could not
be deemed exorbitant in the local market, there should be little
problem. Contracts including such interest payments have been
upheld by the Authority for the Settlement of Commercial
Disputes, the judicial body set up by Royal
Decree to have
1 46
exclusive jurisdiction in commercial matters.
In Kuwait, the Court of Cassation in the High Court of Appeal has
held that a plaintiff may recover interest, but only if the plaintiff has
specifically asked the court for the payment of interest. 147 Conversely, in
Sudan, section 110 of the Civil Procedure Act of 1983 states, "The Court
shall under no circumstances whatsoever make a decree ordering payment
of interest on the principal sum adjudged."'"4 The civil laws of Kuwait,
Bahrain, and the U.A.E. enforce interest payments, but only up to a ceiling
set by the state. 49 However, in these states, "there remain a significant

142. Gordon, supra note 48, at 812.
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Study of an Arabian Gulf Oil Exporting Economy, 24 INT'L LAw. 1059, 1062 (1990).
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number of practicing lawyers who will not defend cases whose main cause
is the pursuit of Riba."'
"
There are several reasons why these states do not strictly enforce the
Riba prohibition. First, these coastal states have had extensive trading
relations with the West and, as a result, are somewhat less conservative
than the largely land-locked Sudan. Second, it would be extremely difficult
for these states to enforce the prohibition on Riba due to the large number
of Western financial institutions found in these countries. Finally, the Gulf
States realized that if they prohibited Riba, they would do irreparable
damage to their economies. 151
Even if a state prohibits Riba, an enterprising attorney may be able to
come up with Hiyal to circumvent the prohibition. Hiyal is a legal
stratagem established by jurists to circumvent legal concepts proving too
ideal to be practicable. 15 2 In order to circumvent the prohibition on Riba,
several Hiyal have been established.
The first Hiyal against Riba is called Bay' al-Wafa and has been in
existence for hundreds of years. The debtor sells his property to the
creditor for a certain amount of money on the condition that the creditor
will return the property once that same amount is paid back to the creditor.
The creditor's use of the property in the interim represents the interest on
the loan. The problem with this Hiyal is that it constitutes a sale with a
condition, which was strictly
prohibited by Mohammed; thus, this contract
53
would not be permitted.
A second Hiyal is the Bay'atan Fi Bya'atin, or double sale. In order
to circumvent the Riba prohibition, the debtor sells personalty to the
creditor for cash and at a future date, the debtor will buy back the
personalty for a larger amount of cash. The, difference in the two prices
represents the interest." A third possible way for a financial institution to
get around the Riba prohibition is by making service charges when granting
loans. Sudanese banks claim that service charges are legal as long as the
amount of the service charge is not related to the amount of the loan. 5 As
mentioned earlier, Section 281 of the Civil Transactions Act prohibits all
interest. "It is unclear whether Section 281 would prohibit the 'service
charges' typically charged.... p156
There are several other ways for a financial institution to avoid the
Riba prohibition, which even the most conservative Islamic government
150. Id.
151. Id. at 288.
152. J. Schact, Hiyal, inTHE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 152 (1960).
153. EI-Hassan, Freedom of Contract, the Doctrine of Frustration, and Sanctity of
Contracts in Sudan Law and Islamic Law, ARAB L. Q., Nov. 1985, at 55.
154. RAYNER, supra note 120, at 276.
155. Gordon, supra note 48, at 811.
156. Id. at 812.
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will not prohibit. One is known as Mudaraba, or a partnership in which
the client and the bank share equity." 7 Thus, the bank shares in the losses
or profits of the debtor's business. If a bank makes sound choices on
which businesses to loan to, the bank can make even higher profits than a
typical Western bank.
V. CONCLUSION

Sudan is clearly one of the strictest countries in the world where the
implementation of Islamic law is concerned. However, where does Sudan
stand in relation to other fundamentalist states such as Saudi Arabia?
If the reports of death by crucifixion are true, then Sudan's criminal
punishments are more severe than those of any other state in the world,
including Saudi Arabia. Even if the reports are false, criminal punishment
in Sudan still ranks as one of the harshest in the world due to executions
for religious beliefs and crucifixion of criminals already executed for
highway robbery. The only other state that engages in this practice is
Saudi Arabia. Add to this, Sudan's strict prohibition of Riba, and it is
clear that Sudan is the world's strictest experiment in the implementation of
full-fledged Islamic law.

157.
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INTRODUCTION

Discussions regarding the problem of identifying customary
international law have essentially focused on two principal issues. The first
relates to the inadequate manner in which the elements of custom reflect
any empirical reality, or lex lata, particularly when according greater merit
to the opinio juris of states.' Commentators have focused on a host of
customary norms, in particular areas of international law, such as
environmental law, 2 human rights 3 and international economic law. 4 These
commentators have concluded that these so called customary norms serve
as the jurisprudential basis of the relevant international laws are either not
customary due to a lack of state practice or are too indefinite to be
classified as any form of hard law. The second principal contention relates
to the relative nature of the sources of custom. The basic problem, when
*
The author acknowledges the financial support of the Lady Davis Fellowship Trust,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel and the assistance of Dr. Moshe Hirsh. Dr. Hammer has
lectured at the University of Haifa and the University of London. Degrees received include: a
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delineating opinio juris, is that the very purpose and nature of customary
law is being uprooted in deference to the perceived desires of states.'
In attempting to address these aforementioned contentions, some
commentators tend to stress the unavoidably pluralist structure of the
international community. Unique regional and cultural interests suggest the
need for a broader understanding of custom that makes it difficult to
identify a customary norm in any definitive manner.' Recognizing the
purpose of the key elements of custom, particularly the opinio juris of
states, is to reflect the basic structure of a customary norm.7
Commentators have suggested that the distinction between lex lata and lex
feranda has blurred.8 One, therefore, can claim that referring to opinio
juris enhances the role of custom as an adjudicatory source. Discerning
the values indicated in the opinio juris can provide a more clearer direction
for a judicial body applying the customary norm than the strict positivist
approach that tends to stress state practice. 9
Considering the problems associated with customary international law,
this article will account for the role of customary law within the domestic
legal system of states and the extent of the domestic application of
customary international human rights law. Applying customary
international human rights law in the domestic sphere might raise different
considerations than other areas of international law. Human rights serve to
regulate a states behavior towards individuals found within its borders. A
morally consequential form of reasoning regarding the utility of human
rights might incline a domestic legal actor towards different interpretations
of customary law. For example, a court might account for the underlying
purpose of human rights by considering broader sources when identifying
the obligation derived from customary international law. 10
Following a discussion of the more general problems associated with
discerning customary international law, this article will consider Israel's
legal framework for incorporating customary international law.
This
5.

See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77

AM. J INT'L L. 413 (1983); Simma & Alston, supra note 1.
6.
ANTONIO CASSESE, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 88
(Cassese & Weiler eds., 1988).
7.
See generally, MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW (1989); ABI-SAAB, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 10 (Cassese & Weiler eds., 1988).
8.
BROWNLIE, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 70 (Cassese
& Weiler eds., 1988) noting the importance of political circumstances, the catalytic effect of
certain statements, and the modalities of application.

9.
See also Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and
the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD. J. L. STUD. 85 (1996).
10.

Isabelle Gunning,

Modernising Customary InternationalLaw:

The Challenge of

Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INTL. L. 211 (1991) (sovereign enacts human rights for benefit of
community and not as a reflection of an exercise of power).
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article will account for the manner in which the Israel legal system,
particularly the Israel Supreme Court, has applied customary international
law and the implications of such an approach for the future application of
customary international human rights law in Israel.
The reason for this focus on the Israeli system is that the Supreme
Court tends to place a rather strong emphasis on the state practice element
of custom. The positivist comprehension of the Court, however, tends to
reflect the problems associated with this approach. In particular, the Court
has been prone to subjective interpretations of the relevant norms and, at
times, an unrealistic perspective of the customary status of certain rules.
Furthermore, the Courts approach does not appear to conform with its
underlying reasoning for incorporating international customary law into the
domestic Israeli law."
The significance of customary law for Israeli
jurisprudence is that custom creates an obligation on the sovereign state. 2
The state does not maintain an extra-legal status above the strictures of the
law, and therefore customary international norms can provide a common
core of binding human rights. This suggests a cosmopolitan international
framework for human rights, as opposed to an inter-statist approach
generally associated with a positivist perspective. 3 A reference to the
opinio juris of states might provide a clearer adjudicatory source of custom
than would state practice.
This re-examination of the domestic applicability of customary
international human rights law in Israel also seems ripe given Israel's
ratification of the principal human rights treaties during the early part of
this decade. For example, Israel ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention to
Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention Against
Torture. Coupled with the enactment of two important Basic Laws 4 that
strength the status of civil rights in Israel,' 5 one can consider the
applicability of provisions within these ratified but non-incorporated
treaties 6 that embody customary international law.
11.
As compared to a treaty that generally must be incorporated pursuant to a specific
statute.
12. See discussion infra. The Israel Supreme Court has also identified the fact that Israel
is a mixed jurisdiction as another reason for incorporating custom.
13. Dower, Human Rights and InternationalRelations, 1 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 86 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity And Freedom - A Biography of A Power
Struggle, 1 MISHPAT UMEMSHAL 323 (1992) (in Hebrew).
15. David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli
ConstitutionalLaw?, 14 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 173 (1996).
16. Ruth Lapidoth, InternationalLaw Within the Israel Legal System, 24 IS. L. R. 451
(1990); Yeffa Zilbershats, Role of InternationalLaw in Israeli ConstitutionalLaw, 4 MISHPAT
UMEMSHAL 47 (1997) (in Hebrew); Rubin, Adoption of InternationalTreaties into Israeli Law
by Israeli Courts, 13 MISHPATIM 210 (1983-84) (in Hebrew).

ILSA Journal of International& Comparative Law [Vol. 5:23

26

II.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SOURCE

Customary international law is composed of an objective element
regarding the actual practice of states, and a subjective element that the
state believes it is acting under a legal obligation, otherwise referred to as
opinio juris. " One of the key problems in discerning custom is the
independent relative importance of each of these elements and the proper
reference materials for determining their normative content. For example,
customary international law has been prone to uncertainty as a viable
source of law given the difficulty in identifying state practice or the vague
nature of opiniojuris. 8 This form of criticism gained credence particularly
after a variety of International Court of Justice [hereinafter "ICJ"]
decisions emphasized the importance of ancillary sources, such as UN
Resolutions, to establish the grounds for the opinio juris of emerging
customary norms.'

9

In response to this problem, some commentators have adopted a more
realistic approach towards customary law by accounting for factors such as
international relations" that causally persuade states to engage in similar
behavior due to surrounding economic or political circumstances rather
than from a binding legal obligation. Alternatively, other commentators
point to the importance of upholding a viable international legal system by
stressing a strong statist paradigm 2 ' or focusing on other international law
sources, such as treaties, as an efficient normative source for developing a
state's customary law obligations.' One of the key reasons for referring to
treaties as a source of custom is that with the lessened homogeneity of
states and the increased need for clear and effectively, responsive
international doctrine resulting from the growing inter-dependency of
states. Custom has been deemed a rather slow and cumbersome source for
developing international law. 3 Because treaties are a written instrument
and provide for a deductive application of predetermined rules, they can
serve as a key source for entrenching a customary human right. As
17.

See, e.g., North Sea-Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Denmark;FRG/Netherlands),

1969 I.C.J Rep.
18.
A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1 (1995).
19.
See, e.g., Merits, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.
20.
See, e.g., Fidler, Challengingthe Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of
Customary InternationalLaw, 39 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 198 (1996).
21.

Weil, supra note 5.

22. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1983); Leslie
Deak, Customary InternationalLabour Laws and their Application in Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J.COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (1994).
23.

See,

e.g.,

THIRLWAY,

(1972); VAN HOOF, supra note 22.
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acceptance and application of treaties develop, one can elicit an opiniojuris
by states concerning the treaty obligations, and, as states interact with the
international bodies established under the treaties, a subsequent change in
state practice.24
In the international human rights field, there is also a tendency to rely
on statements and declarations made by states in international forums or
during the drafting of an international document. 5 Considering the broad
range of available sources for deriving international norms, such as United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions2 6 or reports from NonGovernmental Organizations [hereinafter "NGO"], human rights
commentators attempt to expand the reach of customary international law.27
One of the basic problems with relying on sources derived from
international organizations is that it tends to reduce the normative basis of
international law.' States might support a particular idealistic notion in
international forums but hesitate to uphold those ideals in practice. Hence
while it is tempting for states to designate a particularly horrific act, such
as torture, as being prohibited by customary law, it is equally important to
provide 29for the enforcement of the norm in a realistic and effective
manner.
Nonetheless, the alternative, positivist, approach tends to overlook the
benefits of referring to opinio juris. As an adjudicatory tool, opinio juris
can assist the judicial determinacy of the norm by clarifying the underlying
value of the norm. Custom derives from a shared understanding of states
and, particularly in the human rights field, fundamental principles that
structure the evolution of customary norms.30 As a result, there is a certain
amount of commingling between the elements of state practice and opinio
juris when considering the customary law status of a human right norm.
One can demonstrate the significance of opinio juris as assisting to
apply a customary rule in a uniform manner upon considering the
enforceability of custom in the domestic legal framework of the majority of

24. See discussion infra. The drawback to this approach is that a treaty is a separate
source of law, such that its utility as a source of custom will depend on the number of states
ratifying and incorporating the treaty in question.
25. MERON, supra note 7; Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and
InternationalHuman Rights Law, 3 HARV. HuM RTS.J. 53 (1990).
26. Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years After), 58 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L 39 (1987) (discussing the relationship between GA Resolutions and custom).
27. MERON, supra note 7.
28. Weil, supra note 5.
29. Weisburd, supra note 18.
30. Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga
Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INTL. L. 211 (1997) (asserting that, in certain instances,
consideration of state practice can be a facilitative factor rather then a necessary exercise).
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states. 3 While application of the customary norm in the domestic sphere
might be subject to different interpretations, the underlying values that
shape and form the rule can serve as guidelines for a domestic entity
charged with enforcing customary principles.32 Considering the opinio
juris of a customary law enhances judicial determinacy and with it the rule
of law while allowing for a relative application of the norm.33 A better
understanding of the application of customary norms in domestic legal
systems, notably in Israel, will clarify the reason for stressing a unitary
basis for the substantive dimension of the source of custom.34
States generally accept the automatic incorporation of customary
international law into the domestic legal sphere. In Germany for example,
Article 25 of the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, binds the states to uphold
customary international law. The courts look to the Federal Constitutional
Court, or Supreme Court, to determine whether a norm has attained the
status of custom.35 In Italy, customary international law also maintains a
normative status that places it above the domestic law.36 While it is
difficult to disentangle instances in which the courts have referred
exclusively to custom as opposed to constitutional principles, the courts
have referred to the customary international law status of the right to
housing, own property, equal protection of the law for aliens, and the right
against discrimination.
The United States arguably 37 recognizes that international customary
norms are applicable in its domestic courts, with some commentators

31.
See, e.g., Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts (Conforti &
Francioni eds., 1997).
32. See, e.g., ABI-SAAB, supra note 7 (noting that the elements of custom can provide
the procedure forcreating and discerning the rule).
33. Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights Law in United States
Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992) (concluding that the lack of
application of customary law is partly due to insufficient precision of the norms).
34. Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the
Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFoRD. J.L. STUD. 85 (1996) (for example equates a similar interpretation
with the international legal systems goal to achieve peaceful coexistence among states).
35. Note that unlike the United States and United Kingdom, domestic legislation in
Germany cannot override a customary international norm.
36. FRANCIONI,
THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF
INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT:

REFLECTION ON THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE IN ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, (Conforti & Francion eds., 1997).

37. Some commentators assert that domestic courts generally do not abide by customary
norms, and where they do, it is limited to specific instances involving maritime law cases.
Trimble, supra note 1; Weisburd, supra note 18, (citing United States v. Alvarez Machain 112
S.Ct. 2188 (1992) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997).
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asserting that custom supersedes prior federal law. 38

The principle, as

noted in the United States Courts, is the binding nature of international
rules over sovereign states.3 9 While reference to customary law by United
States Courts has been rare, as well as subject to controversy, 4° customary
international human rights norms have served as the basis for a number of
legal actions.4' Customary international law maintains a similar status in
Chile42 and Argentina.43
The United Kingdom considers customary international law to be part
of the domestic law, save if it conflicts with an existing law." Canada also
adheres to a similar adoptive approach to customary law.45
A.

Customary InternationalLaw in Israel
In Israel, like the United Kingdom, custom has automatic binding
status in the domestic law' unless the customary norm is contrary to an

38. Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555 (1984); Lillich, supra note 25.
39. This notion can be traced back to Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The
most widely cited case is The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The proposition that it
stands for automatic incorporation of customary law is subject to debate on both historic and legal
grounds. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 1; Weisburd, supra note 18; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 37.
40. Cf. Weisburd, supra note 18 with Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and
the Presumptive Power ofInternationalLaw, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295 (1995).
41. For example, the Alien Tort Statute provides that an alien may raise a tort claim
against another alien who committed breaches of the law of nations. See e.g., Bayefsky and
Fitzpatrick, supra note 33.
42.
VICUNA & BAUZA, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE JUDICIARY; NEW TRENDS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE

IN ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS; supra note 36, at 135.
43.

VINUESA, DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS WITHIN THE

INTERNAL LEGAL ORDER THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA IN ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS; supra

note 36, at 149.
44.

BROWNLIE,

PRINCIPLES

OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(1995);

Andrew J.

Cunningham, The European Convention on Human Rights, Customary InternationalLaw and the
Constitution, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537.
45.
BAYESKEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CANADIAN COURTS; supra
note 36, at 295.

46. Ruth Lapidoth, InternationalLaw Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. REV.
451 (1990); Yaffa Zilbershats, The Adoption of InternationalLaw into Israeli Law: The Real is
Ideal, 25 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 243 (same article in Hebrew - 24 MISPATIM 317 (1994/95);

Zilbershats Role of InternationalLaw in Israeli Constitutional Law, 4 MISHPAT UMEMSHAL 47
(1997) (in Hebrew); Rubin, Adoption of InternationalTreaties into Israeli Law by Israeli Courts,
13 MISPATIM 210 (1983-84) (in Hebrew); Shtampfer v. Attorney General, 10 PD 5 (1956)
(sovereign state is required to abide by customary law).
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existing law.4 7 In determining the criteria for establishing customary
international law, the Israeli Courts have turned to Article 38(1)(b) of the
statute of the ICJ.4" The Article defines custom as a stable, consistent, and
general practice that is broadly acknowledged in international circles as
binding, with an emphasis on the fact that the norm has acquired binding
An ambiguous provision in the
legal force in the majority of nations."
domestic law will impel the Israeli Courts to incorporate a customary
that the
international norm into the domestic law,5" with the presumption
5

legislature is acting within the dictates of a customary norm. '
While the Israeli Court acknowledges the importance of opiniojurisas

demonstrating a state's sense of obligation, the Court tends to stress state
practice as a key part of the doctrine of custom. Adhering to a standard
that the practice must be established, general, and constant, the Israeli
Supreme Court states it is the practice of the subjects of international law,
52
i.e., the states, that is to serve as the key aspect in establishing custom.
The Israel Supreme Court noted that the basis for establishing custom
cannot be the values emerging from international entities since the latter do
47. Ruth Lapidoth, InternationalLaw Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. REV.
451 (1990) (citing) Steinberg v. Attorney Genera, 5 PD 1061 (1951), noting that a governmental
regulation might be subject to customary law, referring to dicta in American-European Beth-El
Mission v. Ministerof Welfare, 21 (ii) PD 325 (1967) (regulation conflicted with right to freedom
of religion). A similar idea applies in the United States, see Michael Glennon, Raising the
Paquette Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive
Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321 (1986).
48. See, e.g., Abu Itta v. Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 37(ii) PD 197 (1983) at
231. Note that international commentators have criticized Article 38(1)(b) as being defective
because the definition is inverted; general practice is evidence of custom. See, e.g., Fidler,
Challenging the Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary InternationalLaw,
39 GERM. YB. INT'L L. 198 (1996). Karol Wolfke asserts that the travaux preparatoires to the
ICJ Statute indicate that the drafters had no clear idea regarding the structure of custom. Wolfke,
Custom In Present International Law (1993).
49. Ruth Lapidoth, InternationalLaw Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. R.
451, 454 (1991) (citing to Abu Itta v. Commander of Judea and Samaria, 37 (ii) PD 197 (1983).
Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Israeli Legal
System: Present and Future, 28 ISR. L. R. 136 (1994) noting a possible different standard for
proving customary humanitarian norms. See, e.g., Taha v. Minister of Defense 45(ii) PD 45
(1991) at 52-54.
50. Hilu, et. al. v. State of Israel, et. al., 27 (ii) PD 169 (1973) at 177. See also, Affu,
et. al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, et. al., 42(ii) PD 4, 35, 76 (1988)
(translated in 29 ILM 139); Shimshon v. Attorney General, 4 PD 143 (1951) (apply international
law where legislature did not consider the succession of the state to the Mandate requirements).
51.
Eyal Benvenisti, The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Israeli
Legal System: Present and Future, 28 ISR. L. R. 136 (1994), citing 2 BARAK, Interpretation of
Law, 576, 580 (1993); 3 BARAK, Interpretation of Law, 354 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Abu Itta v. Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 37(ii) PD 197, 238-39
(1983).
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not address the putative customary values in any practical sense. Although
ideals are an important indicia of custom, state practice represents a more
realistic and entrenched element.53
Following this approach, the Supreme Court tends to apply custom in
a somewhat subjective fashion. For example, the Court has repeatedly
held that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not customary law and therefore
inapplicable.5 4 Alternatively, the Court has relied on subjective applications
of military necessity to avoid the possible customary obligations of the
state .5
Professor Benvenisti explained the Supreme Court's understanding of
custom as an attempt by the Court to counter-balance the lack of other
avoidance doctrines in Israeli jurisprudence, such as the act of state or
He also interprets the Courts narrow
political question doctrines.
application of custom as reflecting a desire to incorporate a deference to
the national security considerations confronting the state.56
The noted reasons for favoring a strict interpretation of customary law
however are descriptive only. They refer to domestic interests that might
apply only after determining the existence of a customary norm.57 Hence,
while the act of state doctrine might provide a basis for narrowing the
application of customary law, such an argument ignores the functional
purpose of custom in international and domestic law as creating a
recognized set of common principles among states. Additionally, domestic
standards of national security need not be central factors when considering
the relevance of customary international human rights since customary
international human rights norms can assist to shape the contours of
security considerations in a manner that conforms with international law.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's interpretation of state practice
appears to be excessively literal and seems to overlook the role of
international sources that shape the practices of states and define the
contours of the customary law. Determining state practice is not a literal
53.

Id.
54. See, e.g., Shahin et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and
Samaria, 41(i) PD 197 (1987) (family re-unification is not an obligatory right nor is it covered by
the Fourth Geneva Convention); Kwasama v. Minister of Defense, 35(i) PD 617 (1981)
(prohibition of expulsion only applies to mass expulsions under the Geneva Convention).
55. Taha v. Minister of Defence, 45(ii) PD 45 (1991) (state may fine parents if their
children commit disturbances in the Occupied Territories).
56.
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE ATTITUDE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN ISRAEL TOWARDS
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENFORCING

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 207, 213-14 (Conforti & Francioni eds.,
1997); Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied
Territories, 26 ISR. L. R. 24 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Matar v. Minister of Defense, 43(iii) PD 542 (1989), where the Israel
Supreme Court held that the Geneva Convention is not customary law and that deportations of
individuals associated with terrorist organizations may occur in the interest of national security.
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exercise but accounts for a broader more objective view of custom. 8
Instances might occur whereby states entertain strong opinio juris, such
that the material practice is a secondary consideration that might not reflect
the emerging customary standard.
If one were to adhere to a strict account of state practice in the
domestic sphere, it is conceivable that states would reject almost all
customary norms because of contrary state practice. For example clearly
states consider torture to be an unacceptable act under customary
international law, yet the practice of torture still unfortunately abounds.
Similarly, as decided in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ relied on the
prohibition of the use of force in the United Nations Charter as a
customary norm despite contrary state practice. The ICJ relied on the
manner in which states tend to justify their- acts of force, by denying any
breach of the Charter or attempting to justify their actions as falling within
the framework of the Charter. It did not however limit the examination to
a hard-look at state practice. 59 Furthermore the ICJ noted that while
regularity of behavior is important, there is no need for complete
uniformity of behavior' ° particularly concerning human rights, which the
ICJ has intimated can derive from customary law sources.6
While the focus on the actual practice of states is proper since it is the
states that create and uphold custom, actual practice does not adequately
account
for
developments
within
international
organizations.
Commentators have deemed a variety of United Nations Resolutions as
reflective of custom, or at the very least as guidelines for the proper
conduct of states that can reflect the development of a customary norm.62
This argument is significant given the large number of states that have
emerged following the creation of the United Nations, thereby suggesting a
58. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT. Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (197475) (defines state practice as any act or statements by a State from which views can be inferred
about international law).
59. A similar approach was indicated in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J Rep. (when the ICJ deemed the Geneva Conventions equivalent to
customary law given the large number of states that have signed the document and the opinio juris
deriving from statements made in international forums).
60. The fact that the ICJ was dealing with the prohibition regarding the use of force
might account for its rather elastic interpretation of the development of a customary norm. See,
e.g., D'Amato, Trashing Customary InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101 (1987).
61.
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), (1980) I.C.J Rep. 3, para. 91; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and

Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), (1986) I.C.J Rep. 14,

para. 267. See also,

Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38

INT'L COMP L.Q. 321 (1989) (interpreting the ICJ cases as recognizing the customary status of
a variety of human rights).
62.

(1988).

Danilenko; The Theory of Customary International Law, 31 GERM. Y.B. INT'L 9
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different pattern for, and relevance of, the elements of custom. Given the
organizational role of international entities that influence the procedural
development of custom, international forums can offer a strong platform
from which to discern the existence or emergence of a customary norm.'
International forums also serve to consolidate a variety of international
interests, including the individual and other interest groups, such as NGOs,
that operate in the human rights arena. Unlike other customary
international laws that might derive from the actual state practice between
states, human rights norms involve the actions of different actors and set of
interests, further intertwining state practice and opiniojuris.
It appears that discerning custom for the Israel Court becomes a
comparative exercise of domestic law of states, at the expense of other
international law sources.'
In reality, custom for the Supreme Court
seems to be the third source of international law mentioned in the ICJ
statute,' namely the general principles of international law. General
principles differ from custom in that the former entail an examination of
the national legal systems of states to obtain a common core of fundamental
principles that are necessary in a legal society.' While general principles
can assist to find and interpret a customary principle,' the focus is on
national legal systems in an attempt to discern a fundamental legal norm, a
rather different approach than custom, which is a less obvious source of
law that applies to a broader range of circumstances.'
Recognizing the inclination in Israel towards a realist approach to
custom, finding the proper grounds for the domestic application of a
customary principle that also incorporates recent developments in the
international arena might be difficult. While the substance of a customary
rule might derive from international sources, the authoritative basis for
applying custom in the domestic sphere clearly is derived from a domestic
source of law.'
Hence even when the Court considered international

63. Jonathan Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L 529 (1993).
64. See, e.g., Taha v. Minister of Defence, 45(ii) PD 45 (1991) (where the Israel
Supreme Court referred to the domestic laws of other states to demonstrate that a state may
control the oversight that parents are to maintain over their children).
65. Article 38(1)(c).
66. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A FunctionalApproach to General Principles of International
Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768 (1990); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Research on the General

Principles of Law Recognized by Ovilised Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L 734 (1957); Linda J. Maki,
General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by all Nations: Freedom From Arbitrary
Arrest andDetention, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 272 (1980).
67. Bassiouni, supra note 66.
68. But see Simma & Alston, supra note 1.
69. Harold Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the
United States 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1989).
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sources that might assist to indicate the practice of states, 70 deference was
accorded to the domestic interpretation of customary international law. As
noted by Israel Supreme Court Justice, Professor A. Barak, regarding the
applicability of customary international law: "As long as there is no
development of practical customary international law, there is no escape
from the fact that every state is to apply the accepted measure for this
matter pursuant to the dictates of its domestic laws." 7 ' It is therefore
important to understand why the Israel Supreme Court prefers to accord
custom a particularly elevated status. It is possible that the particular
reasons for upholding the direct application of customary international law
in the domestic sphere might broaden the reference to custom in other
situations that not only consider state practice, but also account for the
international framework and Israel's obligations that derive therefrom.
This functional understanding of custom will assist to elucidate the
normative theory of adjudication adopted by the Court, thereby making it
easier to expand on the importance of relying on a broader set of elements
when determining the substantive basis of custom.
The PrinciplesBehind the Rule
In The Queen of Right in Canada v. Edelson and others,72 the Israel
Supreme Court outlined the underlying rationale for the automatic
application of custom in the domestic law.' The first reason noted was
that Israel mirrors the United Kingdom common law, particularly as a
result of the Israeli Legislature's adoption of the previous Mandate Law.
The result is that Israel law provides for automatic acceptance of customary
law principles without the need for enabling legislation.
While this might be a practical reason for incorporating custom, it
does not provide any particular rationale for the rule. Furthermore, it can
possibly lead to skewered decisions since it might bind the Israel Courts to
interpretations that cannot deviate from the United Kingdom law, even if
there is no contrary law in Israel.74 Nonetheless, one may stress here the
distinction between the substantive basis of custom, that would provide the
outline of the rule, and the authoritative basis of custom, that would serve
as the interpretative guide for binding the domestic courts. Professor
B.

70. Shahin et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria, 41(i)
PD 197 (1987) (right to enter country based on subjective interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions and narrow interpretation of human rights treaties).

71.
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson and others, Takdin-Elyon,
97(2) P.D. 5757-58 (1997) (translation from author) [hereinafter Edelson].
72. Id.
73. Although the Court did not base its reasoning on this point, the Court referred to
customary international law because there was no other source of legislation.
74. Lapidoth, supra note 16 (noting this, reason in discussing Shtampfer v. Attorney
General 10 PD 5 (1956)).
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Dinstein has noted that the basis for incorporating custom can derive from
the approach of the United Kingdom common law, however that does not
bind Israel to the United Kingdom domestic laws since application of the
rules derive from a domestic interpretation of the international sources.7'
Another reason offered by the Supreme Court focused on the notion
that Israel is a mixed jurisdiction.76 Justice Barak for example has stated
that Israeli law is a mixture of civil and common law characteristics that
has made it a unique legal jurisdiction. Legal sources are based on
legislative codes, the central role of the judge and academia, domestic
customs, comparative law, a fine balancing between a systematic and
casuistic approach, and unique procedural aspects such as the integration of
civil and religious law.' Hence, customary international law can serve as
a key source for developing domestic Israel law.7 8
This mixed jurisdiction approach explains the Supreme Court's
tendency towards state practice in other jurisdictions rather then referring
to international developments. The Court understands custom as a source
by which to buttress the existing law rather then treat it as a wholly
separate normative framework. In the decision The Queen of Right in
Canada v. Edelson and others,' the Supreme Court recognized the
customary notion of restrictive immunity for states, yet noted that the norm
is to be applied in a manner that conforms with both international law and
the basic legal values of the Israeli law.
In the context of customary international human rights, custom can
interpret domestic legislation where the law is either unclear or requires
clarification.' Pursuant to this reasoning, customary international human
rights can serve as an important source for domestic interpretation,
something that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to recognize.
An additional, and important, reason for invoking customary
international law in the domestic sphere is that a sovereign state has the
responsibility to uphold its international obligations.' Because custom is a

75.

DINSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE (1971) (in Hebrew).

76. Id; Barak, The Israeli Legal System - Its Tradition and Culture, 40 MISHPATIM
197 (1991) (in Hebrew).
77. Barak, supra note 76.
78. Barak, Human Dignity as a ConstitutionalRight, 41 HAPRAKLIT 271 (1993/94) (in
Hebrew); supra note 49.
79. Takdin-Elyon, supra note 71.
80. Barak, supranote 76.
81. Benvenisti, supra note 49.
82. See supra note 71; see also, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson
and others, Takdin-Elyon, Vol. 97(2) 5757/5758-1997.
See also, Rubin, Adoption .of
International Treaties into Israeli Law by Israeli Courts, 13 MISHPATIM 210 (1983-84) (in
Hebrew) mentions this as a key reason for upholding customary law in the domestic sphere.
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prime source for such responsibility, it is incumbent on the courts to apply
the responsibilities that are derived from customary norms.
While this reasoning is valid given that the state is the principal
international actor, one also must account for current developments in
international law. The notion of state sovereignty has undergone a change
due to the emergence of a variety of international developments such as
environment law and human rights.8 3 Given the role of international
organizations as key bodies for defining the obligations of the state, the
importance of referring to the doctrines emanating from international
This increase is most apparent when
organizations has increased.
attempting to derive the customary obligations of a sovereign state.8'
Further, the Israel Supreme Courts reasoning demonstrates that
sovereignty is only a smaller piece in the larger international puzzle. The
law limits the activity of the state since the sovereign is a creature of the
law and not the master of the law. Sovereignty is not an extra-legal
principle that allows the state to act as it sees fit. Rather, as recognized by
the Supreme Court, sovereignty is a means to an end within the
international normative system, particularly when considering the role of
human rights and its domestic enforcement.
The PracticalApplicability of Custom
The rationale of the Israel Supreme Court for directly incorporating
customary international law into the domestic law is based on the state's
responsibility as a sovereign and the constitution of Israel's legal system as
a mixed jurisdiction, being composed of elements of common and civil law.
One may now consider the practical applicability of custom in the domestic
sphere.
From a sovereign responsibility standpoint, what of the importance of
democratic or majoritarian rule, whereby the legislative branch is to pass
laws?85 Surely a sovereign state has an obligation to be true to the
It seems a
mechanisms created by the internal political framework.
counter-majoritarian notion even to allow for the enforcement of a rule that
the legislative branch did not consider.86 This was the rationale of the
C.

Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law
83.
Daes,
E/CN.4/Sub.21989140 (1989); Martti Koskeniemmi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV INT'L
L. J. 397 (1991) (noting role of international law as facilitating development of human rights
while acknowledging important role of state to implement norms); Kahn, The Extinction of
Nation States, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 197 (1992) (role of state decreased with growth of
international organizations and human rights).
Gunning, supra note 10 (outside parties, such as international organizations and
84.
NGOs, influence states and the manner in which states exercise their sovereignty).
Trimble, supra note 1; Weisburd, supra note 18 (discussing issue from federal/state
85.
dichotomy, whereby applying custom can upset the federal balance).
86.
Or even by the Executive branch, upon considering the rule that a new state is bound
by the previously developed standards of custom. For example, this automatic application of
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minority opinion in the Shtampfer decision,87 where Israel Supreme Court
Justice Goitein noted that only the legislature may create internal legislative
changes. Additional domestic policy issues, such as disruption of a state's
foreign policy due to enforcement of an international custom, forcing the
court to decide a political question, or the importance of national security88
are also factors that a state can raise when considering the enforcement of
custom in the domestic sphere.
Some commentators have addressed the counter-majoritarian problem
by noting that domestic courts serve as the best forum within which to
confront issues of applicability. 89
Courts attempt to adhere to
predetermined principles, be it a domestic or international source, without
any involvement in the underlying political debate.' Even regarding
domestic issues, courts must address cases that are not based on a
particular law such that a court must make recourse to their own
presumptive powers.
Additionally, one can interpret the application of a customary norm
within the domestic sphere as a means of completing the obligation created
by custom. An inherent problem with custom is that the subjective element
of opinio juris implies that an obligation already existed, thereby rendering
the customary obligation redundant. 91 However the obligation created by a

custom poses a problem for the People's Republic of China since they desire to rely on their own
sovereign actions. ZHAOJIE, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS IN CHINA; supra

note 36, at 329.
87. Shtampfer v. Attorney General, 10 PD 5 (1956);
See also, Justice Shamgars
reasoning in Afu et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank et al., 42(ii) PD 169
(1988).
88.

These issues have been noted by Professor Eyal Benvenisti

in THE ATTITUDE OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF HUMAN RIGHTS; supra note 36, at 207.
89.
This is the practice for example in Germany where the Constitutional Court interprets
what is custom.

90.

Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100

YALE L. J. 2277 (1991); FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL ANSWERS:

DOES THE

RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)
91.
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1974-75); CHENG, CUSTOM: THE FUTURE OF GENERAL STATE PRACTICE INA DIVIDED WORLD
513 (Macdonald & Johston eds., 1983), which addresses this conflict by noting how legal norms
are abstract rules that are intended to predict behavior by exerting a psychological pressure on a

state's future behaviour. Walden, The Subjective Elements in the Formation of Customary
InternationalLaw, 12 ISR. L. R. 344 (1977) notes that custom creates a normative standard
resulting from internal attitude of states towards a rule.
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customary norm can become an obligation deriving from custom once
enforcement of the norm occurs within the domestic sphere.'
In considering the role of custom in Israel, it is possible that deriving
the obligation from a domestic enforcement of the norm can have particular
relevance for international human rights obligations, where international
commentators tend to rely on opinio juris as a primary source of custom."u
Recognizing the appropriateness of a particular pattern of behavior, the
opinio juris crystallizes a variety of state perceptions towards a particular
norm. The norm inclines a state to alter its practice according to the norm,
particularly as states make an empirical judgement to acquiesce and
subscribe to the rule.' The combination of opinio juris and state practice
as binding the state in a normative sense, rather then merely reflecting or
declaring a desired standard, 9' can occur by way of the domestic legal
grounding of the norm' that will serve to solidify the norm.
Similarly, international human rights treaties can serve to embody the
elements of custom and provide a court with a reference to principles of
law by declaring a previously created customary rule, crystallizing an
emerging rule, or generating a new rule of custom. 97 As treaties enunciate

norms in a clear fashion, the emergence of a customary norm is easier to
detect, particularly as the customary norm develops over a time. 9 For
example, one can refer to a multilateral 'treaty as a source of emerging

customary law where the underlying goal of the treaty is to create a
universal consensus among the signatory nations. While the obligation to
92. Walden, supra note 91, alludes to this approach by distinguishing a claim that a rule
is binding from the eventual legal application of the rule in accordance with the proposed custom.
See also, Maluwa, Custom Authority and Law: Some JurisprudentialPerspectives on the Theory of
Customary InternationalLaw, 6 AFRICAN J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387 (1994) for an explanation of
Finnis' approach to this conundrum.
93. Indeed Cheng, supra note 91, focuses almost exclusively on opiniojunis, noting that
state practice will be altered in accordance with a state's acceptance of an obligation.
94. See Maluwa, supra note 92, at 402 (noting the importance of authoritative rules as
exclusionary reasons for action, particularly where the state acts in the absence of any clear or
understood reason).
95. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 2.
96. Walden, supra note 91, approaches custom as both a primary and a secondary norm
that raises the level of obligation to a greater status than mere declaration and action.
97. Schachter Entangled Treaty and Custom in International Law at a Time of Perplexity
(Dinstein & Tabory eds., 1989) (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Case FRG v. Denmark; FRC
v. Netherlands) ICJ Rep. (1969); Condorelli, CUSTOM ININTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS (Bedjzoui ed., 1991). Baxter, Treaties and Custom, I RECUEIL DES COURS
25 (1970).
98. Meron, The Geneva Convention as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987)
(citing Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. US) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14 regarding Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, where the ICJ
inferred it was custom yet travaux and prior usage were not so clear).
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abide by the treaty derives from specific treaty rules, 99 the treaty may also
indicate an emerging opinio juris of a state and influence subsequent state
practice. Further, if a treaty creates a one-sided obligation on the state,

such as a human rights treaty, the relevance of the opiniojuris in forming
the treaty will be quite significant in demonstrating the customary status of

a rule. State practice serves a secondary role since the practice required by
the treaty is, in itself, an obligation to alter one's practice.

The binding

nature of custom emerges as a state's intent becomes entrenched and a
state's actions become influenced by the treaty.
Reflecting this approach are commentators who treat the two principal
elements of custom as being in an inverse relationship to one another.
Developing the grounds for demonstrating opiniojurisheightens the role of
opinio juris as a key element of customary law and proportionally lessens

the necessity to turn to state practice. " This inverse relationship between

the sources of custom, which the ICJ seems to support,'0 ° is significant for

instances where subsequent state practice contrary to an emerging
customary rule does not create strong enough grounds to form a new
customary norm upon considering the previous opiniojuris. " Such is the
case with states recognizing norms as essential and basic to their survival
or because states maintain deeply held and widely shared convictions,
despite the possibility of contrary state practice subsequent to the
development of the norm.° 3 The utility in referring to treaties assists to

demonstrate the emerging opinio juris in a clearer fashion than would a
focus on state practice, particularly when addressing human rights norms.
The relationship between treaties and custom, whereby treaties assist

to shape the emerging opiniojuris of a state as well as influence subsequent
99. As a state signs and ratifies a treaty, the state is subject to the variety of obligations
and requirements of the treaty, notably the pacta sunt servanda rule that binds the state to act in
good faith to uphold even a non incorporated treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
100. Schachter, supra note 97; Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146
(1987) (sliding scale based on particular norm at issue).
101. Schachter, supra note 97 (referring to the Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), 1949
I.C.J REP. 4, and the case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 ICJ REP. 14). See also, Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons 1996 I.C.J Rep.
102. One of the problems with interpreting the central elements of custom in an inverse
manner is that state practice can be unduly limited, thereby weakening the normative ground of
custom. Weisburd, supra note 18. Some commentators refer to other international sources as a
basis for developing human rights, such as the general principles of nations, Simma & Alston,
supra note 1, or attempt to devise a new form of source of law, such as declarative international
law. Bodansky, supra note 2; Chodosh, Neither Treaty not Custom: The Emergence of
DeclarativeInternationalLaw, 26 TEx. INT'L L. J. 87 (1991).
103. Schachter, supra note 97 (referring to prohibition against torture, large scale racial
discrimination, genocide or killing prisoners of war. Schachter notes that rules are relative to their
importance when considering their method of creation).
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state practice, is particularly important upon considering the manner in
which the Israel Supreme Court focuses on the state practice element of
customary international law. The statements made by states during the
drafting of a treaty that reflect an opinio juris can have greater significance
towards the emergence of a customary law than would subsequent state
practice. Indeed, some commentators assert that what is important in the
creation of a customary law, particularly when considered alongside a
treaty, are the statements made by the state during the drafting or
subsequent statements upon ratification. °4 The statements indicate the
intent by the states to create a binding obligation.
Nevertheless, one should be careful to avoid adopting what Professor
Koskeniemmi has termed a utopian approach when referring to the lex
feranda derived from a treaty negotiation.° 5 The inclination is to infer a
customary rule from state expressions in international forums, even without
the required state perception of the rule as legally obligatory.
Furthermore, a treaty rule operates in a similar manner to a customary rule
since the interpretative process is a subjective exercise that is affected by
the surrounding circumstances.106
One can remove customary law from this purely naturalist framework
by examining the underlying sources of opinio juris in a realist manner.
That would not only include consideration of the practice of states, but also
the manner by which a state incorporates the norms, as indicated by a
treaty ratification or by a states denial of any normative breach of the
relevant rule. A customary rule does not create a conclusive means of
domestic application and interpretation of the relevant rule upon
considering the surrounding factors that have contributed to its creation.'°7
At the same time, one should avoid an apologist approach' that
reduces custom to a mere tacit agreement among states or equates it with a
general principle of international law. The tendency can be to defer to the
wishes of powerful states at the expense of any actual development of a
customary rule from the overall will of the states. One can avoid this
approach by considering the relevant international materials that serve as
the substantive source, or grundnorm, for a customary law despite
differing state practice. Where indications exist that states desire to
establish a universal or broad rule, such as the ratification of a multilateral

104. Baxter, supra note 97; Akehurst, Custom as a Source of Intenational Law, 47 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 1 (1974-75); Cunningham, supra note 44.
105.

MARTrI KOSKENIEMMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).

106. Chin Lim & Olufemi Elias The Role of Treaties in the Contemporary International
Legal Order, 66 NoRDic J. INT'L L. 1 (1997), referring to Louis HENKIN,
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 73 (2nd ed. 1979).

107. Id.
108. Koskeniemmi, supra note 105.
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° the subsequent conformance
treaty,' O
of state practice to the rule will be
undertaken by states by way of different routes.
Regarding the mixed jurisdiction reasoning of the Israel Supreme
Court, the role of custom under this rationale would involve addressing
lacunae in the domestic law. Because domestic law can deviate from a
customary norm, reference to international standards can serve as a means
to an end in clarifying particular domestic laws. A court should not
approach custom as a supra-national legislative source of law but as
working in tandem with the domestic law, with a view towards
ameliorating the international and domestic standards." 0 This approach
was noted by the Supreme Court in The Queen of Right in Canada v.
Edelson and others"' where the Court combined international and domestic
principles to interpret the scope of restrictive immunity to be accorded to a
state.

III. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned discussion regarding the reasons for upholding
custom in Israeli domestic law indicates that the substantive basis of custom
can allow for reference to norms deriving from international sources. The
fact that the Israel Supreme Court has hesitated to apply customary norms
due to its preference for strict state practice does not mean that customary
international law is wholly inapplicable in the domestic law. Israel's
jurisprudence can benefit from a broader reliance on customary
international norms, particularly where the domestic legislation requires
further interpretation. The Israel Supreme Court would do well to consider
international developments that in a broader, and even more realist, sense
indicate the actual practice of states.
Israel's ratification of the principal human rights treaties demonstrates
the emergence of an acknowledgement by the state of its human rights
obligations. International developments in the human rights context are
beginning to play a role within the domestic jurisprudence of Israel,
indicating the necessity for a broader approach to its obligations arising
from customary international law. It therefore is imperative to consider
situations where reference to customary international human rights law
might assist these domestic developments.
109. For example, a state not to reserve on a provision within a multilateral human rights
treaty that allow for a reservation demonstrates a state's intentions towards that provision as
reflecting a customary rule. What is more important, one can interpret the other articles that do
not provide for a reservation as reflecting custom, if associated with other customary provisions
and if the travaux preparatoires to the treaty indicate the emergence of a customary norm. See,
e.g., Baxter, supra note 97.
110. This demonstrates how custom and general principles differ in that determining the
latter would require one to stand on the outside and look into the domestic sphere.
111. Edelson, supra note 71, 97(2) 5757/5758-1997.
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I. INTRODUCTION: CONFUSION OF CRIMINALITY WITH JURISDICTION

It is important not to confuse criminality with jurisdiction.'

The term

criminality is usually associated with the legislative authority to proscribe

conduct. The term jurisdiction is usually associated with the judicial
authority to subject a person or thing to the processes of a court.2 The
*
The author is a graduate of St. Peter's College, School of Management Studies,
Oxford University (M.B.A.) and of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (J.D.).
He has been a member of the American Society of International Law since 1992.
1.
Theodor Meron, InternationalCrminalizationof Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 561 (1995). Unless otherwise noted, I use the word jurisdiction to refer to adjudicatory
jurisdiction. See infra note 98.
2.
The confusion of criminality with jurisdiction is more common than one would
suppose. The most recent example in which this confusion surfaces is the argument that because
murder, rape, and other war crimes are also crimes under national law, defendants must have
known of the illegality of their alleged actions and thus, an international Tribunal may try
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legislative authority to proscribe certain acts by law is not necessarily
coupled with the judicial authority to try to punish violators of the law.

The question of the criminality of the atrocities that occurred in the former
Yugoslavia is distinguishable from the question of which courts have
jurisdiction to try those accused of these offenses.3 The recent creation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia (Tribunal) raises both these questions.
To date, most scholarly debate has focused on the former question,
i.e. which international laws govern the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia. The latter question has received far less comment. 4 The

question of which courts have jurisdiction to try those accused of violations
of international humanitarian law is the topic of this paper.
Part II
addresses the legitimacy of the creation of the Tribunal. Part III discusses
the legal limits of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Part IV examines the

Tribunal's ability to question its own jurisdiction.
conclusions from the reasoning of the prior sections.

Part V draws some

II. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNAL
A.

Composition of the Tribunal

International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia consists of three main organs: the Prosecutor, the Chambers

defendants on this basis. See IT. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dugko Tadid
(Appeals Chamber), para. 135 (Sep. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Appeals Chamber].
Presumably, these scholars are addressing the argument of nullum crimen sine lege,
nulla poena sine lege (no crime without law, no punishment without law). Indeed, international
law prohibits prosecution for crimes, which were not yet law at the time of their commission.
However, these scholars are confusing the defendant's knowledge of the criminality of his actions
with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for
Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639,
647 (1993).
Knowledge of the criminality of one's actions does not confer jurisdiction to all
tribunals in which such actions are deemed illegal. Jurisdiction requires some greater connection
between the illicit action and the tribunal sitting in judgment of the accused. For example,
assuming the auto theft laws of Germany closely resemble those of California, a German court
would not have jurisdiction to try a person accused of stealing an automobile in California,
without some greater connection between the theft or the automobile and Germany.
3.
Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 561 (1995).
4.
George H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 64-5 (1996) (reprinting without commentary the decision
of the Tribunal).
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and the Registry. 5 A major distinction between the current Tribunal and
previous war crimes tribunals is the lack of Office of Defense as an organ
of the Tribunal. 6 Although the Statute of the Tribunal contains a provision
for the appointment of defense counsel,7 the Statute does not create an
institutional mechanism to provide for the appointment or support of the
defense counsel.
The Special Task Force of the ABA Section of
International Law and Practice criticized this failing. 8
The role of the Prosecutor is to fulfill the purpose of the Tribunal: the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed since 1991 in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. 9 The Prosecutor is responsible for the gathering of evidence,
the investigation into criminal cases and the preparation of indictments.' °
The Prosecutor bears the burden of proof in all proceedings."
The
Prosecutor must act independently and may not seek nor receive
12
instructions from any government or from any other source.
Eleven judges comprise the Court.' 3 No two judges may be nationals
from the same state. Each judge serves a term of four years and may be

5.
Statute of the Tribunal, arts. 11(a)-il(c) reprinted in United Nations: SecretaryGeneral's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1190 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the
Tribunal]. There is also a bureau, which handles administrative matters.
6.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO

ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED INTHE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 20 (1993) (noting that "all

defendants before the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal were entitled both to appointed defense
counsel provided without charge and to hired defense counsel of their own choosing").
7.
Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 21(4)(d).
8.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 19-21.
9.
Statute of the Tribunal, art. 16(1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/ Rev. 5
(June 15, 1995) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence], incorporating the Statute of the
Tribunal, art. 1.
10. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at arts. 16(1), 18(1-2).
11.
Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 21(3). According to this article, the
Tribunal, through the Office of the Prosecutor, bears the burden of proof on this issue of
jurisdiction.
12. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 16(2). It is unclear how this article
would operate if under the forthcoming Paris peace conference, certain indicted defendants were
to receive immunity from prosecution.
13. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 26. The following lists the judges of the
Tribunal and their nationalities.
The Appeals Chamber consists of: Antonio Cassese, (Italy) (Presiding Judge); Sir
Ninian Stephen, (Australia); Li Hao Pei, (China); Jules Deschenes, (Canada); George Abi-Saab,
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eligible for re-election.' 4 The judges are responsible for adopting rules of
procedure and evidence for the Tribunal.' 5 The Chambers are composed of
two Trial Chambers (with three judges each) and one Appeals Chamber
(with five judges). 16 The Trial Chambers serve as the first level courts of

the Tribunal.
The Appeals Chamber handles both interlocutory and final appeals.
Both types of appeals are limited to two grounds: an error or question of
law invalidating a decision of the Trial Chamber or an error of fact, which
has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 17 The Appeals Chamber may hear
an interlocutory appeal of a Trial Chamber's decision on preliminary
motions only in the case of a dismissal of an objection based on lack of
All other preliminary motions are immune from
jurisdiction.' 8
interlocutory appeal.' 9 Both the accused and the Prosecutor may appeal
Levie,
final judgments of the Trial Chamber. 20 As pointed out by Howard
2'
acquittal!
an
appeal
may
Prosecutor
the
that
suggests
this language
(Egypt) resigned to resume academic activities and was replaced by Found Abdel-Moneim Riad,
(Egypt) on Oct. 3, 1995.
The first Trial Chamber consists of: Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, (U.S.A.) (Presiding
Judge); Rustam S. Sidhwa, (Pakistan); Lal Chand Vohrah, (Malaysia).
The second Trial Chamber consists of: Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte, (Nigeria)
(Presiding Judge); Germain Le Foyer de Costil (France); Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica)
(Vice-President of the Tribunal). See Sec/C./Res. 857 (1993). See also Judge Antonio Cassese of
Italy Elected President of International TribwWl for Crimes in Former Yugoslavia, 12/02/1993
Federal News Service; Monday Highlights, 10/03/1993 Federal News Service.
14. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 13(4).
15. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 15.
16. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 11-12.
17. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 25(1).
18. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(B); Appeals Chamber, infra note 34, at
para. 6.
19. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(B); Appeals Chamber, infra note 34, at
para. 6.
20. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 25(1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 108(A).
21.
Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: A Comparisonwith the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 1, 26 (1995). See also Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1997)(discussing the infringement of a defendant's
rights by double jeopardy). Indeed the Prosecutor has appealed the first judgment of the
Tribunal, Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT. Doc. IT-94-1-T. The defendant was convicted on eleven
counts and acquitted on twenty counts of his indictment. Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT. Doc. IT-94-1-T,
Tadi6 Judgment (May 7, 1997); Press Release, Tadid Case: The Verdict, UN Doc. CC/PIO/190E (May 7, 1997). Tadid has been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his offenses.
Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT. Doc. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 14, 1997). Despite this
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The Registry assists the Chambers and the Prosecutor in the

performance of their functions. 22

The Registry is responsible for the

administration and servicing of the Tribunal,2 3 including serving as the

channel of communication

for the Tribunal,

disseminating public

information, preparing the minutes of meetings and printing all Tribunal

documents. 24
The appointments of the Tribunal organs and staff were made by the
Security Council, agents of the Security Council, or by the SecretaryGeneral. The General Assembly had a very limited role in the formation of
the Tribunal and in the selection of the Tribunal's officers and staff.25 The
Secretary-General invited nomination of judges from the General
Assembly, and then advised the Security Council to establish from these

nominations a list of candidates "taking due account of the adequate
representation of the principal legal system of the world."26 Although this
conviction, the Prosecutor has appealed the Tribunal's judgment on the twenty acquittals. Press
Release, Tadi6 Case: Defense Counsel Appeals Against Sentencing Judgment of 14 July 1997,
U.N. Doc. CC/PIO/235-E (August 9, 1997); Notice of the appeal was filed two months earlier on
June 9, 1997: Press Release, Tadii Case: ProsecutorFiles Notice of Appeal Against Judgement,
U.N. Doc. CC/PIO/210-E (June 9, 1997).
22. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 33.
23. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 17(a); Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 33.
24. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 23, 1993) [hereinafter Report of
the Secretary-General] reprinted in United Nations: Secretary-General'sReport on Aspects of
Establishing an International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993), para. 90 (explaining Statute of the Tribunal, art. 16).
25. The Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, was appointed by the Security Council on the
nomination by the Secretary General. The staff of the Prosecutors, the Registrar, the staff of the
Registry were appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Statute of the Tribunal,
arts. 16(4), 16(5), 17(3), and 17(4).
26. Report of the Secretary-General, para. 75; Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at
art. 13(2)(c). On August 20, 1995, the Security Council reduced the 41 judges nominated by
United Nations members (including the Vatican and Switzerland) to 23 candidates for the 11
tribunal judgeships. The list of judicial candidates consisted of: Georges Abi-Saab, (Egypt);
Julio Barberis (Argentina); Raphael Barras (Switzerland); Sikhe Camara (Guinea); Antonio
Cassese (Italy); Hans Corell (Sweden); Jules Deschenes (Canada); Alfonso de los Heros (Peru);
Jerzy Jasinski (Poland); Heike Jung (Germany); Adolphus Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria); Valentin
Kisilev (Russia); Germain Le Foyer de Costil (France); Li Hao Pei (China); Gabrielle McDonald
(United States of America); Amadou N'Diaye (Mali); Daniel Nsereko (Uganda); Elizabeth Odio
Benito (Costa Rica); Huseyin Pazarci (Turkey); Moragodage Pinto (Sri Lanka); Rustam Sidhwa
(Pakistan); Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia); and Lal Chan Vohrah (Malaysia).
23 Candidates
Named for Balkan War Crimes Tribunal, Agence France Presse (August 20, 1993).
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language seems inclusive on its face, to my knowledge
all principal legal
27
systems of the world are Western-based legal systems.

B.

Creation of the Tribunal by the Security Council ratherthan by Treaty
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council of the United Nations created

the International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia. 28 Some States and scholars recommended that the Tribunal be

created by treaty, utilizing the more representative and democratic forum of
the General Assembly, rather than by the Security Council as a subsidiary
organ. 29 The advantages of establishing the Tribunal by treaty would have

been:

(1) the participation of all United Nation member states in the

establishment of the Tribunal would endow it with greater legitimacy; (2)
signatory states to a treaty establishing the tribunal could not later dispute
the legitimacy of the establishment of the Tribunal, and (3) the participation
by such a generality of states, considering themselves legally bound to such
a treaty, would provide evidence of the consensus required to create
international customary
law, which eventually would bind even non30
signatory states.
27. Sharf, supra note 21, at 311 n.28 (commenting that only four of the eleven judges
come from countries with predominantly Muslim populations and that none of the judges are
Muslim).
28. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR., 3217th mtg. (May 25, 1993). Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., para. 1 (February 22, 1993) called for the imminent
establishment of the Tribunal, although it indicated neither how such a tribunal would be
established nor on what legal basis.
29. Among the States opposed to the Security Council formation of the Tribunal were:
1. China (remarks of the Chinese representative during the Security Council
deliberations on Security Council Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 33 (1993)),
2. Brazil (remarks of the Brazilian representative during the Security Council
deliberations on Security Council Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 36-37 (1993)),
3. Mexico (Views of the Government of Mexico Supplied Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25417 (1993)),
4. Russia (Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to
the Secretary-General (Apr. 5, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25537, at 15 (1993), and
5. Yugoslavia (Letter from the charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General (May 19, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25801, at 3 (1993)).
30. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary
international law "as a general practice accepted as law." Compare this definition to that of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102(2)
(1987): customary international law "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation."
These two definitions contains two elements: (1) acceptance by a generality of states,
and (2) acceptance by the generality of states out of a sense of legal obligation. See Hiram E.
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According to the Secretary General, two reasons supported the use of

the Security Council rather than the General Assembly as the proper United
Nations' organ to establish the Tribunal. First, the Secretary-General
feared that if the Tribunal were created by treaty, even after months of
negotiation and concessions, some member nations would not have voted
for its ratification.3 1 "[T]here could be no guarantee that ratifications will
be received from those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to

be truly effective.

32

Some scholars suggested and the Secretary-General hoped that the
General Assembly would give its consent to the Tribunal by approving both
the Tribunal's budget and nominating its judges.33 Indeed, the General
Assembly endorsed the establishment of the International Tribunal: by
nominating its Judges, by approving the Tribunal's budget, and by passing
resolutions in support of the Tribunal.34 However, such consent dose not
permit States to voice their objections to: the structure of the Tribunal
(e.g., the lack of an Office of Defense), the scope of its jurisdiction, the
language of the Statute, its criminal procedure and evidence rules or the
Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: the Emergence of Declarative InternationalLaw 26 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 87, 89 (1991).

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), I.C.J. 4 (June 27), established
the proposition that treaties could be a source of customary international law. Accordingly, if the
General Assembly were to establish the Tribunal by treaty and a generality of states explicitly
consented to its establishment, the Tribunal would also be binding on non-signatory states as
binding customary international law. See contra J.Y. Sanders, Jurisdiction,Definition of Crimes
and Triggering Mechanisms, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 233 n. 10 (1997) (quoting GRIGORY
TUNKIN,

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 122-33 (1974) (international law is based on

consent)).
31. Report of the Secretary General, at para. 19.
32. Report of the Secretary General, at para. 20. One wonders if the Secretary-General,
in reference to those states meant the states or parties currently disputing the land in the former
Yugoslavia or prominent and outspoken members of the United Nations (e.g., China, Russia or
the United States). See J.Y. Sanders, supra note 30, at n. 4.
See also Terry Atlas, Atrocity Docket UN Has Done Little to Prosecute Villains in
Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1994:
The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, is the most forceful
advocate of the tribunal in the face of something less than unqualified
international enthusiasm. . . [T]he British and French, in particular, have been
cool toward pursuing war crime indictment of Bosnian Serb leaders that might
complicate peace talks.
33. James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 643 (1993). U.N. Doc.
S/25704 at 21, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1168. The Tribunal's Appeals Chamber also mentioned this
argument in defense of its jurisdiction.
34. Appeals Chamber, 32 I.L.M. 1993, para. 44.
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Tribunal's sanction powers.
Accordingly, the manner in which the
Tribunal was established greatly diminishes the precedential value of this
Tribunal as a representative consensus on the necessity and function of an
international criminal court.
The second reason that the Security Council was used to create the
Tribunal was the issue of time.35 The Tribunal was created in less than
seven months. The rules of criminal procedure were drafted in less than
four months. 36 Gathering the unanimous support of the General Assembly
undeniably would have taken far longer than achieving a consensus among
the limited number of States serving in the Security Council.37 The speed
of the Tribunal's creation is reflected in the imprecise drafting of its
Statute. For example, Article 1 states the Competence of the Tribunal:
"The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in
accordance with the provision of the present Statute." One scholar
explained that Article 1 should have stated that the International Tribunal
had the power "to try persons allegedly responsible for" or "accused of'
serious violations rather than to "prosecute persons responsible" for them.38
Prosecution is the function of the Prosecutor, not of the
Tribunal; and persons are) not responsible until that has
been determined by trial and conviction. Moreover, it was
obviously not intended that the serious violations of
international humanitarian law were to have been
committed in accordance with the provisions of the present
39

Statute.

Such hastily constructed phrasing does not strengthen the legitimacy
of this worthy endeavor.

35.

Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunalfor

the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR., U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 20

(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report].
36.

William W. Home, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAWYER, Sept., 1995, at 5.

37.

Secretary General's Report, supra note 35.
Levie, supra note 21. at 7 n.28.
Id.

38.
39.
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C.

Was the Tribunal Established by Law?
The question of how the Tribunal was established is quite important
when read in light of one of the most important humanitarian treaties to
date, the International Convention on the Protection of Civil and Political
Rights. Article 14(1) of this treaty provides that the accused is entitled to
the right to be tried by a tribunal establishedby law. 4° Accordingly, if the
Tribunal was established by powers beyond the authority of the Security
Council (or beyond those currently belonging the United Nations), it would
be disqualified from conforming with Article 14(1).
This objection was raised by the defense counsel for Du~ko Tadi641
(Defense), the first defendant to be tried by the Tribunal. The Trial
Chamber dismissed the defense's objection to jurisdiction questioning the
validity of the Tribunal's creation rather than as questioning the Tribunal's
jurisdiction.42 The Defense then appealed to the Appeals Chamber, under
Rule 72(B), which allows interlocutory appeals in the case of dismissal of
an objection based on lack of jurisdiction.4 3 The Appeals Chamber took the
appeal. 44
The Appeals Chamber avoided the issue of whether the Tribunal was
in conformity with Article 14(1) by stating that Article 14(1) of the
International Convention on the Protection of Civil and Political Rights
applied only to national courts. "This Chamber is, however, satisfied that
the principle that a tribunal must be established by law, as explained below,
is a general principle of law imposing an international obligation which
only applies to the administration of criminal justice in a municipal
setting."45 According to the Appeals Chamber, the rights of the accused
are different under international law than under national law. Moreover, at
least in this case, the Appeals Chamber is implying that the human rights
accorded individuals are less protected under international law than under
national law!
This construction of the nature of rights is greatly troubling. The
Appeals Chamber's decision requires that rights stem from beneficent
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (concluded
Dec. 9, 1966), art. 14(1).
41. The thirty-nine year old Du~ko Tadid is a former cafe owner, karate instructor, and
policeman in the town of Kozarac, Bosnia. He is married and has two children. W. H. and
Hillary Kessler, Tadi Trial Primer, AM. LAWYER, Sept., 1995, at 59.
42. Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadid in the Trial Chamber, para. 4.
(Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Trial Chamber].
43. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(B).
44. Appeals Chamber, supra note 34, at para. 6.
45. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 42.
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grants of legislative and juridical authorities, rather than stemming from a
person's entitlement as a human being. This dangerous precedent calls into
question the nature of protection afforded by all international humanitarian

conventions and treaties.4
For this reason, the Appeals Chamber's
decision warrants a more thorough investigation.
The parties before the Appeals Chamber submitted three potential

interpretations of the phrase established by law. The first interpretation
sounds akin to the Appeals Chamber's conclusion above that rights are
created by law, presumably by a legislative body. The Defense argued that
the legal establishment of a law requires the efforts of a legislature. Under
this interpretation, both executive and judicial acts are not considered law
[Elstablished by law could mean established by a
legislature. [The Defense] claims that the International

Tribunal is the product of a mere executive order and not of
a decision making process under democratic control,
necessary to create a judicial organization in a democratic
society.
Therefore the [Defense] maintains that the

International Tribunal [has] not been establishedby law.47
The European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by both the
European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights, reaches the same conclusion: established by law requires the efforts
of a legislature.48

46. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 GAOR, Resolutions
(A/810), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948): "[Tlhe inherent dignity and... the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world.. . ."; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966): "[R]ights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.";
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19,
1966): "[R]ights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."; American Convention
on Human Rights, Preamble, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (adopted Nov. 22, 1969): "Recognizing that the
essential rights of man are not drive from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based
upon attributes of the human personality...."
47. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 43.
48. id. para. 43:
The case law applying the word establishedby law ... bears out the view that
the relevant provision is intended to ensure that tribunals in a democratic society
must not depend on the discretion of the executive; rather they should be
regulated by law emanating from Parliament. (See Zand v. Australia, App. No.
7360/76, 15 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70, 80 (1979); Piersak v.
Belgium, App. No. 8692/79, 476 Eur. H.R. (ser. B) at 12 (1981); Crociani,
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Such a construction, however, undercuts the possibility that law can be
created in a common law fashion. 49 According to this line of thought,
customary law, including customary international law, would cease to be
law. The crimes that the accused war criminals are being tried for, crimes,
which are considered by most scholars as part of customary international
law,50 would cease to be international crimes. Obviously, the Appeals
Chamber did not desire to bring about this counterproductive result.
Because of this danger, the Appeals Chamber refused to interpret the
phrase established by law in this manner. The Appeals Chamber concluded
that because no international legislature exists, which is formally
empowered to enact law binding on international legal subjects, this
interpretation of established by law is not applicable to the international
sphere.5 ' Of course this interpretation begs the question: if no legislative
body can enact binding international law, how could the Security Council
create a Tribunal whose jurisdiction is binding on individual defendants.
A second possible interpretation of established by law refers to the
"establishment of international courts by a body . . . [that] has a limited
power to take [sic] binding decisions." 52 This cryptic phrasing suggests a
court is legally established, if enacted by a political body (such as the
Security Council) that is endowed with the authority to make legally
binding decisions on other branches of an organization.
This second interpretation differs from the first in its not requiring the
actions of a legislature to enact law. Taking a domestic example, the
decisions of the United States' Supreme Court are binding on the coordinate
branches of the United States government; thus these decisions are
considered legally established, even though they are "enacted" without a
legislature.
The Defense argued that because the Security Council decisions are
not necessarily binding on other coordinate branches of the United Nations,
its decisions (such as the establishment of the Tribunal) are not established
by law. 3 The Appeals Chamber responded that the Tribunal should be
considered established by law if the Security Council acted according to its
Palmiotti, Tanassi and D'Ovidio v. Italy, App. Nos. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79
& 8729/79 (joined) 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 147, 219 (1981)).
49. By common law fashion, I mean law that is built upon principles of justice and
fairness found in precedential cases, rather than the law that is created by legislative enactment of
statutory law.
50. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 98-127.
51. Id.at43.
52. Id.at44.
53. Id.
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powers under the United Nations Charter.54 Thus, if the Security Council
were empowered under the United Nations Charter to make binding
decisions on either the Secretary-General or the General Assembly on

issues falling within its enumerated powers, its creation of the Tribunal
would be, under this second interpretation, "established by law."
Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is empowered
to make legally binding decisions on other organs of the United Nations.55
However, its enumerated powers do not include jurisdiction over

individuals, 6 nor can it create subsidiary organs with broader jurisdiction
that it itself possesses. The Appeals Chamber correctly noted that Security
Council is empowered conditionally to take action when a threat to the
peace is involved.57 However, the scope of the Security Council's authority

to act is the issue at hand, not whether the Security Council can act at all.
The Defense did not question the Security Council's ability to intervene in
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, rather, it maintained that the
Security Council's institution of a criminal tribunal was beyond the scope of

its constitutional powers.
The third possible interpretation of the phrase established by law is
that the establishment of the Tribunal "must be in accordance with the rule
of law." 58 This interpretation refers to the standards and procedural
safeguard common to all legal systems. 5 9 Among these standards are:
"fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity with
internationally recognized human rights instruments. "60

54. Id.:
It does not follow from the fact that the United Nations has no legislature that the Security
Council is not empowered to set up this International Tribunal if it is acting pursuant to an
authority found within its constitution, the United Nations Charter.
55. United Nations Charter, art. 25. Of course, if the establishment of the Tribunal were
binding on other branches, theoretically the General Assembly would have been bound to approve
the Tribunal's funding and thus this would detract from the earlier argument that the General
Assembly's voluntary support was evidence of the consent of its members.
56. The interests of individuals, especially those belonging to minority groups, are not
always well represented by the General Assembly, which is composed of appointed
representatives of nation states rather than elected officials.
57. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 29. See also id. para. 44:
"[W]e are of the view that the Security Council was endowed with the power to
create this International Tribunal as a measure under Chapter VII [Article 41] in the
light of its determination that there exists a threat to the peace."
58. Appeals Chamber, supra note 34, at para. 45.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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In addition to finding that the Tribunal satisfied the second
interpretation of established by law, the Appeals Chamber found that the
Tribunal's establishment satisfied this third interpretation. 6' The Security
Council followed the appropriate procedures of the United Nations Charter
in establishing the Tribunal.62 While the third interpretation is obviously
necessary to establishing a legitimate Tribunal, this interpretation does not
bear on the issue of whether the creation of the Tribunal was ultra vires.6 3
The internal procedures of the Tribunal are of secondary importance
compared to whether the existence of the Tribunal is legitimately supported
by international law.
Because the creation of the Tribunal expands the jurisdiction of
international organizations to try and punish individuals, such an expansion
of powers potentially represents a dramatic change in current international
law. 64 That is, even if the Security Council can create a Tribunal, it cannot
enact new international law. Thus, the Tribunal was not legitimately
established by existing international law and is most likely an ultra vires
application of the Security Council's authority. Moreover, the precedent
setting judgments of the Tribunal, which can be said to be creating new
international humanitarian law, is an exercise of jurisdiction beyond the
power of the organ which created the Tribunal, the Security Council.6 5
In summary, Article 14(1) calls for any legitimate international court
to be established by law. The Tribunal was not established by law in the
sense of having been created by a legislative body. As for the second

61. But see Scharf, supra note 21 (criticizing the Tribunal's procedure for allowing
.double jeopardy, rotation between the trial level and appellate level, limiting the defendant's
ability to cross-examine witnesses, and the partial involvement of the Security Council).
62. Appeals Chamber, supra note 34, at para. 47:
"[Tihe Appeals Chamber finds that the International Tribunal has been
established in accordance with the appropriate procedures under the United
Nations Charter and provides all the necessary safeguards of a fair trial. It
is thus 'established by law'."
63. Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber glossed over this distinction, citing
the fact that a proposed amendment to change the wording of Article 14 to pre-establishedby law
was successfully defeated. Trial Chamber, para. 34; Appeals Chamber, para. 45.
Yet the Defense's concern is not whether or not the Tribunal were pre-established by
law, but rather whether it was created within the legitimate, (if not specifically enumerated),
powers of the Security Council.
64. See R.J. Goldstone, Submissions by the Prosecutor, an Application for Deferral by
the FederalRepublic of Germany in the Matter of Dusko Tadi Also Known by the Names Dusan
'Dule' Tadi at para. 3 (noting that the Tribunal is the first attempt by the United Nations to
enforce international humanitarian law).
65. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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interpretation, although the Tribunal was established by an organ with
binding authority over other branches of the United Nations, the Security
Council's establishment of a tribunal with jurisdiction greater than the
Security Council itself possesses does not satisfy Article 14(1). Although
the Tribunal was established by law according to the third interpretation in
the sense of having fair procedures, this alone is most likely not enough to
satisfy Article 14(1). According to the most critical test of established by
law, i.e., having been established by a body acting within its powers, the
Tribunal was not established by law. Although the Security Council can
bind other organs of the Untied Nations, it cannot bind them with regard to
areas in which it lacks jurisdiction, and jurisdiction over individuals is not
within the Security Council's enumerated or existing powers.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION
Even if we put aside the question of the legitimacy of the creation of
the Tribunal, the question remains whether this Tribunal has the jurisdiction
to try and punish individuals, even those accused of war crimes. In order
for an international tribunal to legitimately obtain jurisdiction over
individuals, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the tribunal must be
established by law, that is, it must be created in accordance with the current
conceptions and limitations of international law. As discussed above, this
point is debatable. Second, such a tribunal must have jurisdiction to try
individuals.
The question whether a court has jurisdiction over a criminal act may
be divided into two parts: (1) whether the criminal law under which the
criminal act falls authorizes a specific court to try the alleged offense and
(2) whether the court has competence to try the accused for this criminal
act. Taking the United States Supreme Court as an example, the United
States Constitution explicitly grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a Party. . . . "66
Because the
Constitution also is the foundation of the Supreme Court's competence, this
same article provides the competence of the Supreme Court to try anyone
accused of these cases. However, the Court's jurisdiction is not unlimited.
For example, the Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction over a dispute
involving a French Ambassador and an Australian consul, that took place in
England, unless there existed some connection to the United States. The

66.

U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. III, cl. 2.
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legislative authority to proscribe conduct does not automatically confer
judicial authority to try all instances of transgression. 67
A.

InternationalCriminalLaw and Competent Courts

On the international scale, the source of an international criminal law
determines which court systems will have legitimate jurisdiction over an
international criminal offense. The two chief sources of international
criminal law are treaty law and international customary law. When an
international criminal law originates in a treaty, we should examine the
treaty to determine the appropriate judicial body to administrate the legal
consequences of violating the law. When the international criminal law
originates in international custom, we should first look to international
custom to determine the appropriate judicial body to administrate the legal

consequences for violating the law.
Many national courts have the jurisdiction to try crimes committed in
violation of international law.68 Judicial bodies that may be empowered to
adjudicate alleged violations of international criminal law include national
or multinational courts. 69 Usually treaties obligate the courts of the
contracting states to try those accused of violating the criminal offenses set
out in the treaty.70

67. See Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1908)(A default
judgment case, in which Lord Ellenborough inquired: "Can the Isle of Tobago pass a law to bind
the rights of the whole world? Would the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?").
68. See German Grundgesetz (Basic Law), art. 25 which incorporates rules of customary
international law as part of German federal law. See also similar provisions incorporating
customary international law as part of national law, and thus within the jurisdiction of national
courts: art. 9 of the Austrian Constitution, art. 2 of the Greek Constitution, and art. 10 of the
Italian Constitution.
For incorporation of treaty provisions into national law see the Netherlands
Constitution, arts. 91(3), 94 (1983); art. 55 of French Constitution as decided by the Klaus Barbie
Case (Cour de Cassation, 62 J.C.P. II, No. 20,107 (Criminal Chamber) (October 6, 1983)
reprintedin 78 I.L.R. 125, 128-31(1988).
69. Prior to the creation of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, there have only been a multinational war crimes tribunals. See Trial Chamber, para.
6: "This is the first time that the international community has created a court with criminal
jurisdiction."
"The Nuremberg Tribunals--the closest analogy--was not in fact a body
representing the international community as a whole, but was created by a special treaty of the
victorious nations after World War II." Lieutenant Col. Robert T. Mounts, USAF (Retired),
Douglass W. Cassel, Jr. & Jeffrey L. Bleich, Panel II: War Crimes and Other Human Rights
Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 WHITrTER L. REV. 387, 412 n.44 (1995).
70. Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof InternalAtrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 561 (1995).
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The United Nations Secretary-General recently reaffirmed the
criminality of numerous provisions of international humanitarian law. The
Secretary-General also stated that violators of these international laws will
be held individually responsible. "The Security Council has reaffirmed on
several occasions that persons who commit or order the commission of
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such breaches as serious
violations of international humanitarian law." 7 However, regardless of the
illegality of these actions, this illegality alone does not confer universally
the jurisdiction to try those accused of these violations of international
humanitarian law.72 None of the provisions of treaties defining war crimes
authorizes the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to try alleged violations of these international crimes.
B.

Does the Tribunal have Legitimate Jurisdictionover Individuals?

The question whether the Tribunal has legitimate jurisdiction over
individuals accompanies the question relating to the establishment of the
Tribunal.73 Even if the Tribunal was established by law, as required by
Article 14(1), 7 4 the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction would still be an
issue. For this reason, this section investigates the sources and limits of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.
1. Sources of the Tribunal's Jurisdiction
The sources of Tribunal's jurisdiction differ from those of past war
crimes tribunals the most famous of which is the Niirnberg Tribunal. The
Niirnberg Tribunal perceived two grounds for its jurisdiction. First, under
customary international law, a victor's assumption of jurisdiction, after an
unconditional surrender of a defeated state, legitimately transfers the
territorial jurisdiction normally exercised by the courts of the defeated state.
Thus the unconditional surrender of the German Reich to the Allied
Powers, endowed them with legitimate jurisdiction to try and punish
individuals for war crimes as defined by German law. 75

71. Report of the Secretary-General,para. 39, 53.
72. Obviously a court or tribunal set up illegally, would not have the jurisdiction to try
these offenses.
73. See supra text accompanying note 40.
74. Id.
75. This territorial jurisdiction is distinguishable from victor's justice jurisdiction, which
the Nidrnberg Tribunal explicitly rejected: the Allied Power's jurisdiction to try and punish those
aacused of war crimes and crimes against humanity was "not an arbitrary exercise of power on
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Second, the Allied Powers, in creating a war crimes tribunal to try
those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity and punish those
found responsible, did "together what any one of them might have done
singly. " 76 Because the crimes of which the accused were charged were
crimes associated with universal jurisdiction, any of the Allied Powers
could have tried the accused in their own national courts, regardless of the

situs of the offense or the nationalities of the offenders or the victims.
[The universality principle assumes that every state has an
interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious
offenses that states universally have condemned. Piracy
and slave trading are the prototypical offenses that any state
can define and punish because pirates and slave traders
77
have long been considered the enemies of all humanity.

Although the Nirnberg Tribunal stands as an example of an organization of
states trying individuals for war crimes, the question remains whether an
organization having no direct connection to the hostilities may apply

universal jurisdiction in excess of its express jurisdictional limits.
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia does not rest on either of the grounds that supported the
Nimberg Tribunal.
First, no clear victor in the conflict can be

determined.78 While victor's justice has been highly criticized, few victors
have ever been tried for their war crimes.

Second, the accused are being

the part of the victorious Nations." InternationalMilitary Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), reprintedin 41 AM. J.INT'L L. 172, 216 (1947).
76. Id. at 216.
77. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 785, 788 (1995). See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
pirates as hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind).
78. "[H]ow do you convene a war-crimes trial when the accused have won the war--or
have not been defeated and run to ground?", No Road to Nuremberg from Dayton, CHI. TRIB.
Nov. 12, 1995, at 12, WL 6267217 (comparing the Tribunal to that of the Niirnberg trials).
79. Although the fire bombing of Dresden, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and the atrocities committed in Vietnam come readily to mind, no soldier or
commander has been brought to justice for these intentional losses to civilian life. See National
Public Radio, Four Hours in My La: Book About the Massacre, Weekend Edition, (March 14,
1992):
.400 Vietnamese civilians--unarmed old men, women and young
children--were murdered by US soldiers .... who destroyed the hamlet of My
Lai. Only four participants were ever brought to trial and only one, Lieutenant
William Calley, who received a life sentence, ever served time for the killings.
Mr. Calley spent several months under house arrest before being paroled.
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tried by non-participants in the conflict.

If the Tribunal's jurisdictional

grounds are not those of the Niirnberg Tribunal's, where, then, can they be

found?
The Security Council functions as the limited executive branch of the

United Nations, possessing neither legislative nor judicial functions. Thus,
the Security Council can neither create new international law nor make
binding interpretations of existing international law.
It should be pointed out that, in assigning to the
International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons

responsible

for

serious

violations

of

international

humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be

creating or purporting to legislate that law.

Rather, the

International Tribunal would have the task of applying
existing international humanitarian law.80
For this reason, in his report the Secretary-General stated that the
international law applied must be "beyond any doubt part of customary
[international] law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all
States to specific conventions does not arise.""' It would be absurd for the
Secretary-General to require that the substantive law (i.e. what actions
constitute war crimes) applied by the Tribunal be part of established
customary international law, while allowing the procedural law (i.e. the
scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal) applied by the Tribunal to exceed
existing customary international law.
It is problematic that United Nations Charter does not contain a
provision giving any branch of the United Nations jurisdiction or authority
to try or punish individuals. 2 The United Nations does not have the
authority to try or imprison individuals, even those who have violated
international law. Moreover, the Security Council's ability to punish
80. Secretary-General'sReport, para. 29.
81.
Secretary-General's Report, para. 33. Interestingly, such a construction of the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal assumes that a state's consent is necessary to
legitimizing the process of the court.
82. Although the elimination of discrimination based upon race, sex, language and
religion are listed as purposes of the United Nations, (United Nations Charter, arts. 1(3) and
55(c)), the framers of the Charter contemplated that the promotion and protection of these
purposes would be by member-states rather than by the intervention of the United Nations (arts.
2(2) and 2(7)). Of course, the final sentence of Article 2(7) concludes that this article will not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, the very chapter used by
the Security Council to create the Tribunal. However, it is unlikely that Chapter VII was
envisaged as providing near limitless power upon this highly unrepresentative organ.
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individuals for international crimes is not among its enumerated powers
listed in the United Nations Charter.
In addition, no international
convention, agreement or treaty that codifies international humanitarian law
grants to the United Nations the power to adjudicate these criminal cases. 83
Instead, these documents generally state that the signatory states will have
the jurisdiction
to try these cases, often regardless of where the violation
84
occurs.

2. Limits of the Tribunal's Jurisdiction
Undeniably, the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited by the Security
Council's jurisdictional limitations. 85 No political body can delegate more
jurisdiction than it itself possesses. Thus, the Tribunal's jurisdiction cannot
exceed that of the Security Council's. The Trial Chamber noted this fact

83. For instance, the pertinent articles of The Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, provide an example of the understanding that national
tribunals are the appropriate tribunals to try those accused of the odious crime of genocide:
Article V: The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with
the respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective
penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in article III.
Article VI: Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by such internationalpenal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
G.A. Res. 260(HI) A (Dec. 9, 1948) (emphasis added). It was generally accepted that an
international criminal tribunal could not be created without first obtaining consent from
contracting parties to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal. Report of the 1953 Committee on
InternationalCriminalJurisdiction, General Assembly, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (A/2645) at para.
50 (1954) cited in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,

AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP

TOWARD WORLD PEACE--A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 439 (1980).
84. See for example article IV of The International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (obligating parties to adopt legislation to try offenders of this
law regardless where the crime occurs). But cf. articles 5 and 8 of The Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Annex to G.A. Res.
3946 (Dec. 17, 1984) (limiting a state's national jurisdiction over crime of torture and other
degrading treatment to territorial jurisdiction (when the offense occurred in the prosecuting state's
territory), nationality jurisdiction (when the alleged offender is a national of the prosecuting state),
and passive personality jurisdiction (when the victim is a national of the prosecuting state)).
85. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 28.
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when answering the Defenses' contention that the Tribunal was an ultra
vires action of the Security Council.
Support for the view that the Security Council cannot act
arbitrarily... is found in the nature of the Charter as a treaty
delegating certain powers to the Untied Nations. In fact, such a
limitation is almost a corollary of the principle that the organs of
the Untied Nations must act in accordance with the powers
delegated them.8 6
Moreover, because the Tribunal is not empowered to create new
international law, the Tribunal is limited by the historical limits of the
jurisdiction of the Security Council. The Appeals Chamber conceded that:
the Security Council is an organ of an international
organization, established by a treaty which serves as a
constitutional framework for that organization. ...
Those
powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the
jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention
other specific limitations or those which may derive from
the internal division of power within the Organization. 7
The limitations on the Security Council's authority are stated in Chapters
VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the United Nations' Charter. 8
The most
important of these chapters is Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Under
Chapter VII, the Security Council is authorized to interrupt economic
relations,8 9 halt transnational communication, 9° cease diplomatic relations,91
86. See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 15.
87. Appeals Chamber, para. 28.
88. U.N. Charter, art. 24(2): "The specific powers appointed to the Security Council for
the discharge of these duties are laid down in chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII." It is important to
note that some scholars maintain that these specific powers are not limitations, but examples of
powers. According to this argument the Security Council has power limited only by the general
purposes of the United Nations (Chapter 1). However, it seems unlikely that the drafters of the
document would have enabled the least representative branch of the United Nations with such
unchecked control. Furthermore, it is unlikely that if such power existed, it would have gone
unused as it has--nearly 50 years. This is even more unlikely when taking into account the
Security Council's silence in the face of the atrocities committed in Cambodia, under the Pol Pot
regime. See also Trial Chamber, para. 7.
89. U.N. Charter art. 41.
90. U.N. Charter art. 41.
91.
U.N. Charter art. 41.
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enforce economic sanctions,9 2 and initiate armed invasion.93 None of these
provisional measures taken by the Security Council may prejudice "the
rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. "94
None of these explicit powers grants the Security Council jurisdiction
over individuals, nor does any other provision of the United Nations
Charter, nor has the Security Council ever asserted such powers in the past.
For these reasons, we may conclude that, historically, the Security Council
has not had jurisdiction over individuals.
Despite the United Nations' lack of authority to try individuals,
national courts are often empowered to apply international law in their
domestic role.95 For instance, both the Constitution and the Criminal Code
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1990, incorporate both
international customary and treaty law into national law. 96 Thus, it would
be a completely legitimate exercise of jurisdiction for a national court
established by the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia to try
individuals accused of violating international law. Because the existence of
alternate forums in which to try those accused of violating international
humanitarian law, there is little need to bend out of shape the rules of
existing international law to cover the creation of an international tribunal.
The prosecution for the Tribunal has argued that it is odd that the
community of nations could each try a violator of international
humanitarian law individually, but not collectively under the auspices of the
United Nations. 97 However, odd it may be, this is the current state of
international law.
92. U.N. Charter art. 42.
93. U.N. Charter art. 42.
94. U.N. Charter art. 40. The cryptic phrasing of Article 40 leaves unexplained how the
Security Council may launch an armed invasion into a State without prejudice to its rights or
claims.
95. Appeals Chamber, 32 I.L.J. 1993, para. 132.
96. Id.; See also Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, art. 210.
97. See Appeals Chamber, para. 135. Compare this argument to the justification of the
Nurnberg Tribunal, see supra text accompanying note 75. The jurisdictional powers of the
Nurnberg Tribunal and the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia may be
distinguished by the foundations upon which the tribunals' jurisdiction rests. The jurisdiction of
the Nirnberg Tribunal rested upon three foundations of its jurisdiction: territorial jurisdiction of
the German Reich, the customary international law of victors' justice having secured Germany's
unconditional surrender and the universal jurisdiction to try those accused of violating
international humanitarian law. In contrast, the jurisdiction of the International War Crimes
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia rests solely upon this final foundation: universal jurisdiction
to try those accused of violating international humanitarian law. Moreover, the International War
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's jurisdiction over individuals is highly questionable.
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IV. THE TRIBUNAL'S ABILITY TO QUESTION ITS JURISDICTION
Given the arguments of the proceeding sections, the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal over individuals is highly questionable.
However, without
standing to question the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or an appropriate forum
in which to question the Tribunal's jurisdiction the preceding sections
would be doomed to realm of academic musings. Part III argues that even
though the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to try and punish
individuals, it does have the jurisdiction to decide the legal scope of its
jurisdiction.
The word jurisdiction in regard to a judicial body is capable of several
meanings. 98 The first interpretation is the power to decide whether one has
the authority to decide the matter before the court. A court's ability to
decide its own jurisdiction fits within this interpretation. The second
interpretation is the power to decide the matter under the law. A court's
abilities to adjudicate a dispute and to decide a criminal action are examples
of this second interpretation. The third interpretation, often referred to as
subject-matterjurisdiction, is the power to decide what law applies to the
matter before the court. A court's ability to rule on which laws govern a
given situation illustrates this third interpretation. While the first two parts
of this paper addressed the Tribunal's jurisdictional power over individuals,
the second interpretation of jurisdiction, Part III examines the first
interpretation of jurisdiction. Part III addresses whether the Tribunal can
98.

Jurisdiction is capable of several meanings, each dealing with the relation of authority

of different branches of a political organization and law. Legislativejurisdiction is the authority
to create law applicable to specific actors, events or things. Adjudicatory jurisdiction is the
authority to subject actors or things to the processes of judicial or administrative tribunals.

Enforcement jurisdiction is the authority to compel specific actors to comply with its laws and to
redress noncompliance. Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66
TEX. L. REv. 785, 786 (1988).
In regards to legislative jurisdiction, five types of criminal jurisdiction exist. See
Eric S. Kobrick, The Ex Post Facto Prohibitionand the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over
InternationalCrimes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (1987):
International law recognizes five types of criminal jurisdiction: (1) territorial --

jurisdiction based on the location where the alleged crime was committed, and
including objective territorial jurisdiction, which allows countries to reach acts
committed outside territorial limits but intended to produce, and producing,
detrimental effects within a nation; (2) nationality -- jurisdiction based on the

nationality of the offender; (3) protective -- jurisdiction based on the protection
of the interests and the integrity of the nation; (4) passive personality -jurisdiction

based on the nationality of the victim; and (5) universality

--

jurisdiction for certain crimes where custody of the offender is sufficient.
See also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEx. L.

REV. 785, 787-88 (1988).
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rule on its own jurisdiction, or whether such an investigation would either
be barred by the limits of the Tribunal's judicial review powers or be
barred as a non-justiciable political question.
A. The Tribunal'sAbility to Decide Whether it Can Question its Own
Jurisdiction
The first defendant to be brought before the Tribunal is Dugko Tadi6.
In accordance with Rule 73(A)(I), 99 Tadi 's defense questioned the
legitimacy of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, presenting the Tribunal with the
first opportunity to examine this controversial issue. The Trial Chamber
held that the Tribunal was not empowered to question the legitimacy of its
creation. I°° The Trial Chamber declined to entertain the question of its own
jurisdiction for several reasons.
[I]t is not for this Trial Chamber to judge the
reasonableness of the acts of the Security Council .... 1o1
[E]ven if there be such limits [on the powers of the Security
Council], that is not to say that any judicial body, let alone
this International Tribunal, can exercise powers of judicial
review to determine
whether . . . those limits have been
02
exceeded.
The Trial Chamber considered such challenges to its jurisdiction and
the question of the legitimacy of the Security Council's action in creating
the Tribunal as being non-justiciable, because either the Tribunal lacked the
power of judicial review or that questioning the actions of the Security
Council (including the establishment of the Tribunal) involved a political
question.
With regard to lacking power of judicial review, the Trial Chamber
found persuasive precedent in the rulings of the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) and the Administrative Tribunal that these courts lacked
judicial review powers over the decisions of other organs of the United
Nations. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the I.C.J. held that "the Court

99. Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 75 (A) (I).
100. See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 8.
101.

Id. at para. 16.

102. Id. at para. 17.
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does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
03
decisions taken by the United Nations organ concerned."
With regard to the Security Council's actions being a political
question, and therefore non-justiciable, the Tribunal concluded:
"The
factual and political nature of an Article 39 determination by the Security
Council makes it inherently inappropriate for any review by this Trial
Chamber. "'0 4 Note that the Trial Chamber strictly interpreted its own
jurisdiction as described in Article 1 of its Statute as being precisely and
narrowly defined, stating the "full extent of the competence of the
International Tribunal."' 05 Contrariwise, the Trial Chamber rendered a
liberal interpretation of the Security Council's jurisdiction, reading the
enumerated economic and political measures accorded placed under
Security Council jurisdiction by Article 41 as not exhaustive.' °6
The Defense appealed the ruling of the Trial Chamber to the Appeals
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber rephrased this Prosecutor's arguments
against the Tribunal's ability to question the legitimacy of its creation:
This position comprises two arguments: one relating to the
power of the International Tribunal to consider such a plea;
and another relating to the classification of the subjectmatter of the plea as a 'political question' and, as such,
'non-justiciable', regardless of whether or not it falls within
its jurisdiction.'0 7
Although the International Tribunal was not established to "scrutinize the
actions of organs of the United Nations,"' 0 8 the Appeals Chamber found it
had jurisdiction to examine the legitimacy of its jurisdiction as established
by the Security Council."' 9 The Appeals Chamber found the power to
decide its own jurisdiction in the residual power of its judicial function.
"[J]urisdiction cannot be determined exclusively by reference to or
inference from the intention of the Security Council thus totally ignoring
any residual powers which may deserve from the requirements of the
'judicial function' itself. " 110
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at para. 11.
Id. at para. 24.
See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 8.
Id. at para. 28.
32 I.C.J. 1993, para. 13.
Id. at para. 20.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 14.
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In deciding this issue, the Appeals Chamber distinguished two types of
adjudicatory jurisdiction, each referred to by more than one name:
original, primary or substantive jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction
explicitly conferred by statute;"' incidentalor inherent jurisdiction refers 1to2
the jurisdiction that derives from the exercise of the judicial function. 1
Among the inherent jurisdictional powers of a court is KompetenzKompetenz in German or la competence de la compitence
in French, i.e.
3
the power of a court to determine its own jurisdiction."
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's decision on its
ability to investigate the legitimacy of its creation, holding that the Tribunal
did have the authority to interpret the Charter of the United Nations and
thus investigate the legitimacy of the Security Council's actions in creating
the Tribunal.
The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the
International Tribunal is barred from examination of the
Defense's jurisdictional plea by the so-called114 'political' or
'non-justiciable' nature of the issues it raises.
[I]t has been argued that the question put to the Court is
intertwined with political questions, and that for this reason
the Court should refuse to give an opinion. It is true that
most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations
will have political significance, great or small. In the
nature of things it could not be otherwise. The Court,
however, cannot attribute political character to a request
which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task,
namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision. 15
According to this ruling, the Tribunal may investigate the legitimacy
of its creation by the Security Council. This important decision allows the
Tribunal to rectify the situation in which it now finds itself, namely, that
despite the best of intentions, the legitimacy of the establishment of the
Tribunal is in peril.

111. Id. at para. 20.
112. Id.
113. 32 I.C.J. 1993, para. 18.
114. Id. at 25.
115. Appeals Chamber, para. 24 quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. Reports 151, at 155 (Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962).
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B. Establishinga Legitimate InternationalCriminal Court, With
JurisdictionOver War Crimes
Two courses of action could be taken to institute a International
Criminal Court, whose legitimacy would be beyond question. First, the
General Assembly could act. The General Assembly is the only branch of
the United Nations capable of amending its Charter or expanding the
powers vested in the Organization. l" 6 Although Article 10 grants the power
to amend the Charter to the General Assembly, this article also incorporates
Article 12, which limits the General Assembly's ability to interfere in any
action of the Security Council, other than by the. Security Council's
request. 11 7 The limits imposed by Article 12 are themselves limited to only
those functions of the Security Council "assigned to [the Security Council]
in the present Charter."' 18
Thus the question arises, if the Security Council is exercising powers
beyond those assigned by the Charter, is the General Assembly limited by
Article 12? It seems unlikely that this question will reach the International
Court of Justice, for unless there is overwhelming pressure to have the
Statute of the Tribunal ratified as a treaty, the General Assembly will not
press the matter.
However, if broad support for ratification where to
arise, the Security Council would be unlikely to impede the ratification of
the Statute of the Tribunal as a treaty. Thus, there being no procedural
obstacles, the General Assembly should proceed to ratify the statute as a
treaty in order to demonstrate overwhelming support for the Tribunal, or by
its inaction the General Assembly could acknowledge that the Security
Council has the ability to create new international law. Ratification, which
would greatly enhance the Tribunal's legitimacy, would also provide a
viable precedent for the eventual establishment of a international criminal
court.
V. CONCLUSION

In Part I we saw that the legitimacy of the creation of the Tribunal is
highly questionable.
First, the Tribunal was not established by a
representative body of the international community. Second, the manner in
which the Tribunal was established neither affords the international
community of States the opportunity to consent to the establishment of the
Tribunal nor enables them to object to its establishment. Third, the

116. U.N. Charter, art. 10.
117. See id., at art 12.
118. U.N. Charter, art. 12.
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Tribunal was hastily established. The resultant mistakes from this haste
detract from the legitimacy of the Tribunal.
In Part II we saw that Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to that of the
Security Council's. First, nowhere in the United Nations Charter is the
Security Council granted jurisdiction over individuals. Second, historically
the Security Council has not had jurisdiction over individuals. Third, the
Security Council is not empowered to create new international law. For
these reasons, the Security Council cannot create a Tribunal with legitimate
jurisdiction over individuals.
In Part III we examined the Tribunal's ability to question its own
jurisdiction. Because all courts have Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the Tribunal
does have the power to investigate the limits of its jurisdiction. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that it was not barred from examining its own
creation by the Security Council nor was the legitimacy of its creation a
non-justiciable political question. Accordingly, based on the reasoning of
Parts I and II, the Appeals Chamber should have concluded that it had no
jurisdiction over individuals, even those accused of violating international
humanitarian law.
The Appeals Chamber overcome with the immensity of the atrocities
and its desire to prevent their continuance, glossed over the technical
requirements of jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
[T]o the violations at issue here, we have no doubt that they
entail individual criminal responsibility, regardless of
whether they are committed in internal or international
armed conflicts. . . . No one can doubt the gravity of the
acts at issue, nor the interest of the international community
in their prohibition.11 9
Such conclusive language without the support of reasoned legal analysis
fails to endow the Tribunal with unassailable legitimacy.' 20
119. Appeals Chamber, 32 I.C.J. 1993, para. 129.
120. On November 21, 1995, the leaders of the former Yugoslavian republics signed a
peace agreement in Dayton. The peace agreement carefully avoids using the word consent in
reference to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. For the sake of consistency, those who believe that
the Tribunal was established within the legitimate powers of the Security Council, the consent of
the governments whose citizens are on trial is irrelevant. Thus, the Dayton peace agreement
states that the governments must "cooperate with. . . the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia." Proximity Peace Agreement at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
(November 1- 21, 1995), Chapter 3, art. XIII(4).
Note that by cooperating with the Tribunal, the government have only agreed to
cooperate with its adjudicatory jurisdiction, i.e., the findings and holdings of the Tribunal. The
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The creation of an international criminal court is very appealing and a
most worthy endeavor to pursue. The Trial Chamber has suggested that the
Tribunal "represents an important step towards the establishment of a
permanent international criminal tribunal." 12 ' To provide posterity with
the precedent of a legitimate international criminal tribunal, the creation of
the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia should be
thoroughly scrutinized.
An international criminal court should be
established, but established by the most representative body of States in
order to ensure that all States have a voice in the creation of a court that
can try and punish their citizens. This paper addressed problems in the
creation and jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. This Tribunal was not created in complete conformity
with the rules and limitations of existing international law. It is my hope
that bringing these problems into clearer focus, will enable the world
community to overcome the legal hurdles obstructing the establishment of a
fully legitimate international criminal court.

enforcement jurisdiction of whatever body may be charged with "arresting" alleged war criminals
is not mentioned in the peace agreement. However, the final words of article XIII(4) add that the
governments will cooperate with "any other organization authorized by the U.N..Security Council
with a mandate concerning human rights or humanitarian law." Presumably the governments
have committed to the implicit understanding that they will cooperate with other organizations
legitimately authorized (i.e., within its powers) by the Security Council.
121. See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 6.
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On January 27, 1998, an embattled President Clinton stood before the
nation promoting a litany of government initiatives in his State of the Union
Address. Buried in his list of promises was a reference to a renewed
pursuit of foreign trade agreements. President Clinton attempted to allay
the fears of those who believe the expansion of free trade will only result in
lower environmental and labor standards for the United States. Rather, the

Mr. William J. Kovatch, Jr. received his B.A. in 1992 from the University of
Miami; M.A. in 1994 from American University; Juris Doctorate Degree in 1998 from Temple
University; and is a 1999 LL.M. candidate at Temple University. The author would like to thank
Professors Jack Coe, Jeffrey Dunoff, Henry Richardson, III, and Deborah Zalesne for their
inspiration and encouragement. The author would like to give special thanks to his fiance,
Lamphanh Sorathsasomboune, for her patience and support.
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President asserted that the United States cannot promote higher standards if
it retreats from foreign trade.'
The President directed this portion of his speech to fellow Democrats,
who played a large role in the defeat of Fast-Track in 1997.2 Many
Democrats feared how support of Fast-Track would impact their re-election
campaigns slated for 1998. Specifically, the AFL-CIO, a traditional
supporter of the Democratic Party, invested heavily in a public campaign to
defeat Fast-Track, claiming the expansion of free trade would only cost the

United States jobs.3

The Clinton Administration desired Fast-Track, in part, to assist in
building a hemispheric free trade zone to include all of the Americas by the
year 2005." The President promoted this agenda in a 1997 trip to South

America.5

The use of Fast-Track to create a free trade zone of the

Americas, however, confronts some tensions within the United States'
federal structure.

The Constitution creates a federal system based upon the coexistence

of the central government and the state governments. 6
The state
governments retain certain powers. However, the trend of trade
liberalization and the power of states have come into conflict. Trade

liberalization includes the reduction of "non-tariff barriers."

These non-

tariff barriers are regulations that have the effect of limiting access to a
particular market of imported goods. However, regulations may stem from
legitimate concerns of a state for its population. Yet, as the states do
participate in trade agreement negotiations, they may find themselves
bound by an instrument calling for changes in their regulatory scheme
without participation. By giving the President the authority to act as the
I. President's State of the Union Address, reprintedin This Is Not a Time to Rest. It Is
a Time to Build, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1998, at A24.
2.
Fast-Track involves a grant of authority to the President in international trade
matters. Under Fast-Track procedures, the President would have the authority to enter into trade
negotiations, conclude a trade agreement, and submit the implementing legislation to Congress.
Congress would then be prohibited from amending the implementing legislation, and could only
approve or disapprove the measure. Fast-Track aims to streamline the process of concluding trade
agreements, resulting in greater efficiency and certainty for trading partners of the United States.
3.
Terry M. Neal, Ad Watch: Trade Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1997, at A22.
4.
Carla Anne Robbins & Matt Moffett, Clinton Hopes to Boost Pact on Latin Trip,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at A15.
5.
Anthony Faiola, Brazilians Wary of U.S. Trade Pact: Businesses Fear Dropped
Barriers CouldDamage Recovering Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1997, at A24.
6.
When dealing with an issue such as international trade that affects both foreign
nations and the fifty states of the United States, there exists a danger of confusion with respect to
terms. The word "state" has a different meaning within the context of international law, and
United States domestic law. To avoid this confusion, where possible, the term "state" in this
paper refers to one of the fifty political subdivisions within the United States. For the sake of
simplicity, the term "nation" will be used to denote a state in the context of international law.
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voice of the nation in trade agreements involving non-tariff barriers, FastTrack has the effect of eroding federalism.
This paper examines how Fast-Track affects the United States
constitutional system. Part I explains the background to Fast-Track and
NAFTA. Part II outlines the power of Congress to regulate Foreign
Commerce with respect to state sovereignty. Part III argues that states
have a legitimate concern under the Constitution in regulating for the
benefit of their citizens.
As Fast-Track does not involve formal
consultation with the states prior to the conclusion of the trade agreements,
it does threaten to erode the principle of federalism. Part III suggests an
alternative to preserve federalism by including consultations with state
governors during the negotiation process.
I. FAST-TRACK, FREE TRADE, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS

A.

Background
Congress delegated power to the President to conclude international
trade agreements as a method of avoiding the influence of special interests.
Congress became aware of this danger after protectionist interests in 1934
pursued policies helping to push the world into the Great Depression.'
Congress responded through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934' which delegated in the President the authority to negotiate and
implement international trade agreements. 9 Congress periodically extended
this authority until 1967 when it lapsed.' °
President Ford and Congress negotiated a renewal of presidential
authority over international trade through the Fast-Track provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "1974 Act").'
Under Fast-Track, the
President must first make a determination that barriers to trade "unduly
burden and restrict the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affect
the United States economy." 2 Then, the President may enter into a trade
agreement to remove those barriers.13 The President must notify Congress
of his intentions ninety days before entering into a trade agreement. " The
President then submits the implementing bill through the majority leaders in
7.
Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J.INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 697 (1996).

8.

Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354).

9.

19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(A)(1934).

10.
Edmund W. Sims, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5
FLA. J.INT'L L. 471, 475 (1990).

11.

Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1974)).

12.

19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(1).

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at § 2112(e)(1).
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both the House of Representatives and the Senate.' 5 Congress may not
amend the implementing bill.' 6 Congressional committees then have fortyfive days to consider the bill. If the bill is still in committee after forty-five
days, it is automatically discharged. 7 A vote on the final passage of the
bill is to be held no later than fifteen days after its discharge.'" This gives
Congress a total of sixty days to consider the bill. Debate in both the
House' 9 and the Senate 2° islimited to twenty hours. Fast-Track under the
1974 Act lapsed in 1980. Congress renewed Fast-Track authority with the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,21 and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988. 2 Fast-Track authority lapsed in 1993.
B.

Changes in Trade Agreements: NAFTA and the WTO
The end of the Cold War led to dramatic changes in the world
economy.
The economies of the world have become more
interdependent. 23 There has been a general rise in the understanding that
international issues affect domestic interests. 24 The process of globalization
has caused "a worldwide convergence of economic and political values."'
As the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA") 26
and the World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") 27 demonstrate, the
nations of the world have agreed that the lifting of barriers is the best way
to promote international trade. However, these new trade agreements have
provoked a debate on the limitations of Fast-Track in considering the
domestic impact of international trade issues.
1. Fast-Track and Adequate Debate
Through agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO, the scope of
international trade agreements have expanded to include issues previously
15.
19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)(1).
16. Id.at § 2191(d).
17. Id.at § 2191(e)(1).
18. Id.
19. Id.at § 2191(0(2).
20.
19 U.S.C. § 2192(g)(2).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
22. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988)).
23. Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
429, 430, 439 (1997).
24. Id. at 429, 433.
25. Id. at 429.
26. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
27. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 13
(1994).
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considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
government. These new trade agreements give international entities a

greater ability to review domestic laws to determine if they create non-tariff
barriers that are incompatible with the principles of the agreements. This
creates the potential for the alteration of a nation's domestic laws and a
limitation on that nation's sovereignty. As Fast-Track limits debate, there
is a question as to whether there is an adequate opportunity to assess fully
the impact of these agreements on domestic law.'

Fast-Track may not adequately protect the interests of states with
respect to the harmonization of domestic laws. In December of 1992, the
United States, Canada, and Mexico concluded NAFTA. NAFTA differed
from previous trade agreements involving the United States as it provided
for greater economic integration between the United States, Canada and
Mexico. 29 Through NAFTA, "the United States [surrendered] its role, at
least to Canada and Mexico, as a separate trading entity and [became] a

part of a regional entity." 3"
By developing a system that strives for greater harmonization,

NAFTA created a tension between trade liberalization and the sovereignty
of subsidiary governments. Article 105 of NAFTA states: "The Parties
shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken to give effect to the

provisions of this Agreement, including their observance, except as
otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial
governments."3 Thus, the drafters of NAFTA consciously bound their

governments to strive for integration even of their subsidiary governments.
For the United States, this aspect of NAFTA led to objections from

state governments. The "impetus for globalization" has limited the states'
ability to regulate in areas such as environmental protection, labor
28. See Dana Rohrabacher, Pennies for Thoughts: How GATT Fast Track Harms
American Patent Applicants, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 491, 494 (1996).
Representative Rohrabacher raised the concern of adequate debate when she testified before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property on the effect the WTO had on United States
patent law. Before the creation of the WTO, United States patent law guaranteed seventeen years
of protection to the patent owner after the date the patent was issued. Id. Under the WTO,
however, Representative Rohrabacher claimed patent protection was changed to twenty years from
the date of application. Id. at 495. Because protection under United States law would now start
at the time of application, inventors applying for patents representing significant technological
breakthroughs would receive less protection under these changes as such patents typically take a
number of years to issue. Id. at 495-96. Representative Rohrabacher claimed that as this passed
under Fast-Track procedures, Congress did not give the change "neither full debate nor full
scrutiny." Id. at 494. As Fast-Track prohibited Congress from adequately addressing this issue
due to the limitation of debate, this significant change in the law was not addressed thoroughly.
29. C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEo.WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1994).
30. Id. at 7. (alteration in original).
31.
NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 105 (emphasis added).
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protection, health and safety standards, and competition rules.32 No
constitutional duty exists for federal authorities to consult with the states
when negotiating trade agreements. 33 Yet, by the terms of NAFTA, states
must regulate according to its guidelines.3 4 In response to this situation,
state authorities complained that NAFTA weakened the enforcement of
state regulations. 35 State laws would now become subject to challenge as
non-conforming to NAFTA provisions on non-tariff barriers. 36 NAFTA
brought into conflict the goal of integrating the North American economies
in order to facilitate trade and the sovereignty of state governments.
2. NAFTA Labor and Environmental Issues
NAFTA's failure to address labor and environmental issues in the text
of the primary agreement set the stage for a bitter political battle in the
United States. 3 7 By including Mexico in the agreement, the opponents of
NAFTA feared the agreement would lead to the erosion of labor and
environmental standards in the United States. Mexican labor is cheaper
than that of the United States and Canada.
This gives Mexico a
comparative advantage in labor costs.3 " Thus, by adding Mexico to the
free trade agreement, opponents argued jobs would migrate from the
United States to Mexico. Opponents also argued NAFTA would also
create pressure on the United States to lower its labor standards.3 9
With respect to environmental protection, Mexico is a developing
nation. Mexican environmental regulations are less stringent than those of
the United States and Canada. The Mexican government is also less
effective in enforcing those regulations. As companies can take advantage
of this situation, this gives Mexico a comparative advantage with respect to
environmental standards. Companies wishing to decrease their costs in
connection to protecting the environment could move to Mexico.'
Further, opponents to NAFTA were concerned that United States
environmental standards could come under attack as non-tariff barriers. 4'
32. A.J. Tangeman, Comment, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State Government in a
Global Economy: Will the NAFTA Federal-State Consultation Process Preserve State
Sovereignty?, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 243, 244 (1996).
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 245-46.
Id. at251.
Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The

Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 425 (1995).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Taylor, supra note 29, at 8.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 101.
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NAFTA was seen by opponents as setting a dangerous precedent for
future trade agreements. By ceding authority over non-tariff barriers to
other trading partners, the United States endangered the concerns of labor
and environmental interests. To this end, President Clinton proposed
addressing labor and environmental issues in side agreements to NAFTA.42
This, however, did not alleviate the concerns of NAFTA opponents. The
result was a fierce political battle over the passage of the implementation
legislation.
C.

The 1997 Proposals
President Clinton submitted to Congress a proposal to renew the
President's authority to negotiate trade agreements utilizing Fast-Track.4 3
This proposal was known as the Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1997 (hereinafter "1997 Clinton Proposal"). 44 The
proposal came at a time when the President desired to begin negotiations to
include Chile in NAFTA. 45
In response to the President's request for Fast-Track authority,
Representative Bill Archer, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, introduced H.R. 2621, a bill entitled the "Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Authorities Act" (hereinafter "H.R. 2621"). 46 H.R. 2621 left
intact the procedure for Fast-Track as set forth in the 1974 Act.4 7 H.R.
2621 also provided for consultations between the Executive and
Congress. 41
H.R. 2621 also sought to ensure that foreign nations would not use
labor, environmental, health and safety standards are as arbitrary or
unjustified barriers to trade. 49 H.R. 2621 further aimed to prevent a nation
from taking advantage of lowering their labor and environmental standards.
To accomplish this task, H.R. 2621 charged the President with ensuring
that a nation does not waive or derogate from
its existing standards in order
50
to gain a competitive advantage in trade.

42. Taylor, supra note 29, at 8.
43. Letter from President William J. Clinton to the Congress of the United States (Sept.
16, 1997).
44. Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997 (visited Sept. 18,
1997) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/lnitiatives/FastTrack/bilI.html>.
45. Bob Davis & Greg Hitt, Clinton Asks for Trade-Pact Authority, Avoiding Labor,
Environmental Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1997, at A2.
46. H.R. 2621, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) [hereinafter H.R. 2621].
47. Id. § 103(b)(3).
48.

Id. § 104.

49.
50.

Id. § 102(b)(7)(A).
Id. § 102(b)(7)(B).
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II. FAST-TRACK AS A THREAT TO FEDERALISM

A.

The Role of Federalism in the United States ConstitutionalSystem

The Founding Fathers built the United States' government upon the
principle of federalism. Instead of creating single central government and
dissolving the existing state governments, the Federal Government was
superimposed upon the several states. James Madison specifically rejected
the notion that the Constitution would spell the downfall of the state
governments. Rather, Madison envisioned the states as "essential parts of
the federal government," playing a larger role in the lives of the people
than the Federal Government.5 1 To that end, Madison argued, "[T]he
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite." 52
Federalism continues to serve a vital function in the United States. By
retaining the states, the federal system promotes diversity, pluralism, and
experimentation in public policy.5 3 In addition, federalism serves a
prophylactic function. The continued existence and vitality of the states
protects the people "from arbitrary majoritarianism and overcentralization
.... ",5 The structure of the Constitution sought to avoid the accumulation
of power in a single entity.55 By dispersing power, not only among the
three branches of the Federal Government, but also among the Federal
Government and the governments of the states, the Constitution serves to
secure the people from such an excessive accumulation.
Federalism ensures a "greater degree of citizen participation."5 6
Through a republican form of government, the people choose
representatives to serve their interests. When a single legislature governs a
population the size of the United States, the voice of a single citizen is
necessarily diluted. But when a republican government governs smaller
geographical units with smaller populations, the citizens have a greater
voice in the formation of public policy. In a state legislature, the ratio of
citizens to representatives is smaller than in the Congress which governs
the entire nation. The smaller the ratio, the greater influence a single voter
has. Federalism, therefore, ensures greater liberty, and gives the voter
greater control over their own governance. Federalism is a value that
should be secured, and protected.
51.

THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).

52.

Id.

53.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AMERICA
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 105 (1969).
54.

Id.

55.

THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).

56.

ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 53, at 105.
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B.

CongressionalPower over Commerce and State Sovereignty
Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
nations." s Chief Justice John Marshall stated "[The power of Congress
does not stop at the judicial lines of the several States. It would be a very
useless power, if it could not pass those lines." 58 The Tenth Amendment,
however, declares that all "powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. 59 The question is whether this reservation
of power to the states can act as a limit on the power of Congress to
regulate foreign commerce.
1. The Commerce Clause and State Sovereignty
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and state sovereignty in National League of Cities v.
Usery.' Congress exercised its commerce power by amending the Fair
Labor Standards Act [hereinafter "FLSA"] 61 to extend its coverage to state
employees.' The Court proclaimed: "This Court has never doubted that
there are limits upon the power of Congress to override sovereignty, even
when exercising its otherwise plenary power to tax or to regulate
commerce which are conferred by Article I of the Constitution."63
Congress used its Commerce power to regulate "States in their capacities
as sovereign governments," interfering with states acting "in areas of
traditional governmental functions."' The act was, thus, unconstitutional.
The Court revisited Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transportation Authority.' The Court faced the issue of whether state
sovereignty immunized states from the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the FLSA.' The Court asserted that lower federal courts
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
58. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824). Gibbons, however, involved
the conflict between a New York act that granted a monopoly over the navigation of waterways
within its jurisdiction with a license granted by Congress. Id. at 2-3. As the case involved
interstate commerce, Marshall's discussion of international commerce is dicta. However,
Marshall was using the discussion to explain the extent of Congressional power over commerce,
and to illustrate how that power penetrates state boundaries.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. X (ratified 1791).
60. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)(1994).
62. Usery, 426 U.S. at 836-37.
63. Id. at 842.
64. Id. at 851-52. Chief Justice Rehnquist listed a few traditional governmental functions.
They are: fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public safety, and parks and recreation.
65. 469 U.S. 528 (1984).
66. Id. at 533.
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struggled with the Usery standard of "identifying a traditional function for
the purpose of state immunity under the Commerce Clause." 67 The Court
rejected the Usery standard as "unworkable" and "inconsistent with
established principles of federalism . . . ."' Accordingly, the Court
69
upheld the constitutional validity of the FLSA as it applied to the states.
In support of his opinion, Justice Blackmun contended that the rights
of states received protection from the structure of the federal government. 70
The Constitution accommodated state sovereignty through representation in
the House of Representatives, and equal representation in the Senate. 7'
This protected the states from an overreaching Congress. 72
Justice O'Connor dissented stating, "The Court today surveys the
battle scene of federalism and sounds a retreat. Like Justice Powell, I
would prefer to hold the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to
the wounded."'7 O'Connor proclaimed, "The true 'essence' of federalism
is that the States as States have legitimate interests which the National
Government is bound to respect even though it laws are supreme." 74 In
O'Connor's view, the courts must remain diligent in protecting the
principle of federalism. 75 Reminding the Court of Chief Justice Marshall's
formula from McCulloch v. Maryland,76 Justice O'Connor declared, "It is
not enough that the 'end be legitimate'; the means to that end must not
contravene the spirit of the Constitution."'77 Therefore, just because the
task may be difficult, courts should not abdicate its duty to protect state
sovereignty.78
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor defended state sovereignty
in Gregory v. Ashcroft. ' In that case, state judges challenged a provision
of the Missouri Constitution requiring judges to retire at age seventy as a
violation of the ADEA. 8 Justice O'Connor asserted that "a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 546.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1984).
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
Garcia at 581 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
17 U.S. (3 Wheat) 316 (1819).
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
501 U.S. 452 (1991).

80.

Id. at 456.
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reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. "81 The states,
therefore, "retain substantial powers under our constitutional scheme,
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere."82 The citizens of
a sovereign state have a right to set the qualifications for judges within
their state.83 Thus, as ambiguity existed as to whether judges were
employees under the act, O'Connor construed the act to avoid the intrusion
upon the rights of the states, thereby upholding the Missouri constitutional
age requirement.8
. The limits of the use of commerce power by Congress to proscribe
rules to the states when involved in environmental matters became an issue
in New York v. United States.85 A provision of an act of Congress required
the states to regulate radioactive waste in a manner consistent with the
direction of Congress, or to "take title to and possession of low level
radioactive waste generated within their borders and become liable for all
damages waste generators suffer as a result of the States' failure to do so
promptly. "86 The Court concluded: "that while Congress has substantial
power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the
disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the
Constitution
does not confer on Congress the ability to compel the States to
87
do so.,,
Therefore, Congress cannot use its commerce power to direct the
states to adopt a particular scheme of regulation.88 The choice given to the
states, to regulate according to the Congressional desire or take title to the
waste, was "tantamount to coercion," and therefore an unconstitutional
invasion of state sovereignty.89
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate the
state's relationship to its employees as if it were a private employer.
However, Congress may not intrude upon the states' sovereign
prerogatives. Congress may not use its commerce power to interfere with
the means by which a state chooses it public officials. Nor may Congress
use its commerce power to direct the states to adopt regulations that
Congress prescribed.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 458.
d. at 461.
Id.at 473.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id.at 174-75.
Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 175.
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2. Foreign Affairs and State Sovereignty
The cases mentioned above, however, dealt with Congressional power
over interstate commerce. As Fast-Track would extend to the President the
ability to negotiate international trade agreements, the power of Congress
to regulate when faced with state sovereignty may take on a new
dimension.
Justice Holmes found the power of the Federal Government over
international affairs to confront different considerations when conflicting
with state action in Missouri v. Holland.93 Holland involved a treaty
between the United States and Great Britain concerning the killing of
migratory birds that passed between Canada and the United States. 9'
Justice Holmes first noted while "[a]cts of Congress are the supreme law of
the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution"' no such
qualification existed with respect to the supremacy of treaties. Holmes
found it questionable whether the provisions of the treaty were contrary to
the Constitution. 93 "The only question is whether [the treaty] is forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment." 94 Holmes concluded that "[n]o doubt the great body of
private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty
may override its power."' Therefore, when the nation faced an issue that
could only be addressed in conjunction with a foreign nation, the Federal
Government ma intrude upon the states' power and proscribe a rule
through a treaty.
State action may nonetheless be upheld even when that action may
have an effect on international relations. In Clark v. Allen 9' a resident of
the State of California died in 1942 bequeathing her property to relatives in
Germany.9" The California Probate Code at that time required a foreign
nation grant reciprocal rights to United States citizens before aliens residing
in that nation could take property by succession or through a will.' The
Court conceded that this statute had some incidental effect in foreign
nations. 00 However, when there is no overriding federal interest, and the
state did not actively pursue foreign policy, a statute having incidental
90.

252 U.S. 416 (1920).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 433-34.
Id.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
Id.at 435.
331 U.S. 503 (1947).
Id.at 505.
Id. at506, n.1.
Id.at 517.
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effects on foreign relations is not automatically invalid.' 1 Therefore, the
California statute was valid.
Different consequences follow when a state actively pursues a foreign
policy agenda. In Zschering v. Miller 2 a resident of Oregon died intestate
leaving heirs in the Communist nation of East Germany. An Oregon
statute required a foreign nation to guarantee the right of its citizens to
receive property by succession "without confiscation" before the property
could be transferred. 0 3 The Court determined that the statute was an
intrusion in the field of foreign affairs, entrusted by the Constitution to the
President and Congress. °4 The Court noted that the statute aimed to
exclude Marxist nations from taking title to the property of the deceased."5
In order to determine when "confiscation" occurs, the State of Oregon
would have to make inquiries into foreign law, and judge the credibility of
The Court noted that decisions under this law
diplomatic statements."
were made according to foreign policy attitudes present during the Cold
War.1 °7 The Court stated that the lack of a treaty on the subject matter was
itself not dispositive. Rather, "even in the absence of a treaty, a State's
policy may disturb foreign relations. " " As such, the Oregon statute was
found unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the extent of the foreign
commerce power of Congress in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles.1 "
In this case, Japanese shipping companies owned ships
designed to carry cargo containers. These containers would travel through
the State of California. Under California law, property located in the state
on March 1 of any year was subject to an ad valorem tax." The Japanese
company paid the tax, but sued for a refund."'
The issue before the Court was whether the California tax
unconstitutionally intruded upon the power of Congress to regulate foreign
commerce. The Court noted that "[w]hen construing Congress' power to
'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' a more extensive constitutional
inquiry is required" than under the interstate commerce power. 1'
101.
subject.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 517. One such overriding federal interest could be if a treaty is in force on the
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Id. at 431.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437 (1968).
Id. at 441.
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 446.
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Specifically, in foreign commerce, there is a greater need for national
uniformity: "[A] state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce
may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national
essential.
concern." 1 3 The California tax created an asymmetry in international
taxation that created a disadvantage for Japan. "4 Therefore, as the tax
defeated uniformity, it stood as an unconstitutional invasion of the foreign
commerce power of Congress. 115
That a tax scheme may differ from state to state, however, is not
enough to invalidate the tax as an invasion of the foreign commerce power.
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board"6 a California
franchise tax employed the "unitary business" principle in determining the
tax base. "7 California applied this principle to a Delaware corporation
doing business in California as well as in foreign nations. The Court
asserted that merely because a tax has "resonations" in foreign affairs, it is
Here, the tax did not create an
not necessarily unconstitutional. 118
asymmetry in international taxation." 9 Taken with the fact that it was
imposed on a United States corporation, the Court held that the foreign
policy of the United States was not seriously threatened by the tax. 120
The Holland holding dealt specifically with the power of treaties to
displace state regulation. Under the authority granted by Fast-Track, the
President would not negotiate a treaty for the purposes of Article VI of the
Constitution, but an executive agreement authorized by a delegation of
power by Congress. Congress would need to pass implementing legislation
for the agreement to have the force of law. In that regard, it would not
deserve the enshrinement as the supreme law of the land as a treaty.
Both the Clark and Container Corp. of America decisions show that
more is necessary for a state law to be unconstitutional than the fact that the
law touches upon foreign relations incidentally. Under these precedents, a
state law will be found unconstitutional when a state intends to affect
foreign policy, even when that law falls within the traditional state
jurisdiction. Thus, despite the fact that probate law is an area of regulation
113.

Id.at 448.

114. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,453 (1979).
115. Id. at 453-54.

116. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
117. Id. at 162-63. Under the unitary business formula, the state first defines the scope of
the business entity's activities in the taxing jurisdiction. Then, the state apportions income
between the taxing jurisdiction and the elsewhere by looking at the character of the activities
performed within and without the jurisdiction. Id.at 165.
118. Id.at 193 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S.
425, 448 (1980)).
119. Id.at 195.
120.

id. at 196.
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reserved to the states, when the Oregon law in Zschering required state
judges to make foreign policy considerations it intruded upon the foreign
policy powers of the Federal Government. The aim of the Oregon statute
was to further Cold War objectives by denying the validity of testamentary
gifts made to citizens of Communist nations. In contrast stands the
decision in Clark. The California statute applied equally to all foreign
nations. The only requirement was that of reciprocity. The California
statute did not attempt to pursue an international affairs agenda of favoring
nations adhering to an ideology consistent with that of the United States.
A state regulation that has the effect of barring the importation of
foreign goods should not be found invalid unless it reflects an attempt on
the part of a state to interfere in foreign policy matters. Often, when a
state regulates in the areas of health, safety, environmental and labor
standards, it is acting to protect the interests of its citizens. So long as the
regulations are not applied in a discriminatory fashion there is little danger
that the aim of the state is to affect foreign policy. When the regulation
does not aim to affect foreign policy it does not represent an
unconstitutional encroachment upon the power of the Federal Government.
The decision of the Court in JapanLine appears to be consistent with
the need for establishing a uniform system of taxation with respect to
foreign commerce. Thus, the Foreign Commerce Clause would forbid a
state from imposing its own tariffs. Extending the reach of the foreign
commerce power of Congress to all non-tariff barriers, however, would
appear contrary to the design of the Founding Fathers. The historical
experience of the American Colonies supports the notion that in delegating
the power to regulate foreign commerce to Congress, the Founding Fathers
were concerned primarily with taxation as a means of regulation."'2 Thus,
in the experience of the Founding Fathers, the imposition of duties acted as
the main vehicle of regulation of international trade.
The concept of non-tariff barriers only recently emerged in
multilateral trade agreements. The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations,
which lasted from 1973 to 1979, was the first time multilateral trade

121.

Prior to independence, Great Britain imposed upon the American Colonies the system

of mercantilism. Britain imposed high duties on imports in order to force the American Colonies
to purchase goods from other British possessions, and not from competing foreign colonies in the
West Indies. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

12 (1935).
Alexander Hamilton asserted that a unity of national regulation over international
trade was necessary in order to give the United States an advantage over foreign powers. THE
FEDERALIST, No. 11 (Hamilton). By uniting against foreign nations such as Great Britain,
Hamilton theorized that the United States could force Britain to open markets in the West Indies,
and protect American rights concerning fisheries, and navigation of the Great Lakes and
Mississippi River. Id. Therefore, the grant of power over foreign commerce was meant to
provide the United States with a united front when acting in international trade issues.
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negotiations focused on the issue of non-tariff barriers.'22 Previously, the
primary concern of trade negotiations was the level of tariffs. It appears
unlikely that the Founding Fathers conceived of the regulation of non-tariff
barriers when drafting the Constitution.

III. INJECTING THE STATES INTO FAST-TRACK
A.

States Have a Legitimate Role to Play in InternationalTrade
The United States embarked on a new era of international trade
relations demanding greater federal and state cooperation. Since the end of
the Cold War, the world has become increasingly economically
interdependent. 123 Issues of foreign relations have direct effects on the
lives of United States citizens. 24 For example, lower wage levels in
nations such as Mexico create incentives for companies to locate
manufacturing facilities in those nations. As a result, manufacturing jobs
have been migrating out of the United States.
Greater participation of the state governments in international trade
does not represent an intrusion upon the power of the Federal Government.
Rather, it is an adaptation "to a changing world in which the line between
national and state or local concerns is much less clear than when the
Republic was founded."" 2 By acting in international trade, states merely
"promote legitimate concerns and interests and express the views of their
citizens in international and foreign policy issues of relevance and
importance to them."' 26 Foreign trade and investment translates into more
local jobs. The role of the state in some respects has become to act as the
protector and creator of jobs within their boundaries. Much of the state
action in international trade has been to further these roles.127
Additional concerns have been raised by the creation of a free trade
zone through NAFTA. Free trade zones aim to eliminate barriers to trade
among its members. This means not only the elimination of customs and
duties, but also the elimination of non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers
122. D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty-Making: The Tokyo
Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 68 (1983).
123. Seita, supra note 23, at 439.
124. Id. at 433.
125. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities inForeign Relations, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 821, 828 (1989).

126. Id.
127. For example, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the City of Philadelphia
recently pursued the Norwegian shipbuilding firm of Kvaener SA to invest in the Philadelphia
Navy Yard. The Navy Yard was closed by the United States Government in 1995. Since then,
the Commonwealth and City governments have actively sought an investor to utilize the shipyard
in order to create more jobs in the Philadelphia area. J. Alex Tarquino, Developments:
Philadelphia's Ship May Be Coming In,WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 110.
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include more than just the imposition of quotas on imports. The term is ill

defined, and subject to an expansive meaning.'2 In 1974, when Congress
approved Fast-Track, the Senate stated that the term: "cover[s] a variety
of devices which distort trade, including quotas, variable levies, border
taxes, discriminatory procurement and internal taxation practices, rules of
origin requirements, subsidies and other direct and indirect means used to
discourage imports or artificially stimulate or restrict exports."129 The

Senate definition demonstrates the ambiguity, and expansive nature of the
term. Specifically, an indirect measure used to discourage imports may
refer to any regulation that has the effect of restricting trade. Such an

expansive definition of "non-tariff barriers" has been used by the European
Union. 30 Regulations in matters such as health, safety, and labor issues
can be viewed as non-tariff barriers if they have the effect of acting as an

impediment to market entry of products from other nations.
If
congressional power over foreign commerce is read to pre-empt state
M
T

regulation over all non-tariff barriers, there is a real danger of encroaching
upon the state sovereignty.

128. Non-tariff barriers have been defined as obstructions to international trade other than
customs duties or taxes on importation. 2 R. STURM, CUSTOMS LAWS & ADMINISTRATION §
61.2 (1985).
129. S. REP. No. 1298, at 74 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7224
(reporting on a bill granting President authority to enter into trade agreements regarding non-tariff
barriers).
130. Any national rule directly or indirectly, actually or potentially capable of hindering
trade is forbidden by the EU as a non-tariff barrier. Case 120/78, Reme-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1978] E.C.R. 649.
131. NAFTA does allow the member nations to retain the right to promulgate standards
related to safety, protection of life and health, protection of the environment, and the protection of
consumers. These regulations must conform to the principle of non-discrimination. In addition,
unnecessary obstacles to trade cannot be established. The regulations must have a demonstrated
purpose of achieving a legitimate object, and the regulation cannot exclude goods of a member
nation that meets that legitimate object. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 904.
A similar provision is found in the European Union. Nations that are part of the EU
may maintain their own standards. However, any national rule that is directly or indirectly,
actually or potentially capable of hindering trade is forbidden as a non-tariff barrier. If the EU
has not itself developed a rule on a certain issue, the member nations may adopt their rules that
are reasonable and proportional. A proportional measure cannot be broader than necessary. Case
120/78, Reme-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1978] E.C.R. 649.
Indeed, Germany's beer purity laws came under attack for violating the rule of
proportionality. While Germany defended its law as a measure necessary to protect the health of
German citizens, the European Court of Justice found that the regulation was not necessary to
protect public health. Of key importance was the fact that other European nations allowed the
very additives and preservatives forbidden by German law. In addition, Germany allowed the
same preservatives when used in other beverages. Case 178/84, Re Purity Requirements for
Beer: Commission v. Germany, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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In order to create greater integration of markets, harmonization is
necessary not only among the national governments, but the
subgovernments as well. Within a national government that employs a
federal scheme, power is diffused among the national and subgovenments.
In the United States, the fifty states and the District of Columbia may
regulate certain subject matters. Specifically, under the police power, the
states have the power to regulate the health, safety, welfare, and morals of
its citizens.132 Such standards may preclude the admission of imported
products to the state's market when those products fail to meet those
standards. The negotiators of NAFTA specifically aimed to address this
problem, by binding the national governments to ensure that their
subgovernments adhere to the agreement. 133 If states must adhere to the
requirements of a trade agreement such as NAFTA, regulations may need
to come into conformity with the agreement. By aiming to reduce nontariff barriers, these agreements may encroach upon state sovereignty.
State governments do not play a formal role in trade negotiations. As a
result, states may be bound to change their laws and regulations by an
agreement which they had no part in creating. By precluding states from
participating in the negotiation of international trade agreements, issues
which increasingly have local consequences are being made by a more
remote decision-making bodies.' 34 Involving states in international trade
only serves to further the democratic process.
It has been argued that the structure of the federal government protects
the rights of states. 3 However, constitutional changes have eliminated any
body of the Federal Government that represents the interests of states as
states. Each state is entitled to two Senators. 36 However, due to the
Seventeenth Amendment Senators are popularly elected, not appointed by
the state governments.' 37 While Senators do represent the population of the
state from which they are elected, they do not necessarily represent the
interests of the state governments.
Under Fast-Track, no provision exists to protect the legitimate
interests of the states to promulgate regulations. Yet, should the United
States follow the precedent set in NAFTA, states will be bound by trade
agreements to comply with their terms. This effectively robs the states of
132. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 577 (1847); Commonwealth v.

Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
133. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 105.
134. "As national governments become larger, more remote and more indifferent, it is
only through state and local governments, more accessible and responsive to their views, that
ordinary citizens can make their voices heard." Bilder, supra note 125, at 828-29.
135. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 550 (1984).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ci. 1.
137. Originally, under Article I, § 3 of the Constitution, the state legislatures chose the
Senators. The rules changed in 1913 with the passage of the 17th Amendment.
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their sovereignty in favor of the central government.
Through the
mechanism of trade agreements, the President and Congress may direct the
states to adopt a course of regulation of subjects rightfully within the states'
police power. Trade agreements, therefore, would allow the federal
government to violate the standard of New York v. United States. 3'
B.

A Proposal
A solution to this problem would be to create a role for the states in
Fast-Track. When the President enters into negotiations over a trade
agreement that will affect non-tariff barriers, the President could consult
the governors of the states. The President need not consult each governor
individually, just as under Fast-Track the President need only consult the
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee.' 39 In a similar fashion, the governors of the fifty states could
organize themselves in a committee to deal with trade issues affecting
states' interests. Such a requirement would ensure a voice for the states in
the process of negotiating trade agreement that could affect states'
interests. 40
The participation of the governors should be limited to those areas
where states have a legitimate interest. Those are non-tariff barriers.
Specifically, the governors should only offer their opinions on those nontariff barriers that would change state regulations. These would be in
health, safety, environmental, and labor issues. The governors should not
be able to affect those parts of the trade negotiations dealing with issues
fully within federal jurisdiction, such as tariff levels, the elimination of
quotas, and rules of origin. Such constraints would ensure that the
governors only participate in areas of legitimate state concern, and not
unduly hinder the negotiation process.
Congressional consultations are reinforced by the fact that Congress
must still approve of the trade agreement before it can become law. Thus,
Congress has the security of voting on the trade agreement. The governors
do not have such insurance. This can be remedied by requiring any
provision of a trade agreement that involves changes in existing health,
safety, environmental and labor regulations to receive approval from a
majority of the committee of governors. Without such approval, any such
provision cannot become law.
To set up such a mechanism within Fast-Track need not create an
inefficient hindrance to the President. First, as Chief Justice Burger

138.

505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).

139.

H.R. 2621, supra note 46, § 104(a)(1)(B).

140.

This proposal would be consistent with current United States policy as 19 U.S.C. §

2114c(2)(A)(i)(1998) provides an informal method whereby the President consults with state
governments where "he deems appropriate," during the course of trade negotiations.
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Indeed, if

efficiency translated into the accumulation of power in the hands of the
President at the expense of the states, this could lead to a tyrannical
government. The President would be able to rule without taking into
concern the interests of the state governments.
Second, efficiency would actually be promoted by adding a
prophylactic mechanism to protect state sovereignty 42 before the
conclusion of the trade agreement. Currently, states would be forced to
43
wait until after the agreement is concluded to challenge the agreement. 1
Otherwise, without a final agreement, there would be no tangible injury
141. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1982).
142. See supra, notes 51-56 and accompanying text for an argument that federalism is an
independent value from the rights and interests of the people who live within the states that is
worthy of protection. See also, supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text for a summary of
Justice O'Connor's defense of federalism.
143. In Public Citizens v. United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 917
(D.C.Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit faced a challenge to NAFTA
negotiations. The plaintiffs sought an order for the Trade Representative to prepare an
environmental statement for NAFTA during the negotiation process. The court found that for
there to be a cause of action, there needed to be a final act of an administrative agency. Id. at
919. In this case, as the negotiations were still in progress, there was no guarantee that the
negotiations would produce a final agreement. Without a final agreement, there can be no final
act of an administrative agency. Id.
After NAFrA had been concluded, but before it had passed Congress, the plaintiffs
renewed their suit. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the President had the authority to
renegotiate NAFTA, or decide not to submit it to Congress, it was not the Trade Representative's
action that the plaintiffs were challenging. Public Citizens v. United States Trade Representative,
5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C.Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994). As presidential actions
were not final administrative agency acts, they were not reviewable under the APA. Id. The court
concluded by stating that "NAFTA's fate now rests in the hands of the political branches. The
judiciary has no role to play." Id. This statement is a power indication of the deference the courts
gave to the Executive branch. It implied that the courts would not interfere in the process of
implementing the trade agreement, even if it involved the accelerated process involved in Fast
Track.
One more attempt to compel the issuance of an environmental impact statement came
to the District Court in Public Citizens v. Kantor, 864 F.Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994). In this case,
the Uruguay Round of GATT had to be completed, and an agreement sent to Congress under FastTrack procedures. Id. at 211. This time, the court asserted that the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the second action brought by the plaintiffs "unequivocally foreclosed judicial review."
Id. The court could not revisit the issue on a writ of mandamus. Id. at 213.
These cases demonstrate a reluctance on the part of the courts to review the process
of negotiation of trade agreements. Instead of deciding the case on the merits of the cause of
action, the courts dismissed the cases under a doctrine of deference. The courts decided to
dismiss the cases finding either the controversy to lack the requisite ripeness, or the plaintiff to
lack standing. This suggests a tendency of the courts to avoid the issue of the constitutionality of
the President's authority under Fast-Track.
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that the states could contest.'" The states would be forced to challenge
trade agreements only after becoming law. At that point, there would be
greater pressure on the courts to uphold the validity of the agreement.
The better alternative would be to address the issue of state
sovereignty before the agreement is concluded. The removal of non-tariff
barriers that affect state regulations could then be addressed during the
negotiation process, and receive an approval before the agreement becomes
final. Then, an agreement such as NAFTA could not be said to dictate to
the states how to regulate without including the states in the process. This
would have the function of protecting not only the value of creating greater
certainty with regard to trade agreements that affect the states, but also of
upholding federalism.
IV. CONCLUSION

The history of presidential trade authority has shown a tendency of
Congress to delegate power to the President to decrease influence of
special interests.
Beginning in 1934, Congress sought to avoid the
influence of protectionist forces. The effect of Fast-Track today is to blunt
the influence of labor and environmental interests. It is for this reason that
labor and environmental interests have aimed to defeat Fast-Track.
However, in centralizing authority over international trade
agreements, Congress may be acting to circumvent safeguards deliberately
placed in the constitutional structure. Specifically, federalism acts to ensure
excessive power does not become accumulated in one set of hands. The
aim is to avoid tyranny.
No safeguards exist in Fast-Track for federalism.
As trade
agreements address non-tariff barriers, the Federal Government must
recognize that trade agreements affect states' interests. By the very terms
of NAFTA, the Federal Government is bound to seek state compliance.
Yet, the states have no role in the formation of the trade agreements.
Instead, they are forced to accept the agreement and any changes in state
laws, without a voice in its creation. This problem can be solved easily by
requiring the President to consult representatives of state governments
during the negotiations, just as the President consults members of
Congress. Such a requirement would not act as a hurdle to the formation
of a trade agreement, and encourages greater efficiency by avoiding attacks
on the agreement after it has been concluded. Requiring consultations with
representatives of state governments during trade negotiations would ensure
continued vitality of federalism.

144. Public Citizens, 970 F.2d at 919.
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The first concrete reference to money laundering can be traced to the
European Parliament [hereinafter "EP"] Resolution of October 16, 1986.
This Resolution urged the Council of Ministers (the community's main
decision making organ) to adopt promptly an instrument on "concerted
action to tackle the drug problem."' More particularly, the EP urged the
Council of Ministers to introduce effective measures to deal with
laundering of proceeds from narcotics trafficking by, inter alia, adopting a
directive making the reporting of currency transactions compulsory in all
Member States. On October 30, 1986, the Council of Ministers meeting at
*
Dr. Konstantinos D. Magliveras received his Juris Doctorate Degree in Athens,
Greece, LL.M. degrees in Britain and his Doctor of Juridical Science Degree from the University
of Oxford. Dr. Magliveras lectured at the University of Aberdeen, Britain, and the University of
Sussex, Britain and has performed Post-Doctoral research at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the
Netherlands. He is currently practicing law in Greece.
1.
Council Resolution on The Drug Problem 1986, 1986 O.J. (C 383) 76; see Bull. Eur.
Communities 10-1986, point 2.4.17.
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the justice ministers level issued a declaration on the drug problem.
However, the declaration did not go as far as the EP's proposal. It only
proposed that practical guidelines be established for freezing and
confiscating the assets of drug traffickers. 2
The following year, the European Community [hereinafter "EC"]
participated actively in the preparatory work of the International

Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking [hereinafter "The
Conference"] which was held in Vienna, Austria in June 1987. 3 The
Conference led to the adoption of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 4 The Vienna Convention is

primarily concerned with criminalizing narcotics trafficking,'

it also

envisages that signatory parties should make the laundering of proceeds
resulting from narcotics a criminal offense. In the Vienna Convention, the
term "money laundering" has been defined in the following two ways:
1. The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that [it has
derived from a drug offense] for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any
other person who is involved in the commission of [a drug
offense] to evade the legal consequences of his actions; 6 and

2.
See Bull. Eur. Communities 10-1986, point 2.4.10.
See European Commission Recommendation to the Council Concerning the
3.
Community's Participation and the Action Programme on its Contribution to the Conference,
COM(86)457 final; Bull. Eur. Communities 7/8-1986, point 2.1.113.
4.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
signed in Vienna, Austria, on Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.82/15, [1989] 28 I.L.M. 493,
MISC 14 (1988) CM 804 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. This Convention is a typical
example among contemporary treaties which break away from the traditional rule of international
law that only states may become signatory parties by allowing also regional economic integration
organizations to accede to them. Another example of such a treaty is the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, whose art. 305(l)(t) envisages that any international
organization, which fulfills certain criteria, may sign it. The European Community (EC) did so
on Dec. 7, 1984 and ratified the Law of Sea Convention by virtue of Council Decision 94/562 of
July 25, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 215) 9.
5.
Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3(1). It obliges signatory parties to make
the commission of relevant offenses liable to criminal sanctions, which take into account their
grave nature. Note that the European Community has implemented this provision by adopting the
Council Resolution of Dec. 20, 1996 on Sentencing for Serious Illicit Drug-Trafficking, 1997
O.J. (C 10) 3.
6.
Id. at art. 3(1)(b)(ii).
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2. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement or ownership of property,
knowing that such property is derived from [a drug] offense.

The Vienna Convention includes a number of provisions aiming at
effective investigation and prosecution of money laundering cases. More
particularly, it provides for extradition between signatory parties in
criminal cases involving money launderers, for mutual legal assistance9
and for the possibility of transferring to another jurisdiction proceedings
for criminal prosecution of alleged money launderers.' 0
Finally, the
Convention obliges participating states to take appropriate measures to
facilitate the confiscation of laundered property, which has been
transformed or converted into legitimate assets. To that end, parties must
ensure that national courts are empowered to order the disclosure of bank
records; states may not invoke domestic rules of bank secrecy to avoid
compliance. "
Fresh impetus to the problems posed by the wide-ranging money
laundering activities and the interaction between organized crime and the
banking system was given once again by the EP. In its Resolution of
September 12, 1991, it called upon the European Commission (the
Community's executive organ) to work with national governments to come
up with efficient measures drastically combating organized crime. In
particular, it suggested that in appropriate circumstances, bank secrecy2
rules should be lifted in order to control and prevent money laundering.'
However, since bank secrecy is an area traditionally associated with state
sovereignty, the EP's call was largely ignored and no concrete action was
taken by the EC.
These sporadic initiatives did not fully address the real problem facing
the EC. The liberalization of the financial sector achieved in the late
7.
Id. at art. 3(1)(b)(i).
8.
Id. at art. 6. Extradition proceedings between most EC Member States are regulated
by the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, under the auspices of the Council of
Europe, E.T.S. 24.
9.
Id. at art. 7. A basis for mutual assistance is afforded by the European Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg, Apr. 20, 1959, 472 UNTS 185, E.T.S.
30. Note that during the 1990s the United States has concluded mutual legal assistance treaties
with the following EC Members: Austria (signed on Feb. 23, 1995, not yet in force),
Luxembourg (signed on Mar. 13, 1997, not yet in force) and the United Kingdom (signed on Jan.
6, 1994, in force since Feb. 12, 1996).
10. Id. at art. 8. The European treaty covering this field is the Convention on Transfer
of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, May 15, 1972, 1137 UNTS 29, under the auspices of the
Council of Europe, E.T.S. 73.
11. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
12. See PARL. EUR. Doc. B3-1393, 1399, 1420 and 1426/91, 1991 O.J. (C 267) 113;
Bull. Eur. Communities 9-1991, point 1.2.134.
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13
1980's and early 1990's posed complex problems of banking supervision.
More importantly, it allowed money launderers to take full advantage of
the new regime, thus endangering the foundations of the Community's
financial sector. The situation became even more complicated, because in
a large number of Member States the notion of money laundering was an
unknown entity. It is true that the criminal law of all Member States does
punish the offense of dishonestly handling stolen goods or goods deriving
from the commission of other crimes or the proceeds of such crimes.14
Although the theoretical construction of money laundering and the handling
of stolen goods share common characteristics, there are fundamental
differences in their nature.' 5
The myriad of issues and difficulties involved in devising an effective
framework for combating money laundering made it imperative that the EC
responded en block and that it was not left to Member States to deal with
money laundering on an individual basis. Although, at the time, the
principle of subsidiarity had not yet been incorporated in the Community
legal order.' 6 However, it has been submitted that money laundering
constitutes a typical example of an area, where legislative action adopted
by the EC can achieve far better results than any action undertaken by each
Member State separately.
The reason for this submission is that money laundering is not a crime
confined within the boundaries of any given country. On the contrary,
money launderers operate as internationally organized players for which
the notion of nation-state is obsolete.' 7 Due to the integration of the world
economy at large and the bringing down of barriers in the EC in particular,
it has been possible for money launderers to organize themselves on a
transnational basis and exploit the financial sectors of those countries. This

13.

On the interplay between effective supervision and money laundering,

see

KONSTANTINOS MAGLIVERAS, THE ATTEMPTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO INTRODUCE
EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR IN 1996 ONWARDS: LOWERING

THE BARRIERS FURTHER 81, 82 (Caiger & Floudas eds., 1996).
14. E.g. §§ 21-22 Theft Act, 1968, (Eng. & Wales); Larceny Act § 7 (1990) (Ir.); Penal
Code art. 394 (Greece); Penal Code art. 261 (F.R.G.); Penal Code art. 546 (Spain).
15. See Magliveras, supra note 13, at 96-97.
16. It was inserted as art. 3b of the EC Treaty by virtue of art. G(5) of the Treaty
Establishing The European Union [hereinafter "EU Treaty"], Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992). This principle sets out the rule that in those areas which
do not fall within the European Community's exclusive legislative competence, the Community
shall take action only if the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States acting on their own.
17. On global money laundering, see Bruce Zagaris & Shiela M. Castilla, Constructing
an International Financial Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-MoneyLaunderingPolicy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 872, 874 (1993).
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is because their legal systems, either premeditatedly" or inadvertently,' 9
are unable to halt money laundering operations.2
II. THE DIRECTIVE PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERERS FROM USING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SYSTEM

The concerted response of the European Community to money
laundering came in mid-1991. On June 10, 1991, the Council of Ministers
adopted Directive 91/308 on prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering. 2 ' Directive 91/308 envisages a
threefold action.
First, to ensure that all Member States introduce
legislation, which will make the laundering of proceeds deriving from
serious crimes a criminal offense (Article 2). Second, to devise a system
whereby credit and financial institutions facilitate investigations undertaken
into money laundering operations by the competent national authorities.
This is to be achieved, inter alia, by keeping adequate records of
suspicious transactions, which will then be made available to such
authorities (Articles 3 to 11). Third, to allow Member States to extend the
provisions of Directive 91/308 to all those professions and entities involved
in large cash transactions which are usually carried out undetected, e.g.
dealers in art and in precious stones and metals, real estate agents,
accountants, casinos, bureaux de change and travel agencies. In this way,
it was hoped that the loopholes created by these largely unregulated
businesses will be covered (Article 12).
In Article 1, Directive 91/308 attempts to cover the whole financial
system of the European Community. Therefore, its provisions are not only
applicable to banks but extend to all types of credit and financial
institutions, which are being used or could be used by money launderers.
Credit institutions are defined in accordance with Article 1(1) and (3) of the
First Banking Directive. 22 Financial institutions are very broadly defined:

18. We have in mind those states, which, although they have been severely criticized for
lacking or maintaining lax money laundering legislation, they oppose any amendments to bring
their laws in conformity with international standards; most of the so-called international tax
havens belong to this category.
19. We refer to those states, which for various reasons (e.g. lack of expertise or
resources) are prevented from promulgating the required anti-money laundering legislation.
20. In its report of Feb. 28, 1996, the United Nations International Narcotics Control
Board concluded, inter alia, that criminals take advantage of countries with unregulated or
inadequately supervised financial sectors to move their laundering operations there.
21.
Council Directive 91/308, on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77. On the legislative history of the Directive,
KONSTANTINOS MAGLIVERAS,

MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

IN

BANKS: FRAUD AND CRIME 171, 174-75 (Norton ed., 1994).

22. Council Directive 77/780, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30, as last amended by Council
Directive 89/646 of Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, (Second Banking Directive). Therefore,
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on the one hand, they comprise undertakings, other than credit institutions,
which have their registered offices inside or outside the European
Community's territory and whose principal activity is to carry out any of
the transactions stipulated in the Annex of the Second Banking Directive;'
on the other hand, they comprise insurance companies duly authorized to
carry out activities in accordance with the relevant Directive. 4
The definition of money laundering is also given in Article 1 and it
becomes immediately clear that it has been heavily influenced by Article
3(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.'
The following intentional acts
constitute the offense of money laundering:
(a) conversion or transfer of property, when it is known that such
property has derived from criminal activities, for the purpose of
concealing or disguising the illegal origin of the property or of
assisting those involved in the carrying out of such activities to
avoid prosecution;
(b) concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition or movement of property, although it was known that
the property had derived from the commission of criminal
offenses;
(c) acquisition, possession or use of property, where the
perpetrator was aware, at the time of receipt, that the property
had derived from illicit activities; and
(d) participation or association in attempts to commit, aid, abet,
facilitate or counsel the commission of any of the acts described
above.
The offense of money laundering is also committed when the criminal
operations from where the laundered proceeds originated, were carried out
in the territory of a Member State or third country, different from the state
where prosecution is pursued. The term criminal activity is defined in
Article 1 and has been deliberately drafted in wide terms. It comprises the
offenses specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention. The
banks, other entities accepting deposits and offering banking services, and branches of banks
whose registered offices are in a different Member State or in a third country, are covered.
23. See Nos. 2 to 12 and 14 of the Annex to the Second Banking Directive, supra note
22.
24. Council Directive 79/267 of Mar. 5, 1979 O.J. (L 63) 1, (First Life Directive) as last
amended by Council Directive No. 92/96 of Nov. 10, 1992 O.J. (L 360) 1, (Third Life
Directive).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
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definition of criminal activity includes the cultivation, production,
manufacture, transportation and sale of narcotic drugs and the management
or financing of any of these activities, and "any other criminal activity
designated as such for the purposes of this Directive by each Member
State." This wording suggests that Member States are not compelled to
extend the scope of prohibited money laundering operations to proceeds
other than those deriving from drug trafficking offenses (the predicate
offenses).
In this respect, the definition of money laundering has been badly
drafted because it leaves it to the discretion of Member States to decide
which criminal activities should be designated. In effect it allows for
considerable disparities between national legislation. One consequence of
this disparity could be seen in cases of extradition: if Member State A
requests from Member State B the extradition of C for alleged laundering
of funds derived from terrorist activities and the laws of Member State B
criminalize only the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds, the request
shall be turned down, because the principle of double criminality (i.e. that
the act for which extradition is petitioned must be a criminal offense in
both Member States)26 would not be fulfilled. It would have been better, if
a minimum catalogue of predicate offenses had been included in Directive
91/308, possibly covering drug trafficking, terrorism, tax evasion, loan
sharking, illegal gambling and prostitution, and Member States had been
left free to add to that list.
Directive 91/308 has a stipulation that money launderers may only be
prosecuted if they were aware that the property given to them for
conversion derived from committing or participating in a predicate
offense. 27 This places an additional obstacle to successfully bringing before
the courts money laundering cases. This is because prosecutors bear the
onus of proving that the launderers had concrete knowledge of the
property's illicit origin.28 It should be stressed that Directive 91/308's
strict requirement that the alleged money laundering operations must have
been intentional in order to be prosecuted has not been followed by all
Member States.
Thus, the implementing legislation adopted in the
Netherlands, 29 Ireland30 and Britain3' also punish negligent money
26. In Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903), the United States Supreme Court
stated that "the general principle of international law is that in all cases of extradition the act done
on account of which extradition is demanded must be considered a crime by both states." This
rule has been incorporated as art. 2(1) of the European Convention on Extradition, supra note 5.
27.
C. Art. 3(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 4.
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5(7) (urging signatory parties to consider
reversing the burden of proof regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds liable to
confiscation).
29. Penal Code art. 417 bis (Neth.); see Konstantinos Magliveras, The Implementation of
the 1991 EC Directive on Money Laundering in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, 8 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM OF THE N.Y. B.A. 89, 95-96 (1995).
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laundering. In other words, cases where the defendant ought to have
suspected that the proceeds whose identity he disguised had derived from
the commission of a predicate offense.
A further difficulty with which prosecutors in Member States are
faced is that they must link the illicit proceeds to a specific crime. This is
particularly true in the case of drug trafficking offenses, which are usually
committed many times in the course of a single day. As early as 1988, the
British Metropolitan Police maintained that the fact that the prosecution had
to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the laundered money had been
the proceeds of drug trafficking resulted in considerable difficulties, not
only in conducting in-depth investigations but also in securing convictions
for money laundering offenses. 2
Similar obstacles exist in relation to confiscation orders. The position
of the British law exemplifies how a Member State had to amend its
legislation to overcome these difficulties. Under the Criminal Justice Act
1988, confiscation orders could have only concerned proceeds derived
from the offense for which the defendant was convicted. It followed, that
proceeds of crimes, the defendant was not charged with could have never
been the object of a confiscation order. With the promulgation of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, the British legislator changed this state of
affairs: section 2(4) of the 1995 Act now empowers courts to make the
assumption that all property held by the defendant at the time of conviction
is perceived as proceeds of the offense charged with.33
Article 2 of the Money Laundering Directive proved to be quite
controversial, because its original wording insisted that Member States
"ensure that money laundering is treated as a criminal offense." 3 4 At one
point, this provision jeopardized the adoption of the whole directive by the
Council of Ministers.3 5 The dispute at issue was whether the European
Community enjoys any legislative power in the area of criminal law. This
was not the first time that an EC instrument falling within the broad area of
criminal law proved to be controversial. For example, in 1987 a proposal
was put forward for a directive harmonizing insider dealing across the
Community. 36 This Directive required that insider dealing should be
30. Criminal Justice Act § 93A(l)(1988); see Konstantinos Magliveras, The Regulation of
Money Laundering in the Republic of Ireland, 11 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 82, 83 (1995).
31.
Criminal Justice Act § 93A(1)(1988)(Eng.), § 93A(l)(1998)(Eng.), inserted by virtue
of Criminal Justice Act, § 29(1993)(Eng.).
32. See House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Session 1988-89, Seventh
Report, Drug Trafficking and Related Serious Crime, Vol. I, para. 79, H.C. 370.
33. See Konstantinos Magliveras, Extending Further the Powers of Confiscation in
Britain: The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 8, 9 (1997).
34. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
35. See Magliveras, supra note 21, at 178-79.
36. COM(87) 111 final, 1987 O.J. (C 153) 8.

1998]

Magliveras

treated as a criminal offense. The uncompromising position of Germany
led to the amendment of the relevant provision (Article 13) to the following
wording: "Each Member State shall determine penalties to be applied for
infringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. ,31
A similar compromise was reached in the Money Laundering
Directive and Article 2 was changed to read: "Member States shall ensure
that money laundering as defined in this Directive is prohibited." In order
to compensate for this watered-down provision, the European Community
partners gave the undertaking that their implementing legislation would
make money laundering a criminal offense by December 31, 1992.38
Article 2 of the Money Laundering Directive was supplemented by
two new provisions, which did not appear in the original proposal. 39 The
first is Article 14, whose wording is identical to Article 13 of the Insider
Dealing Directive.' This Directive obliges Member States to determine
the penalties to be imposed in case the measures adopted under the
Directive are infringed upon. The second is Article 15, which empowers
Member States to promulgate against money launderers measures stricter
than those envisaged in the Directive.4 '
During the deliberations for the adoption of the Money Laundering
Directive, the EP proposed that Article 2 should have also obliged Member
States to ensure that all proceeds from criminal activities were subject to
confiscation. This view was not shared by the Council of Ministers. The
EP amendment considerably altered the scope of the Directive, which aims
only at preventing money launderers from exploiting the European
Community's integrated financial system for their benefit. It follows that
the Directive was not conceived as an instrument facilitating confiscation of
illicit proceeds. Currently, this may only be achieved under specific

37. Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30., coordinating regulations on insider
dealing. The German position has consistently been that insider dealing should not be
criminalized. See Engel, Zur Problematic eines gesetzliches Verbots von Insider-Geschaeften, 3
JAHRBUCH FLIER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT 338 (1991). It was finally outlawed under the Securities
Trading Act (Gesetz ueber den Wertpapierhandel) of July 26, 1994, published in
Bundesgesetzblatt (German Official Gazette), Part I, at 1749. See ASSMAN, THE PROPOSED
GERMAN LEGISLATION ON INSIDER DEALING IN INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE:

CURRENT STATUS 15 (Wegen ed., 1994).
38. The undertaking took the form of a declaration of intent, attached to the text of the
Directive, supra note 21. Note that the European Parliament has argued that because of the
importance of the organized crime problem, the fight against it should become a matter of
exclusive Community competence. See European Parliament Resolution on Criminal Activities in
Europe, PARL. EUR. DoC. A3-0033/94; 1994 O.J. (C 61) 235.
39. See Commission Proposal on a Directive to Curb Money Laundering, COM(90)106
final, 1990 O.J. (C 106)6; 2 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 411 (1990).
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
41. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
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treaties, such as the Vienna Convention,4 2 the Council of Europe
Convention on Laundering, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of
Crime4 3 and the Schengen Implementing Agreement."
Articles 3 through 7 of the Money Laundering Directive contain the
measures, which Member States must impose on credit and financial
institutions operating in their jurisdiction.4" Article 3(1) provides that such
institutions must proceed with customer identification when an account is
opened or a transaction is carried out exceeding, in local currency, the
amount of ECU 15,000 ($ 13,650) either in a single operation or in
separate operations, appearing to be loosely connected (the so-called
smurfing).
In practice, the identification requirement is implemented
when banks check in detail the identity of customers (the so-called know
your customer principle) and refrain from opening anonymous4" or proxy
accounts where the beneficiary's identity is not fully revealed.
The identification requirement also extends to insurance companies.
Article 3(3) and (4) exclude from its application those insurance policies
whose periodic premiums, in any given year, do not exceed ECU 1,000 ($
1,350) or whose lump sum investment amounts to ECU 2,500 ($ 3,375) or
less, or insurance policies of occupational pension schemes.48 These limits
have been set at rather low levels and that provision ought to have been
made to index-link these amounts to inflation, which in certain Member
States is not inconsiderable.
Finally, Article 3(8) stipulates that the
identification requirement is fulfilled, if payment of the insurance policy is
effected through an account held in the customer's name and in a credit
institution covered by the Directive. This provision could have been
problematic at the time the Directive was adopted. However, because
supervision in the financial sector was not properly harmonized across the

42. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
43. The Convention was concluded in Strasbourg, France on Nov. 8, 1990, in force since
Sept. 1, 1993, E.T.S. 141, at articles 13-17; reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991). Twenty-seven
states have signed it, but only thirteen have ratified it; the United Kingdom was the first country
to ratify it on Sept. 28, 1992, 1993 Gr. Brit.T.S. No. 59 (Cmnd. 2337).
44. The Agreement was signed in Schengen, Luxembourg on June 19, 1990, in force
since March 26, 1995, [1991], at an. 72; 30 I.L.M. 84. It supersedes the Convention on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at the Common Borders of France, the Federal Republic, Belgium,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg of June 14, 1985 (the so-called Schengen Convention), [1991]
30 I.L.M. 73. See generally O'Keefe, The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European
Integration? 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 185 (1992).
45. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
46. Id.
47. On Austria's insistence to maintain anonymous accounts, see infra at 108-111.
48. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
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European Community, the situation has been undoubtedly improved with
the entry into force in July 1996, of the so-called Post-BCCI Directive. 49
Article 6 of the Money Laundering Directive imposes a duty on credit
and financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the competent
national judicial or law enforcement authorities. However, it was agreed
not to adopt a general reporting requirement similar to the one, which has
been imposed in the United States since 1970.50 The United States
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 requires banks
to file a report (CTR) with the Treasury Department within 15 days after a
customer deposits, withdraws or transfers currency in excess of $10,000,
regardless of whether the transaction was of a suspicious nature. 1
Undoubtedly, the Directive's drafters had a lot to learn from the
application of the United States regulations, especially in relation to
smurfing. Courts have held that the 1970 Act did not prohibit the
structuring of banking transactions to multiple operations involving
amounts less than $10,000 in order to avoid the CTR filing requirement.52
This lacuna was not closed until the Money Laundering Control Act was
promulgated in 1986;51 it enacted the so-called anti-smurfing statute, which
provides that "no person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements, structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure any
transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions."'5 4
The United States legislation has been notably followed in Australia,
where section 7 of the Cash Transaction Reports Act 1988 (in operation
49. European Parliament and Council Directive No. 95/26 of June 29, 1995 amending
Directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC in the field of credit institutions, Directives No.
73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC in the field of non-life insurance, Directives Nos. 79/267/EEC and
92/96/EEC in the field of life insurance, Directive No. 93/22/EEC in the field of investment
firms and Directive No. 85/611/EEC in the field of undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities, with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision, 1995 I.J.
L 168) 7. For
examination of this Directive, see Magliveras, supra note 13, at 83-96.
50. Note that Taiwan's Money Laundering Control Act of Oct. 23, 1996 in force since
April 23, 1997, has opted for the EC suspicion-based reporting system rather than the U.S. one;
see Lee, Recent Anti-Money-Laundering Efforts in Taiwan, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 140,
143-44 (1998).
51. Commonly referred to by the misnomer Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1118, (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1994)), in particular §
5313(A). On the problems created by the vast number of CTRs (estimated to have reached over
100 million by the end of 1997). See Byrne, Bank Secrecy Act Compliance in the 1990's, 179
BANKERS MAO. 15 (1996).

52. See United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1309 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1004 (1989); United States v Mastronardo, 849 F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir. 1988); United States
v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1987).
53.
(1994)).
54.

Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957
See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
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since July 1990 and amended by Part II of the Crimes Legislation
Amendment Act 1992) has introduced a rather low threshold amount
requiring banks, credit unions, casinos, etc. to report cash transactions
over Ash 10,000 ($6,650) to the Australian Transaction Reports and
Analysis Centre (formerly, the Cash Transaction Reporting Agency).
Section 31 of the 1988 Act creates the offense of smutfing and already
there have been a number of prosecutions. It is interesting to note that in
the first case of successful prosecution, the accused was not a bank
customer, but the manager of a foreign bank's Sydney representative
office, whose staff had itself developed a system to enable certain clients to
engage in smurfing.5"
Although the system of compulsory reporting of all transactions
involving a minimum amount has not been particularly effective in
detecting money-laundering operations in the banking sector, certain
countries have recently adopted it. More specifically, section 4 of
Bahamas' Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1995 stipulates
reporting requirements similar to those imposed on United States financial
institutions. 5 In addition, Articles 11 through 13 of the 1998 Brazilian Bill
on Money Laundering obligate home banks and representative offices of
foreign financial institutions to report transactions above a certain threshold
to the national Financial Activities Control Board.57
Article 6 of the Money Laundering Directive also obliges credit and
financial institutions to furnish the competent authorities of a Member State
with all requested information, documents or records and to assist them in
their criminal investigations into money laundering cases.5 s
Since
furnishing such information results in bank secrecy being lifted, this may
possibly lead to a breach of contract by the forwarding institution. Article
9(2) stipulates that any such disclosure, done in good faith to the competent
authorities, shall not involve civil or penal responsibility of any kind on the
part of the institution or its employees that disclosed the sensitive
information.59

55. See Hammond & Waldie, Money Laundering: Foreign Banks Beware, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., May 1996, at 49.
56. See Gibson, Bahamas Money LaunderingRegulations 1996, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L.REP. 1 (1997). The Bahamas was the first offshore financial center to enact legislation against
money laundering.
57. Law No. 9613 of Mar. 3, 1998. See Bruce Zagaris & Sardenberg, Brazil Enacts
Anti-Money - Laundering Law, 14 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 136, 138-39 (1998).
58. Council Directive No. 91/308, supra note 21.
59. Cy. Post-BCCI Directive, supra note 49, at art. 5. It provides that when an auditor
reveals irregularities in the audited company to the competent authorities and thus violates his duty
of professional secrecy, such disclosures shall not constitute a breach of restrictions on disclosure
of information imposed by contract or any legislative or administrative provision and shall not
involve liability of any kind.
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During the Directive's drafting stages, the EP proposed two
amendments to the system of reporting suspicious transactions, which were
accepted by the Council of Ministers. The first, incorporated as Article 8,
ensures that banks will not disclose to their customers the fact that
information relating to their transactions has been requested and transmitted
to judicial authorities or that a money laundering investigation is being
carried out and that their names are in some way implicated in it (the socalled tipping off).
The second amendment, incorporated as Article 6(3), imposes an
obligation upon the competent authorities not to use the information
released in accordance with this provision for purposes other than
investigations into money laundering operations. A similar provision can
be found in Article 10(3) of the Insider Dealing Directive, preventing the
competent authorities from using the information received in any other
context apart from administrative or judicial proceedings against insider
traders. 6
In Article 10, the Money Laundering Directive calls for cooperation
between the various competent authorities of a Member State. However,
the exact structure of such cooperation is to be decided by each state
individually. The exception is that if inspections have been carried out in
credit or financial institutions by competent supervisory authority 6' and
they reveal evidence of possible laundering operations, it must be passed
on to the judicial or law enforcement authorities responsible for combating
money laundering.
In the United Kingdom this obligation has been
implemented in Regulation 16 of the Money Laundering Regulations
1993 . 6 This regulation places a legal duty upon the supervisory authorities
to disclose to the police as soon as practically possible any information
collected by them indicating money-laundering operations.
Unfortunately, the Directive's drafters did not include a provision
allowing the competent authorities in one Member State to request the
transmission of information from another Member State relating to money
laundering investigations.6 This possibility would have ensured the fullest
cooperation and assistance between the competent authorities in all Member
States by exchanging vital information regarding money launderers who
operate across borders. The lack of such a provision is rather curious

60. See supra note 37. Enumerating in a restrictive fashion in which cases confidential
information collected by or exchanged between banking supervisory authorities may be used and
for what purpose.
61. In EC law, the principle is that supervision is exercised solely by the competent
authorities of the state which first authorized the institution to pursue business, the so-called
"home country principle;" see Second Banking Directive, supra note 24, at art. 13.
62. Statutory Instruments No. 1993/1933.
63. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
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considering that such requests are possible under Article 10(1)-(2) of the
Insider Dealing Directive.'
As the situation now stands, such assistance can be afforded either in
the context of an official request pursuant to a bilateral mutual legal
assistance treaty' s or in accordance with the provisions of the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters' or the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering. 67
Article 10 of the latter treaty empowers one signatory party to forward
to another party, without prior request, information on proceeds from
illegal activities when it considers that, by disclosing such information, the
receiving state might be assisted in initiating or carrying out investigations
or prosecuting money launderers.6 It should be noted that this provision
does not give rise to a binding obligation. In other words, signatory parties
are entitled to exercise their discretion in deciding whether such
information should be transmitted to another state.
Taking into
consideration that the Convention could be acceded to by non-Council of
Europe Members, namely Australia, Canada and the United States,' the
prospects which this provision opens for effective international cooperation
are enormous,
should states be prepared to implement it with an open
70
mind.
Although it has been argued that this was the first time that a
multilateral treaty has envisaged such wide-ranging cooperation between
signatory parties,7 1 this submission is not accurate. Article 46(1) of the
Schengen Implementing Agreement had already stipulated that "In
particular cases, each Contracting Party may, in compliance with its
national law and without being asked, send the Contracting Party

64. See supra note 37. In Germany this provision has been implemented under paragraph
14 of the Securities Trading Act.
65. E.g. Agreement between UK and Italy concerning mutual assistance in relation to
traffic in narcotic drugs and the restraint and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, signed in
Rome, Italy, on May 16, 1990, in force since May 8, 1994. 1995 Gr. Brit.T.S. No. 33 (Cmnd.
2853).
66. See supra note 9.
67. See supra note 43.
68. Id.
69. This reflects the fact that these three countries participated actively in the
Convention's drafting; so far, only Australia has signed it, on Sept. 28, 1992.
70. See the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to Supplement
and Facilitate the Operation of the Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, signed in
London, on Sept. 15, 1993, in force since June 2, 1994. 1994 Gr. Brit.T.S. 45 (Cmnd. 2655).
71. See Nilsson, The Council of Europe Laundering Convention: A Recent Example of a
Developing International Criminal Law in Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational
Criminal Law, 457, 472 (Eser & Lagodny eds., 1993).
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concerned any information which may be of interest to it in helping prevent
future crime.'

III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE IN THE MEMBER STATES
According to Article 16, the European Community partners had to
implement the Money Laundering Directive into their internal legal orders
by January 1, 1993 at the latest. However, this deadline was not observed
by the majority of Member States. It is interesting to note that even
countries which had promulgated relevant legislation before the Directive
was adopted failed to achieve complete implementation by the stipulated
deadline. For example, in Britain where the laundering of proceeds from
drug trafficking was made a criminal offense in 1986, ' the Directive was
fully incorporated into national law by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act of
1993'4 and the Money Laundering Regulations of 1993.' 5 Similarly, in
Belgium, where the Act of July 17, 1990, introduced to its Penal Code
Article 505 creating the offense of intentional or negligent laundering of
proceeds of any crime, 76 the Directive was finally given effect by the
Money Laundering Act of January 11, 1993. 77
Although it is not within the scope of the present article to analyze
how the Directive was turned into domestic legislation in each and every
Member State, reference will be made to specific problems, which have
been encountered. The method of implementation opted for by most
Member States in Continental Europe has been to amend their Penal Codes
in order to criminalize money laundering and to promulgate separate
legislation catering for the substantive provisions of the Directive (e.g. the
identification requirement, the obligation to reveal to the competent
authorities all suspicious transactions and the duty not to alert customers
suspected of money laundering). This method was followed, inter alia, by
Germany where the 1992 Act on impeding illegal drug trafficking and
other forms of organized crime introduced a new paragraph 261 to the

72. The Agreement, supra note 44, was concluded three months before the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering, supra note 43.
73. See Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986 § 24 (Eng.). It was later replaced by the
Drug Trafficking Act, 1994 § 50 (Eng.).
74. The Act received the Royal Assent on July 27, 1993.
75. See supra note 62.
76. Loi du 17 julliet 1990, modifiant les arts. 42, 43 et 505 du Code penal et inserant un
art. 43bis dans ce meme Code (F90-2020), published in Moniteur Beige (Belgian Official
Gazette), Aug. 15 1990, at 15886.
77. Loi du 11 janvier 1993 relative a la prevention d I'utilisation du systeme financier aux
fins du blanchiment de capitaux, published in Moniteur Beige, Jan. 28, 1993. These two statutes
were amended by the Act of Apr. 7, 1995, published in Moniteur Beige, May 10, 1995 which

inserted a new art. 505(4) to the Penal Code expressly punishing attempted money laundering.
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Penal Code78 and the 1993 Act on the detection of proceeds from serious
crimes incorporated the substantive provisions.'
In the case of the Netherlands, the Dutch Penal Code was amended
with effect on February 1, 1992, to criminalize intentional (Article 416) or
negligent (Article 417bis) acceptance, possession or transfer of property
(including money) which has been obtained by committing any felony. 8°
The substantive provisions were implemented by the adoption of two
separate pieces of legislation: the Identification (Financial Services) Act
1993 and the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act
1993, both of which came into force on 1 February 1994.1
This method of implementation could be considered as advantageous,
in the sense that it allows Member States to adopt detailed and precise
legislation. However, it has the disadvantage of not being able to tackle
the problem effectively should the various pieces of legislation prove to be
incoherent with each other. The gist of the Directive is that the panacea of
money laundering is not addressed by simply ensuring that it is made a
criminal offense; this is only one of the required measures. Equally
important is the assistance afforded by many different players: law
enforcement agencies, financial institutions, supervisory authorities, etc.
Only the concerted effort of the legislature and these players ensures that
the money-laundering problem is efficiently tackled.
A.

The Case of Spain
This argument is best illustrated by examining the shortcomings of the
Directive's implementation in Spain. Organic Law 1/1988 of March 24,
1988, reforming the Penal Code in relation to illegal drug-trafficking
introduced Article 546bis(f), which penalized the laundering of proceeds
derived from dealing in drugs. 82 A first attempt to incorporate the
Directive's substantive provisions was the promulgation, on December 28,

78. Gesetz zur Bekaempfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer
Erscheinungsformen der organisierten Kriminalitaet of July 15, 1992, published in
Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 34, July 27, 1992, at 1302; see Magliveras, supra note 29, at 90 et
seq.
79. Gesetz ueber das Aufspueren von Gewinnen aus schweren Straftaten
(Geldwaeschegesetz) of Oct. 25, 1993, published in Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 56, Oct. 29,
1993, at 1770.
80. See Magliveras, supra note 29, at 95.
81. Respectively, Wet identificatie bij fmanciele dienstverlening and Wet melding
ongebruikelijke transacties both of Feb. 2, 1993, published in the Dutch Official Gazette, 199293, Nos. 23008 and 23009, respectively.
82.

Published in Boletin Oficial del Estado (Spanish Official Gazette, B.O.E.), Mar. 26,

1988, No. 74, at 9498. Its scope was subsequently widened by Organic Law No. 8/1992 of Dec.
23, 1992, published in B.O.E., Dec. 24, 1992, No. 308.
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1993 of Act 19/1993, on Offenses Relating to the Laundering of Moneys.83
Since this instrument did not implement the Directive fully, a provision was
made whereby the government was granted six months from the day the
Act entered into force (i.e. until June 28, 1994) to adopt the necessary
supplementary legislation. However, this deadline was not observed and,
in effect, Spain was faced with a situation where only some aspects of the
anti-money laundering legislation were in place.
The supplementary
legislation was finally promulgated on June 9, 1995, as Royal Decree
925/1995.' 4
This plethora of instruments regulating the same area has resulted in
unavoidable contradictions. As already mentioned, Article 564bis(f) of the
Penal Code criminalizes the laundering of proceeds deriving solely from
drug trafficking. Whereas the scope of Act 19/1993 has been augmented
to cover not only drug trafficking proceeds, but also proceeds from
criminal activities perpetrated by terrorists or by organized crime groups.
It follows that although a person who launders proceeds from an armed
attack on a security van carried out by terrorists may not be prosecuted
under the Penal Code, a bank manager who failed to report a transaction
for which there was evidence or knowledge that constituted an operation to
launder proceeds from the armed attack will be prosecuted under Act
19/1993. This divergence between the two instruments, which had been
acknowledged by the Spanish government," was rectified in Article 301 of
the new Penal Code.8 6
It would be untrue to argue this state of affairs paralyzed the Spanish
law enforcement agencies. The argument made here is that, until Royal
Decree 925/1995 was promulgated, Spanish law was not in a position to
deal, in a drastic manner, with money laundering operations.
It is
interesting to note the money laundering operations which have been
unveiled by the Spanish police were not discovered as a result of the
legislation's application but by reason of the arrest of the drug traffickers,
83.
Ley 19/1993, de 28 de diciembra, sobre determinadas medidas de prevencion del
blanquero de capitales published in B.O.E., Dec. 29, 1993, No. 311, at 37327.

84.

Published in B.O.E., June 9, 1995, No. 160 and corrected in B.O.E., Oct. 31, 1995,

No. 260.

The Decree, inter alia, provides the complete list of entities whose activities are

covered by the money laundering legislation (art. 2); stipulates in which cases the identification
requirement does not apply (art. 4); sets out the functions of and the procedure before the
Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses, the competent
authority to receive notification of suspicious transactions (arts. 19-26); and amends the penalties

imposed for money laundering offenses (art. 16).
85. See Konstantinos Magliveras, The Recent Legislation to Combat Money Laundering
in Spain, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 84, 85 (1996).
86.

It was promulgated by the Spanish Parliament on Nov. 8, 1995 and published in

B.O.E., Nov. 24, 1995, No. 281, in force since May 24, 1996; see generally Mir, Das neue
spanische Strafgesetzbuch von, 108 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFWISSENSCHAFT 857
(1996).

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 5:93

110

who revealed how the proceeds were laundered.8 7 The most spectacular
prosecution occurred in October 1995, when four individuals were accused
of laundering two billion pesetas ($13 million) between 1988 and 1991,
which had derived from drug trafficking. The method of laundering was a
very simple one: they exchanged in a specific bank the narcotics proceeds,
held in Italian liras and Dutch florins, into pesetas."5
The Case Of Austria
The implementation of the Money Laundering Directive has not only
been problematic for the existing Member States, but also for countries
which acceded to the European Community after it was adopted. The case
of Austria affords a very good illustration and shows that, notwithstanding
the deep integration of the European Community's banking sector, there
still exist considerable differences regarding banking ethics. As a signatory
party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area 9 and to the Treaty
of Nordic and Austrian Accession, under which she became a Member
State on January 1, 1995, 9' Austria was under an obligation to transform
the Money Laundering Directive into national law. Implementation was
achieved on July 30, 1993, with the promulgation of the Penal Code
(Money Laundering) Act 1993. 9'
The Act introduced the offense of money laundering in paragraph
165(1) of the Austrian Penal Code. It stipulates that anyone who conceals
valuables in excess of ASh 100,000 ($7,900) obtained through a crime or
who disguises their illicit origin or makes untrue statements in respect of
them is to be punished with a maximum term of imprisonment of two years
Paragraph 165(3) deals with money
or with a pecuniary penalty.'
laundering operations involving more than ASh 500,000 ($39,500) or
carried out by members of criminal groups which were established with the
B.

87.

See Spanish Police Strike Against Drug-RelatedLaundering, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT

L.REP. 90 (1997).

88.

See Spanish Drug ProsecutorSeeks First Closure of Bank for Money Laundering, 11

INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 479 (1995).

89.

Signed in Oporto, Portugal on May 2, 1992, in force since Jan. 1, 1994, 1994 O.J.

(L 1) 3.
Signed in Corfu, Greece on June 24, 1994, in force since Jan. 1, 1995, 1994 O.J. (C
90.
241) 9; see article 2 of the attached Austrian Act of Accession, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 21. The
legislative changes to Austria's financial services sector brought about by its accession are
summarized in Huber and Luiki, Austria - Major Changes in Financial and Securities Laws
Prompted by New EC Era [1995] 2 Eur. Fin. Serv. L. 35.
Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Strafgesetzbuch im - Zusammenhang mit der
91.
Geldwaescherei geaendert wird, No. 527, published in Bundesgesetzblatt fuer Oesterreich
(Austrian Official Gazette), No. 192, July 30, 1993, at 3885, in force since Oct. 1, 1993; on the
Draft Act, see Kienapfel, Die Geldwaescherei [1993] 48 Oesterreichische Juristen Zeitung 80.

92.

Id.
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purpose of continuously laundering illicit proceeds; these offenses attract
the heavier punishment of a term of imprisonment between six months and
five years.' The lack of the possibility to impose a pecuniary penalty on
money launderers involved in such cases should be criticized, because, as
consistent practice has shown, it is not always possible for the prosecution
to detect the physical location of the laundered funds so as to proceed with
their seizure. In these instances, the imposition of a heavy penalty results,
at least partially, in skimming the convicted launderer of his illicit gains.
Since 1996, Austria has been involved in a bitter dispute with the
European Commission on whether its banking laws comply with the
requirements of the Money Laundering Directive. The issue of the dispute
is the fact that the Austrian legislation, unique among Member States,
allows the opening and holding of anonymous savings accounts, known as
Sparbuch Kontos.' On February 15, 1996, the Commission forwarded a
formal complaint warning the Austrian government that, by not ensuring
the proper identification of individuals opening savings accounts, it had
failed to comply with its obligations under the Directive. The Commission
concluded its communication with requesting Austria to proceed
immediately with abolishing all such anonymous accounts.9 The European
Commission has not been alone in severely criticizing Austria in this
respect. A 1995 United States government report on the vulnerability of
the world banking system to money laundering ranked Austria's banking
sector alongside those of Colombia, Venezuela and Thailand because of its
potential for abuse by money launderers.'
On April 9, 1996, Austria flatly rejected the Commission's complaint.
Reflecting the strong nationalist reaction, which this issue provoked, Mr.
Klaus Liebscher, the Central Bank president, characteristically said that
anonymous savings accounts "are part of the Austrian savings culture
In its response, Austria insisted that
[which] should not be touched."'
these accounts be maintained on the following considerations. 9' First, the
Austrian Constitution guarantees bank secrecy and domestic legislation
provides for adequate guarantees that bank secrecy will be lifted in the
Laundering the proceeds of a criminal organization at its request is regulated in
93.
Article 278a of the Austrian Penal Code and is punishable with a term of imprisonment of

between six months and five years.
94.
The Commission has estimated that Austria's population of eight million maintains
some 26 million such savings accounts holding approximately ASh 1,4 trillion ($ 110 billion).
Zagaris, Austria Will Restrict Bank Secrecy Laws on Securities, But Not Savings
95.
Accounts, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 88 (1996).
96. See Austria: Controversy over Austrian Anonymity Rules, CLIFFORD CHANCE EUR.
FIN. SERv. NEWSLETTER, Mar. 1996, at 1.

97.

See Fuchs, Gewinnabschoepfung und Geldwaescherei Wie soil es weitergehen? [1995]

50 OESTERREICHISCHE JURISTEN ZEITUNG 215.
98.

Id.
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event of criminal investigations.' Second, bank accounts have been held
anonymously in Austria for 200 years. Third, these accounts may only be
opened by Austrian citizens and the maximum amount held in them cannot
exceed ASh 200,000 ($15,800). Therefore, they are not of particular
assistance to money launderers who are mostly engaged in transferring
considerably larger amounts. Fourthly, although during 1995 Austrian
banks reported 310 cases of suspected money laundering transactions, with
a volume of ASh 2.5 billion ($197 million), only a handful of these
involved savings accounts. o
As was expected, the European Commission was not at all impressed
by the argumentation put forward by Austria and especially by the
submission that a different banking culture has existed for so long, which
should be taken into consideration. Consequently, in September 1996, the
Commission addressed Austria in another communication stating its view
that the rule of anonymity in opening savings accounts is incompatible with
the identification requirement enshrined in Article 3(1) of the Directive °1
and that the continued existence of such accounts offers a safe haven for
illicit funds." The gist of the Commission's communication was that the
current Austrian legislation infringes upon not only European, but also
common international standards on the prevention of money laundering to
which all countries are expected to subscribe.
Austria's uncompromising position on its bank secrecy laws led the
Commission to commence the infringement proceedings envisaged in
Article 169 of the EC Treaty. 0 3 Thus, in March 1997, it sent a Reasoned
Opinion to the Austrian government where it recorded the alleged
violations of the Money Laundering Directive and gave Austria final
opportunity to have its anonymous bank accounts abolished. In April
1997, the Austrian government rejected the Commission's contentions and

99. Id.
100. According to paragraph 40(1) of the Austrian Banking Act 1993 (Bankwesengesetz)
published in Bundesgesetzblatt, July 30, 1993, No. 194, at 3903, when banks suspect money
laundering operations, they are under the duty to establish the customer's identity and
communicate promptly their suspicions to the law enforcement authorities. The latter are
empowered under paragraph 40(3) to demand that the bank does not carry out the suspicious
transaction until authorization to do so has been granted. This power has been strongly criticized
because it infringes customers' rights without the legislation expressly authorizing it. See Fuchs,
supra note 97.
101. See supra, at note 21.
102. See CLIFFORD CHANCE EUR. FIN. SERV. NEWSLErrER, Sept. 1996, at 1-2.
103. This provision reads as follows: "If the Commission considers that a Member State
has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State
concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the
latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice."

19981

Magliveras

refused to comply with its request.t " The next step in the infringement
proceedings is for the Commission to lodge an application before the
European Court of Justice asking for a declaration that Austria has violated
its obligations under the EC Treaty."os
It has been reported that on October 15, 1997 the European
Commission decided to refer the case to the European Court of Justice.'06
The Commission's case is based on two considerations. " First, that the
retention of anonymous savings accounts is a flagrant breach of the
principle of identification cornerstone of the Money Laundering
Directive. 0 Second, that the offense of money laundering applies only if
the laundered proceeds exceed the threshold amount of ASh 100,000
contravenes the Money Laundering Directive, which contains no such
threshold. Although it is an undisputed reality that the judgments of the
European Court can only rarely be predicted, it is submitted that Austria's
position will not be vindicated. This is because the European Community's
financial sector is so deeply integrated that no Member State could be
permitted to maintain contradictory legislation. This is so, even though
there are no clear cases suggesting that these anonymous savings account
are being consistently used for money laundering operations in Austria.
IV. OTHER COMMUNITY ACTIvITIEs RELATING To MONEY LAUNDERING

A.

The European Police Office (Europol)
In July 1995, the Council of Ministers drew up the Convention setting
up EUROPOL. 1" Before examining what powers EUROPOL has been
conferred in dealing with money laundering, it is worthwhile to refer
briefly to EUROPOL's predecessors, namely the Trevi Group and the
European Drugs Unit (hereinafter "EDU"). For a substantial number of
years Member States had collaborated on an ad hoc basis on a string of
104. See Poech, The Anonymous Bank Account and Recent Adoptions of EU Directives in
Austria, 12 J. INT'L BANKING L. (1997).
105. See EC Treaty, supra note 103, at art. 169(2).
106. See Leidig, Austria Set to Take on Brussels Once Again, THE EUROPEAN, Oct. 2329, 1997, at 21, col. 1. For the decision to refer Austria to the European Court of Justice, see
European Commission, Fifteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community
Law- 1997, COM(1998) 317 final, 27 May 1998, 1998 O.J. (C 250)1 at 29. Note that the case
has still not been officially lodged before the Court.
107. See EU Takes Austria to Court Over Anonymous Savings Account, 13 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L REP. 476 (1997).
108. See supra note 21, at art. 3.
109. Council Act of July 26, 1995 drawing up the Convention based on article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union on the Establishment of a European Police Office, 1995 O.J. (C 316)
1. The European Parliament's evaluation of EUROPOL is contained in EP Resolution of May
19, 1995, PARL. EUR. Doc. B4-0732/95, 1995 O.J. (C 151) 376.
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issues falling within the scope of the responsibility of justice/home affairs
ministries. The most successful of these arrangements has been the Trevi
Group. This entity was set up during the December 1985, Rome Summit
of the European Council and became operative in June 1986. The Trevi
Group's original terms of reference were to promote police cooperation
and exchange of information in relation to terrorist activities.
Even though justice and home affairs ministers from all Member
States participated in the Trevi Group, it operated outside the formal EC
structure. In effect, its decisions were not legally binding on Member
States, since they were not legislative acts of the European Community
(they rather took the form of gentleman's agreements) and, at the same
time, they were not open to judicial review by the European Court of
Justice. In its meeting in Paris, France in December 1989, the Trevi
Group adopted a declaration stating that its activities will extend to drug
trafficking and money laundering of narcotics proceeds, because these were
considered as areas of high priority."'
The important but not well documented work undertaken by the Trevi
Group was integrated in Title IV of the Treaty on European Union
(hereinafter "TEU")... providing for cooperation in the fields of justice and
home affairs (the so-called third pillar). More particularly, it formed part
of the Coordinating Committee of Article K.4. The European Drugs Unit
was established by the Trevi Ministers in June 1993, and became
operational in January 1994. 112 It was conceived as an entity to replace the
activities of the Trevi Group until EUROPOL was set up."' The European
Council meeting in Essen in December 1994, decided to widen its mandate
by including the following three criminal activities, which since the early
1990's have constituted the new areas of criminality in Europe: trafficking
in motor vehicles; trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances; illegal
immigration smuggling and associated money laundering operations.
to implement this action immediately by
Furthermore, it asked the Council
114
appropriate legal instruments.
Soon thereafter the EDU's legal basis was replaced by a Joint Action
based on Article K.3 TEU,' 15 which empowers the Council of Ministers to
110. See Benyon et al, Police Cooperation in Europe - An Investigation, 157 (Centre for
the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, 1993).
111. See supra note 16.
112. Agreement of Ministers responsible for internal security matters, signed in
Copenhagen on June 2, 1993, Bull. Eur. Communities 6-1993, point 1.4.19; reproduced in Sweet
& Maxwell, Encyclopedia of European Union Law, §§ 130.0007 et seq.
113. Id.
114. See Bull. Eur. Communities 12-1994, point 1.26.
115. Council Joint Action 95/73/JHA concerning the European Drugs Unit adopted on the
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, 1995 O.J. (L 62) 1, Bull. Eur.
Communities 3-1995, point 15.4; reproduced in Sweet & Maxwell, Encyclopedia of European
Union Law, §§ 130.0049 et seq.
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adopt joint action in all matters of common interest in the fields of justice
and home affairs. However, this only applies if the objectives of the
European Union can be better achieved in this way rather than by the
Member States acting individually. The areas of common interest are
enumerated exclusively in Article K. 1 TEU and include, inter alia, asylum,
immigration and fraud.
In Article K. 1 TEU the existence of EUROPOL was envisaged in the
context of "police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of
international crime in connection with the organization of a Union-wide
system for exchanging information within a European Police Office." 116
Although this provision does not expressly lay down that such an entity is
to be set up, the Council of Ministers drew up the EUROPOL Convention
on the basis of the power conferred upon it under Article K.3(2)(c) to
adopt 7treaties in any of the areas of common interest mentioned in Article
K.1.1

Although the drawing up of the Convention had already been agreed
in principle by the European Council meeting in Lisbon in June 1992, it
met with considerable opposition which delayed its conclusion until June
21, 1996, when it was finally signed. 118 The EUROPOL Convention is
expected to enter into force on October 1, 1998, by which time it should
have been ratified by all 15 Member States. 1 9
EUROPOL's objective, as elaborated in Article 2(1) of the
Convention, is to promote the effectiveness and cooperation of the Member
States' competent authorities in preventing and combating terrorism,
narcotics trafficking and other serious international crimes.1 ° However,
EUROPOL will assume jurisdiction only if there are factual indications
than an organized criminal structure is involved affecting two or more
Member States in such a way as to require a common approach by Member
States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offenses
concerned.
This objective is to be achieved progressively. According to Article
2(2) of the EUROPOL Convention, its initial terms of reference are to
prevent and fight narcotics trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and
116. Id.
117. Id.

118. See Bull. Eur. Communities 6-1996, point 1.5. The Convention is based on the
Revised Draft of Oct. 25 1994, which has not been officially reproduced. This draft was the
object of a meticulous examination by the British House of Lords; see House of Lords, Select
Committee on the European Communities, Session 1994-95, 10th Report, EUROPOL, Apr. 25
1995, HL Paper 51.
119. See The European Commission (London Office), The Week in Europe, Feb. 5, 1998,
WE/5/98, at 1.
120. Bull. Eur. Communities 6-1996, supra note 118.
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radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings
and motor vehicle crime.' 2' Its areas of jurisdiction are identical with those
of EDU with the addition of illicit trade in human beings. By virtue of
Article 2(3), EUROPOL is also competent to deal with illegal activities to
launder the proceeds from these offenses. By specifically linking money
laundering with these crimes, the Convention acknowledges the fact that
the traditional patterns of crime have changed fundamentally and that it is
now imperative to address effectively at the Community level specific
manifestations of these offenses, such as the laundering of proceeds.
Since the EUROPOL Convention did not offer its own definition of
money laundering, it was to be expected that the definition contained in the
Money Laundering Directive would have been adopted. However, the
Convention expressly states that the term money laundering is understood
as meaning the criminal offenses listed in Article 6(1)-(3) of the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering. '
The restrictive nature of the
definition contained in the Directive made it inadequate for inclusion in the
EUROPOL Convention, which opted for the quite extensive provisions of
the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering.
B.

Relations with Centraland EasternEuropean Countries
The question of whether the membership of the European Community
should expand to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe has
given rise to considerable controversy. During the Luxembourg Summit
Meeting (December 12-13, 1997), the European Community took the
political decision to proceed with enlargement with 11 candidate-states. 2
With the six countries which were chosen as the first group of states to be
considered for membership (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and the Czech Republic), the negotiations were formally opened in
London, Britain on March 30, 1998.124 This decision was the culmination
of a long process, which commenced in the early 1990's, when the
European Community entered into association agreements with these
states. "z

121. On Dec. 4, 1997, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agreed to extend the
EUROPOL's jurisdiction to include the collection and analysis of information on child
pornography; see Bull. Eur. Union 12-1997, point 1.4.9.

122.

See supra note 43.

123.

See Bull. Eur. Union 12-97, point 1.5.10.

124. With the remaining five states (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia)
the European Community formally opened the accession process; see The European Commission
(London Office), The Week in Europe, Apr. 2, 1998, WE/13/98, at 1.

125.

See generally, Maresceau & Montagatti, The Relations Between the European Union

and Central and Eastern Europe: A LegalAppraisal, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1327 (1995).
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These instruments, commonly known as Europe Agreements, 26 have
aimed at facilitating their economies to reach the standard, which is
required for eventual European Community membership.' 27 One common
aspect of these Agreements is that they incorporate the following provision,
which imposes upon them a duty to become active in combating money
laundering:
1.
The Parties agree on the necessity of making every effort
and cooperating in order to prevent the use of their financial
systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in
general and drug offenses in particular;
2.
Cooperation in this area shall include administrative and
technical assistance with the purpose of establishing suitable
standards against money laundering equivalent to those adopted by
the Community and international fora in this field, in particular
the Financial Action Task Force.
The essence of this provision, which appears as Article 85 in the
Europe Agreement with Poland, 2 ' as Article 86 in the Europe Agreements
with Hungary, 29 Slovakia 3 ' and the Czech Republic 3' and as Article 87 in
the Agreements with Bulgaria'3 2 and Romania,' 3 3 is that the European
Community expects that these countries shall adopt legislation which
incorporates the Money Laundering Directive and the recommendations of
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The latter was conceived during
the 15th Economic Summit Meeting of the G-7 Group (Paris, July 1989),
as a body to promote international cooperation in preventing the utilization
126. The idea to proceed with the Conclusion of the Europe Agreements was launched by
the Commission in its Communication of Aug. 27, 1990 on the conclusion of association
agreements with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, COM(90) 398 final; Bull. Eur.
Communities 7/8-1990, point 1.4.5.

127. See GOWER, EC RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 283 (Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993);
MARESCEAU, EUROPE AGREEMENTS: A NEW FORM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: LEGAL ADAPTATION TO THE MARKET ECONOMY 209 (Muller
Graf. 1993).
128.

Signed in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 16, 1991, 1993 O.J. (L 348) 2.

129.

Signed in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 16, 1991, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 2.

130.

Signed in Luxembourg, on Oct. 4, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 359) 2.

131. Signed
132. Signed
Europe Agreement
Euro. Communities
133. Signed

in Luxembourg on Oct. 4, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 360) 2.
in Brussels, Belgium on Mar. 8, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 358) 3. See also, the
with Slovenia, which was signed in Luxembourg on June 10, 1996, Bull.
6-1996, point 1.4.52. This Agreement has not been officially reproduced.
in Brussels, Belgium on Feb. 1, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 357) 2.
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of the banking system and financial institutions for money operations. 34 Its
recommendations, which were adopted on February 7, 1990, and revised
on June 28, 1996,'3 have long been regarded as the minimum standards
that national anti-money laundering laws must observe.
Already a number of countries in the region have promulgated
comprehensive anti money laundering legislation: Hungary,1
the Slovak
141
14
139
Republic, 137 Slovenia, 138 the Czech Republic Poland and Lithuania.
On September 8, 1994, the European Community's Ministers for Justice
and Home Affairs met with their counterparts from Central and Eastern
Europe in Berlin, Germany to discuss even closer cooperation in the fight
against organized crime.142 They agreed to make full use of the relevant
provisions of the Europe Agreements and to focus their attention, apart
from drug trafficking, to illegal immigration networks, crime involving
radioactive and nuclear materials, motor vehicle theft and money
laundering of proceeds derived from such offenses. 43
There is no dispute that most Central and Eastern European countries
have made great advances in putting in place an effective framework for
combating money laundering.
However, it should not escape one's
attention that these states were asked to change fundamentally the structure
of their economy and financial sector within a relatively short period of
time. This process has been plagued by the lack of adequate financing and
expertise, and by inexperience on how to resolve conflicts between existing
legislation and the adopted anti-money laundering statutes. These problems
have been highlighted in a recent report by the United States government,
134. See Magliveras, Defeating the Money Launderer - The International and European
Framework, J. Bus. L. 161, 166-67 (1992).
135. Reproduced in [1996] 35 I.L.M. 1293.
136. Act No. IX of 1994, published in Magyar Kazlony, No. 25. Mar. 8, 1994, at 797; it
introduced Article 303 of the Penal Code making money laundering a criminal offense.
137. Act on combat against the legalization of proceeds from particularly heavy and
specifically organized crime of Aug. 19, 1994, published in Zbierka Zakonov, No. 72, Sept. 17,
1994 at 249. It has been amended by the Act of Feb. 15, 1997, in force since July 1, 1997; see
Blaha, Money Laundering in the Czech Republic, 12 J. INT'L BANKING L. 35 (1997).
138. Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering of May 8, 1994, published in URADNI
LIST, No. 36, June 22, 1994, at 1474.
139. Act on certain measures against the legalization of proceeds from criminal activities
of Feb. 15, 1996, published in Sbirka Zakonu, No. 19, Mar. 30, 1996, at 61.
140. Article 5 of the Act on the protection of financial transactions of Oct. 12, 1994,
published in Dziennik Ustaw, 1994, No. 126, at 615; see Weigend, Geldwaesche im polnischen
Strafrecht, 108 ZEISCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 416 (1996).

141.

Law on Prevention of Money Laundering of June 19, 1997, in force since July 1,

1997, published in Valstybes Zinios, No. 64, 1502.
142.

See Bull. Eur. Communities 9-1994, point 1.4.1.
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which has recorded the request by Hungary and Poland (the region's most
important economies). The report states that the United States and the
European Community provide increased training and financial support to
help their banking institutions and law enforcement agencies to implement

more strenuous anti-money laundering controls.'"
Finally, it should be noted that the European Community is taking
every opportunity to press the candidate-states of Eastern and Central
Europe to deal with organized crime in an effective manner. Thus, when
in March 1998, the London negotiations on European Community
membership were inaugurated, 45 the European Community and the eleven
applicant states agreed to establish the European Conference as a high level
forum for discussing and implementing policy issues relating to the
European Community's enlargement.'" Combating transnational organized

crime was one of the five priority areas on which the European Conference
will concentrate. 47

C.

The Extradition Convention (The Convention)

Perceived as a top priority in improving judicial cooperation, 4" the
Extradition Convention [hereinafter "Convention"] relating to Extradition
between Member States of the European Union was adopted on September
27, 1996."49 Building upon two relevant Conventions adopted under the
auspices of the Council of Europe, namely the European Convention on

Extradition'" and the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, '5' it aims at accelerating extradition between Member States and
at reducing the number of cases where extradition might be refused. In
facilitating the latter goal, 5 the
Convention breaks away for the traditional
2
rule of double criminality. 1
144. United States General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: A Framework for
Understanding United States Efforts Overseas (May 1996).
145. See supra note 124.
146. See The European Commission (London Office), The Week in Europe, Mar. 19,
1998, WE/ 11/98, at 2.
147. Id.
148. See Council Resolution of Oct. 14, 1996 laying down the priorities for cooperation in
the fields of justice and home affairs for the period from July 1, 1996 to June 30, 1998, 1996 O.J.
(C 319) 1; Bull. Eur. Union 10-1996, point 1.5.1.
149. 1996 O.J. (C 313) 12; Bull. Eur. Communities 9-1996, point 1.5.3.
The
Explanatory Memorandum to the Convention is published in 1996 O.J. (C 374) 4. This
instrument should not confused with the EU Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure,
1995 O.J. (C 78) 2; Bull. Eur. Union 3-1995, point 1.5.3.
150. See supra note 8.
151. Signed in Strasbourg, France on Jan. 27, 1977, in force since Aug. 4, 1978, E.T.S.
90, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93.
152. See supra note 26.
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Article 3(1) of the Convention stipulates that extradition must be
granted when requested in relation to any offense in the field of drug
trafficking and other forms of organized crime, which is punishable in the
requesting state by penalty of deprivation of liberty for more than twelve
months. The innovative aspect of the Convention is that the requested state
must observe the extradition request, even if its domestic law does not
stipulate that the same facts and circumstances constitute a criminal
offense. In other words, the rule of double criminality does not apply.
Since laundering of drug proceeds is a crime directly associated with
trafficking in narcotics, the Convention undoubtedly facilitates the
extradition of money launderers. However, there is one consideration,
which will significantly restrict the amnbit of this provision: Article 3(3)
allows signatory parties to declare that they reserve the right not to apply
Article 3(1) or to apply it under certain conditions.
Whether the Extradition Convention will ever enter into force is open
to speculation, since it requires the prior ratification by all fifteen Member
States. Some of its provisions are extremely far reaching and may give
rise to problems of a constitutional nature. For example, Article 8(1) lays
down the rule that extradition may not be refused on the ground that the
prosecution or punishment of the individual whose extradition is sought
would be barred under the law of the requested Member State. 5 3 Finally,
it should be noted that this Convention is not a comprehensive extradition
treaty and does not seek to replace the European Convention on Extradition
as between the Member States.5 4 In effect, the preamble makes it clear
that the provisions of the 1957 Treaty remain applicable for all matters not
covered by it.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

As G. Giacomelli, the Executive Director of the United Nations
International Drug Control Program, noted the unprecedented advances in
the areas of technology and communications together and the fact that the
banking sector is becoming more and more globalized have resulted in
making money laundering an extremely sophisticated crime."'
The
European Community, as a regional organization whose combined
153. See supra note 8. It would appear that this provision contradicts Article 10 of the
Council of Europe Convention on Extradition. Stipulating that extradition will not be granted
when the person claimed has, according to the law of either the requesting or the requested state,
become immune by reason of lapse of time from prosecution or punishment.
154. Note that Article 28(2) of the Council of Europe Convention on Extradition, supra
note 8, expressly allows signatory parties to conclude between them multilateral agreements in
order to supplement the provisions of this Convention or to facilitate the application of its
principles.
155. Giocomelli, Take the Profit out of the Crime by Policing the Money Laundries, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 4, 1996, at 10.
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membership controls the largest banking sector in the world, is particularly
vulnerable to be exploited by the internationally organized money
launderers, whose vast proceeds exceed the annual gross national product
of the smaller Member States.
The European Community has not regarded money laundering as
simply a criminal offense.
From the very beginning its efforts
concentrated in making the laundering of illegal proceeds a crime and in
adopting a series of measures to protect the banking and financial sectors
from the sophisticated methods used by money launderers. However, it
was soon realized that by concentrating on the Member States' banking and
financial sectors, the European Community was not addressing the panacea
of money laundering effectively, because launderers can very easily
transfer their operations in less regulated systems.
Therefore, the
European Community, by exercising the considerable influence it enjoys,
has attempted to persuade third countries to become seriously involved in
the fight against money laundering.' 56
Parallel to these efforts, the European Community has strived to
improve its own framework.
The conclusion of the EUROPOL
Convention and the Treaty on Extradition will undoubtedly contribute in
materializing this aim.
Furthermore, the application of the Money
Laundering Directive has already made apparent its shortcomings,
especially in relation to its ambit. In June 1996, the European Parliament
regarded that the system for fighting money laundering was inadequate and
called upon the Community to revise urgently the provisions of the Money
Laundering Directive and, in particular, to extend its scope to cover all
conceivable natural and legal persons involved in financial transactions.' 57
It has been reported that the Council of Ministers is considering
broadening both the list of predicate offenses and the compulsory reporting
of suspected transactions to gambling, prostitution and building
industries.158 However, there are no clear indications that an amendment is
imminent. Any amendment of the Money Laundering Directive would be a
very delicate exercise, because its implementation in the domestic laws of
the Member States has led to considerable disparities among them.
Perhaps it is high time to realize that whether the fight against money
laundering will be won or lost does not any longer depend so much on
further European Community initiatives but on how committed Member
States are in applying, observing and safeguarding the existing framework.
156. In this respect, one should mention Council Regulation 2046/97 of Oct. 13, 1997 on
North-South Cooperation in the Campaign against Drugs and Drug Addiction, 1997 O.J. (L 287)
1; Bull. Eur. Union 10-1997, point 1.3.39.
157. See Eur. Parl. Resol. of June 21, 1996, Eur. Parl. Doc. A4-0187196, 1996 O.J. (C
198) 245.
158. See den Boer, Police Cooperation in the TEU: Tiger in a Trojan Horse? 32
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 555, 574-75 (1995).
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Despite the spectacular integration that the European Community has
achieved in the banking and financial sectors, Member States still retain
peculiarities in these areas, as the dispute regarding Austria's anonymous
savings accounts has characteristically shown.
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The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter
"CRC"], adopted on November 20, 1989 is considered by many to be a
comprehensive treaty.' It is identified as comprehensive because it not
only contains civil and political rights such as freedom of expression and
religion but also economic, social, and cultural rights including the rights
to an adequate standard of living, to healthcare, and to education. 2 For
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instance, CRC articles 6 through 22 cover civil and political rights, while
articles 23 through 31 are economic, social, and cultural ones.' Cynthia
Price Cohen further identifies the CRC as all encompassing given that it
protects and promotes the rights of the girl child.4
Despite its comprehensiveness, the CRC does not adequately protect
and promote the rights of girl children as Cynthia Price Cohen seems to
believe. The absence of a provision against child marriage will be used as
the basis for the conclusion that the CRC does not apply to boys and girls
equally. While the CRC was designed to be gender blind, violations that
primarily affect boys (i.e., child soldiers) are covered under CRC article
38. The same consideration is not given to violations predominantly
affecting girls with child marriage.' This argument can be taken further in
the sense that violations that are peculiar to girls (female circumcision) are
likewise not expressly addressed in the CRC. For the purposes of this
article, however, the focus shall be on child marriages, specifically those
that involve girl children. This study will examine various international
law treaties, which contain provisions against child marriage and conclude
that this is not a sufficient reason to exclude a provision against early
marriage from the CRC.
This article will begin with an overview of the incidence of child
marriages. Next, an examination of the various provisions contained in the
CRC, as well as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women [hereinafter "CEDAW"] article 16, banning child
marriages, the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage, and Registration of Marriages [hereinafter "Marriage
Convention"] will be conducted as a way to determine their efficiency in
ending early marriages. This examination will prove that different factors
including: vague treaty terminology, loopholes, treaty reservations, and
refusal to ratify make these other provisions' and/or treaties' attempts to
ban child marriages less effective than if the CRC itself contained a
provision against early marriage. In the end, only by modifying the CRC
to include a provision against child marriage can it be deemed a more

CHILD, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448; Cynthia Price Cohen, Freedomfrom Abuse: One of the
Human Rights of Children, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 601, 623 (1986).

3.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
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It should be noted that in certain regions of the world including the northern Indian
state of Rajasthan, boys are also victims of child marriage and are married off during adolescence.
John F. Bums, Though Illegal, Child Marriageis Popular in Partof India, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1998, at Al, A8.
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gender neutral 6 and complete treaty and one which protects the rights of
boys and girls equally.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INCIDENCE OF CHILD MARRIAGES

Over thirty countries still allow child marriages below the age of
fifteen. These countries include African countries such as Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Nigeria, Latin American countries including Peru and
Argentina, Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon and Iran, Asian
countries such as Sri Lanka and Malaysia, and North American ones like
the United States.7
Some researchers claim that the marriage age has increased worldwide.' However, upon closer examination these claims are invalidated
because most marriages, despite legislation advising otherwise, are not
registered. 9 Furthermore, a shift toward higher age at marriage may not be
indicative of a shift in customs or social attitudes, but rather a state policy
designed to serve demographic interests. In other words, countries driving
toward development are raising the marriage age as a way to reduce
fertility.'0 Finally, age at marriage and the potential for change differs
from region to region.
The propensity to raise the marriage age is higher in urban areas,
where laws are more comprehensive and more expediently enforced.
Educational levels tend to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas.
Due to these factors as well as the paramount importance of tradition,
women have fewer opportunities in rural regions. " Consequently, child
6.
Even if the CRC is modified to include a provision against child marriage, it will still
remain lacking and discriminatory toward girl children because it also does not contain a provision
directly addressing female circumcision.
7.
Child Mothers and Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at B12; HELEN
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Achievements Made in the Implementation of the UNICEF Policy on Women in Development,
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MATERIAL DEATHS 55 (Erica Royston & Sue Armstrong eds., 1989).
8.
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NANDINI RAO, MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY AND WOMEN IN INDIA 226 (1982).
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marriage retains its advantages for poor families in rural locations. These
advantages stem from cultural, religious, social, political, and economic
variables.
The demand of dowries combined with poverty give rise to a situation
where girls are perceived as economic burdens. Early marriage relieves
the parents of the costs and responsibilities attached to raising a girl.' 2 At

the same time as the girl's parents are relieved of their burden, the groom's
parents also benefit because they gain an unpaid slave and often, a dowry.
Thus, child marriages are mutually convenient for both sets of parents. 3
Another purpose child marriage serves and one sanctioned by the
religious community is to assure the girl's chastity. Virtue is a highly
prized commodity in African, Asian, and Arabic countries. 4 Parents
worry that the longer the girl remains unmarried, the greater the threat to
her virtue.15 Furthermore, under Islamic law for instance, each year past a

girl's puberty, doubts concerning her purity increase.' 6 In parts of India
this results in dowry payments rising for each year after menarche,"... an
unwed girl who has attained puberty can already be classed as damaged
goods."' 7 In contrast, the younger the bride, the less dowry demanded.' 8
Early marriage also ensures a girl is young enough to be molded and
trained by her husband and in-laws, before she can develop a personality or
identity of her own.' 9 Early marriage denies a girl's independence. They
go directly from being under their father's domination to their husband's
DEBATE 99-100 (Judith Mirsky and Marty Radlett eds., 1994); O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 16;
HILDA SAEED, We Can't Stop Now: Pakistan And The Politics Of Reproduction, in PRIVATE
DECISIONS, PUBLIC DEBATE 136 (Judith Mirsky & Marty Radlett eds., 1994); PREVENTING
MATERIAL DEATHS, supra note 7, at 55.

12.
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SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PROFILE 30 (1991); PREVENTING MATERIAL DEATHS, supra note 7, at 55.
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NEWS 56 (1994).
14.
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domination.' Consequently, she is powerless and dependent. This state of
affairs is further intensified if the man she marries is markedly her senior,
assuring the girl a lifetime of intimidation, inequality, and subjugation. 2'
Some connect early marriage to social status. 22 Marriage grants girls
adult status (even if they are only twelve years old or less) with domestic
and childbearing responsibilities. These domestic responsibilities are often
considered a girl's best source of education, whereas actual schooling is
A girl's sole achievement in life hinges on her
considered a waste.'
fertility and early marriage ensures that she will have many fertile years
ahead and be the mother of many sons, thereby further increasing her
status.24 This view is not shared by all. For instance, Erica Royston and
Sue Armstrong maintain that high maternal deaths, following too many
pregnancies, too closely spaced, starting at too young an age, imply low
social status for women. This is so because women's needs and health
have been neglected in favor of men's needs.' Other critics argue that
rather than early marriage increasing a girl's status, it is indicative of her
inferiority. It forestalls her personal development and limits her options to
mother and wife. These critics, therefore, advocate delaying marriage as a
way to raise women's status. 26
International law is one among several vehicles designed to solve the
problems associated with child marriage such as right to life, right to
control the number and spacing of one's children, right to enter a marriage
freely, right to equality, and so forth. Various international law treaties
including the CRC, CEDAW, and the Marriage Convention have all to
varying degrees tackled the issue of child marriage. The following sections
examine the efficacy of these approaches to ending the practice of early
marriage.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD'S
TREATMENT OF CHILD MARRIAGE

As already mentioned, there is no provision in the CRC which
specifically or directly bans the practice of child marriage. However, the
20.
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(1991).
21. DIXON-MUELLER, supra note 7, at 129-130; Karkal, supra note 20, at 8-9; Karkal &
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22. O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 15.
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at 51; GUDETA, supra note 11, at 100; O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 14; PREVENTING MATERIAL
DEATHS, supra note 7, at 49; Karkal & Rajan, supra note 10, at 505.
24. Gudeta, supra note 11, at 100; Karkal, supra note 20, at 7.
25. PREVENTING MATERIAL DEATHS, supra note 7, at 45.
26. Cohen, supra note 1, at 54-55; SOHONI, supra note 8, at 29, 34; O'CONNELL, supra
note 7, at 14; PREVENTING MATERIAL DEATHS, supra note 7, at 55.
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case could be made that certain other provisions under the CRC indirectly
address and prohibit early marriage. This section will analyze these other
provisions and show why they fail to satisfactorily protect girls against
child marriage.
One article that can be applied to child marriage is CRC article 2(2).
CRC article 2(2) places a duty upon States Parties to, "take all appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members." 27 Child marriage, which chiefly affects girls is a form
of sex discrimination that stems from the parents' belief that girls are less
valuable than boys. Girls are viewed as economic burdens because money
needs to be raised for their dowries,2' or they are viewed as an
inconvenience because it is costly to raise daughters when the money is
better spent on sons, who will later take care of the parents in their old
age.2 9 Therefore, because of son preference, daughters are discriminated
against and married off at a young age as a way for parents to dispose of
their burden.30 Consequently, when States Parties fail to legislate or
enforce the ban on child marriages, they perpetuate the type of
discrimination outlined in CRC article 2(2).
Unfortunately, because CRC article 2(2) does not specifically mention
early marriage, proponents of child marriage can argue that it is not
applicable to the practice of early marriage. They can further employ CRC
article 2(1) to invalidate the claims of CRC article 2(2). CRC article 2(1)
prohibits "discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or
her parent's or legal guardian's race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status." 3 1 CRC article 2(1) can be interpreted to
support child marriages because they stem from the parents' religious

27.
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beliefs. For instance, because Islamic law sanctions early marriage, 32
attempts to ban child marriages can be perceived as discriminating against
the parents' religious convictions and in violation of CRC article 2(1). As
a result, CRC article 2(1) and CRC article 2(2) clash with one another and
offer conflicting rights when applied to the practice of child marriage.
Child marriage likewise violates CRC article 6 (right to life). Early
marriage means early and multiple pregnancies. Pregnancy is encouraged
soon after marriage because it is considered the female's role in life. She
is expected to assume her obligations and prove her capability without
delay. 3 Unfortunately, this assignment carries grave physical dangers for
which child brides are not equipped. Girls starting from ten years old to
fourteen years old are five to seven times as likely to die during pregnancy
than the lowest risk group. 4
Rebecca Cook links the roots of maternal mortality to infancy or even
prior to birth. 3' According to her, calcium, vitamin, or iron deficiencies
begin at these stages and continue throughout the girl's life leading to
several health and malnutrition problems such as stunted growth,
contracted pelvis, iron deficiency anemia, all of which make pregnancy an
even more life threatening endeavor for the girl.36 Underdeveloped and
inadequately developed bodies, which are the result of unfulfilled nutrition
needs and skeletal growth, lead to obstructed labor due to the disproportion
between the pelvis size and the baby's head. 37 Labor becomes a trying and
frequently fatal undertaking because the pelvis has not fully developed for

32.
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645, 647 (1992); Ghosh, supra note 9, at 26; BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS &
WRONGS:

THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL & CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 46

(1987).
36.

Id.

37.
PRIVATE DECISIONS, PUBLIC DEBATE: WOMEN, REPRODUCTION AND POPULATION
5 (Judith Mirsky & Marty Radlett eds., 1994); BLACK, supra note 34, at 9; MOSSE, supra note

34, at 86; Ghosh, supra note 9, at 26.
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up to two 3years after menarche (2% to 9% of pelvic growth occurs during
this time). 8
Child pregnancies further endanger the life of the young girl because
they take place too early, too frequently, and are too closely spaced.3 9
Estimates indicate that approximately eight births are needed to ensure the
survival of some children.' The child bride's survival rate is affected by
births less than two years apart or births to more than four children.41
Child marriage violates CRC article 6 because often high-risk
pregnancies lead to maternal mortalities. Advocates of child marriage can
invalidate this article's applicability to the practice of early marriage by
claiming that not all early marriages lead to death. The ambiguous
language of article 6 then offers loopholes for advocates of child marriage
to secure that this practice continues. CRC article 6 would have been a
more effective deterrent against early marriage if it read as, States Parties
recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. Furthermore, this
right shall not be discriminated against by the perpetuation of such
practices as child marriage, female circumcision, child soldiers, child
labor, etc.
Child marriage similarly violates CRC article 24(3) calling on States
Parties to "abolish traditional practices prejudicial to the health of
children." 42 As already mentioned, one outcome of child marriage, a
traditional practice in many societies, is the health risks associated with
Unfortunately, because CRC article 24(3) fails to
early pregnancy.
expressly mention child marriage as one of the traditional practices to
which it is referring, many States Parties can choose to deny that the
practice of child marriage falls under the provisions of article 24(3).43
Child marriage violates the girl child's right to education as outlined
under CRC article 28. Early marriage ensures, if her education has not
already been terminated, the end of the girl's education. The parents,
knowing that she will marry young, are not overly concerned with her
38. Kathleen Merchant & Kathleen Kurz, Women's Nutrition Through the Life Cycle:
Social and Biological Vulnerabilities, in THE HEALTH OF WOMEN: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 28, at 75; PREVENTING MATERIAL DEATHS, supra note 7, at 47.
39.
O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 24; DIXON-MUELLER, supra note 7, at 142; Child
Mothers and Marriage, supra note 7, at 14; Renee Holt, Women's Rights and InternationalLaw:
The Struggle for Recognition and Enforcement, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 117, 124 (1991);
STRATEGY FOR IMPROVED NUTRITION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

30 (1990).
40.

SOHONI, supra note 8, at 81.
DIXON-MUELLER, supra note 7, at 142; CHALLENGES FOR CHILDREN, supra note

41.
12, at 31; PREVENTING MATERIAL DEATHS, supra note 7, at 187.

42. Supra note 3, at art. 24(3).
43. Ladan Askari, The Human Rights of Girl Children: An Argument for Establishing
Gender Equality as a Jus Cogens (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
California) (on file with the University of Southern California Library).
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education." There is no specific reference to child marriage under the
terms of CRC article 28 so this too can be interpreted as not addressing the
practice of early marriage. Additional safeguards can also be employed to
circumvent article 28. For example, grooms can promise to allow child
brides to attend school after marriage thereby no longer rendering the
practice of early marriage in violation of the right to education. Whether
they actually comply with their promise or whether the local government
officials apply pressure on the population to obey the right to education
provision of the CRC is another matter. What is clear is that the CRC
article 28 is not a satisfactory ban on child marriage and can be easily
bypassed.
The provision in CRC article 32(2a), "States Parties shall provide for
a minimum age for admission to employment," 45 could also be applied to
the practice of child marriage. Child brides often end up no better than
servants or unpaid slaves in their in-laws household. 46 Unfortunately, CRC
article 32(2a) appears to mainly address child labor in the public sector.
However, servitude of pubescent girls in the private sector is also a form of
child labor, which possesses the same hazards and pitfalls (i.e. long hours,
physical punishment, stunted mental, moral, social, spiritual development)
as child labor in the public sector. Actually, child brides are worse off
because they do not receive the benefits, such as pay, that victims of child
labor in the public realm receive. The situation of child brides cloaks
economic exploitation and child labor within the private domain.
However, this public/private distinction is disposed of by CRC article 3 in
situations where the best interests of the child are at stake. Therefore,
child labor occurring in the private realm as in the case of child brides
performing as servants for their in-laws, does not make the violation of
article 32(2a) any less persuasive. The state has a duty under CRC article
32(2a) in conjunction with CRC article 3 to end child labor whether taking
place in the public or private realms due to the compelling health and
development risks that stem from child labor. Nevertheless, supporters of
child marriage can argue that CRC article 32(2a) applies to employment in
the public sector only, and in any event housework is not child labor
according to the traditional definition of that word.
CRC article 37 (right against torture, or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment) can likewise be employed to ban the
exercise of child marriage. Like CRC article 32(2a), CRC article 37 reads
as a provision banning torture specifically in the public sector, or torture at

44. Askari, supra note 43; Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 11, at 51.
45. CRC, supra note 3, at art. 32(2)(a).
46. Cohen, supra note 1, at 65; Anderson, supra note 11, at A27; Convention of the
Rights of the Child, supra note 11, at 51; Child MarriagesPerformed in India, supra note 13, at
19L.
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the hands of public officials. This narrow interpretation of the right against
torture needs to be revised.
According to article 1 of the Torture Convention, four elements are
needed for an act to be defined as torture: 1) severe physical and or mental
pain and suffering; 2) intentionally inflicted; 3) for specified purposes; 4)
with some form of official involvement, be it active or passive. 7 These
four elements that make up the definition of torture apply to the practice of
child marriage.
First, severe physical and mental pain and suffering accompany child
marriage. The young girl in many cases is coerced into getting married.
Once married, she suffers physical and mental abuse at the hand of her
The young bride is forced to get pregnant
husband and in-laws.
immediately after marriage, frequently and at too close intervals, when her
body is inadequately developed. Second, to be classified as torture, the
pain must be intentionally inflicted. 48 Requiring girls to marry before they
are psychologically prepared for the responsibilities of married life or their
bodies are physically prepared for child-bearing, constitutes purposeful
Third, the specific purposes behind torture include:
behavior.4 9
intimidation, punishment, and discrimination. 0 The physical and mental
abuse the child bride suffers at the hands of her husband or in-laws is
either for reasons of intimidation as a way to keep her in her place or
punishment when she fails to accomplish a task satisfactorily."s Finally, the
requirement of official involvement is likewise fulfilled in the case of child
marriages.
Either national legislation actively promotes these types of unions52 or,
where legislation does not allow for child marriages, the State's

47.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 24 I.L.M. 535.

48.
49.
50.

See id.
Askari, supra note 43.
Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror- UnderstandingDomestic Violence as Torture, in

HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:

NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 129-135 (Rebecca

Cook ed., 1994).
SOHONI, supra note 8, at 32-33; GUDETA, supra note 11, at 99-100; SOHONI, supra
51.
note 14, at 9; Karkal & Rajan, supra note 10, at 505; PREVENTING MATERIAL DEATHS, supra

note 7, at 55.
52. National child marriage laws often fall short of an effective or explicit ban on the
practice itself. For example, The Indian Child Marriage Restraint Act created in 1929 and
amended in 1977, raises the minimum age for marriage but fails to ban child marriages nor does
the Act render child marriages null and void (SAEED, supra note 11, at 139; Sara Hossain,
Equality in the Home: Women's Rights and Personal Laws in South Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN, supra note 50, at 476; Child Marriages Performed in India, supra note 13, at 19L;

Karkal, supra note 20, at 7; Karkal & Rajan, supra note 10, at 505).
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unwillingness to restrict these practices allows them to continue resulting in
a passive type of official involvement.53
By looking at torture from this broader perspective and expanding it
beyond acts in the public realm to also include actions in the private sector,
a case could be made to stop child marriages because they constitute a form
of torture. Still, because the language of CRC article 37 is directed mainly
at torture at the public level, its expansion into the private sphere as a way
to ban child marriages will not be readily accepted. In order to validate the
notion that acts in the private realm also constitute torture, the drafters of
the CRC, when and if they add a provision against child marriage must
identify it as a form of torture.
It is evident that these other indirect provisions against child marriage
found in the CRC do not effectively deter the practice of early marriage.
Where the CRC is lacking in a definite provision banning child marriage,
CEDAW is not. CEDAW offers a better source of protection against child
marriage that the CRC.

III. THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN, ARTICLE 16: BAN ON CHILD MARRIAGES
Unlike the CRC, CEDAW contains a specific provision prohibiting
the practice of early marriages. CEDAW article 16(2) provides that child
marriages shall have no legal effect.54 Thus, child marriages in those states
that have ratified CEDAW not only violate international law but are void.
On the surface then, CEDAW article 16 appears to adequately ban early
marriages. Unfortunately, a variety of factors, which will be discussed
subsequently, dispel the notion that CEDAW article 16 is an effective
deterrent against child marriage.
Linguistic flaws are among some of the shortcomings from which
article 16 suffers, rendering its implementation tentative. For example,
CEDAW article 16 fails to prescribe a minimum age at which a girl can be
married. This oversight weakens article 16 because it fails to clarify what
the drafters of CEDAW define as child marriage. Is child marriage the
marriage of a child below the age of 10, 12 or 16? How old or young does
the child have to be for a marriage union to be identified as a child
marriage and therefore in violation of CEDAW article 16? The failure to
set a minimum age at marriage under its provision banning child marriage
allows signatories to CEDAW to easily avoid obligations under article 16.
For example, countries such as Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Sri
Lanka, and Venezuela, all States Parties to CEDAW for over ten years
have set twelve as the minimum age for marriage.55 The omitted language
53. Askari, supra note 43.
54. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
I.L.M. 34 (1980).
55. Cohen, supra note 1, at 42.
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of CEDAW article 16 allows rather than prohibits these countries to

establish low minimum ages for marriage.
CEDAW is also incompetent as an international law treaty because it
has the highest rate of reservations than any other human rights treaty.56
Reservations limit treaty obligations and the potential domestic effect of the
treaty by implying partial commitment. Introducing reservations connotes
the essential human rights guarantees of the treaty are weakened. 5
Moreover, two of the main reasons reservations have been entered into for
CEDAW are the following: 1) laws pertaining to marriage and family
relations and 2) religious and customary laws. 9
As a result, the

proficiency of CEDAW article 16 is further called into question.
In addition to the overwhelming number of reservations that make
CEDAW a weak human rights instrument, it further suffers because it is

not widely ratified. In contrast to the CRC, which is almost universally
ratified (191 nations),' CEDAW is not as popular.6 1

56. William Schabas, Reservations to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 18 HM.RTs.Q. 472, 474 (1996); Tracy R. Thomas, The Status of Women and Health
Under InternationalLaw, in THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY
19 (Patricia L. Munhall & Virginia M. Fitzsimons eds., 1995); Elissavet Stamatopoulou,
Women's Rights and the United Nations, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 34,
at 38; Rebecca J. Cook, Women, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDERS 451-53 (Oscar Schachter
and Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995); LIEsBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN? 4 (1995); Elizabeth Ann Mayer,
Cultural Particularismas a Bar to Women's Rights: Reflections on the Middle East Experience,
in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 179; HOSSAIN, supra note 52, at 470;
Stanlie M. James, Challenging PatriarchalPrivilege Through the Development of International
Human Rights, 17 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 563, 569 (1994); Hilary Charlesworth, What are
Women's InternationalHuman Rights?, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 50, at 59; Anne
F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to the Domestic Application of Women's InternationalHuman
Rights Law, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 50, at 352; OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Joanna Kerr
ed., 1993).
57. Askari, supra note 2; Askari, supra note 43; MAYER, supra note 56, at 179-182;
Cook, supra note 56, at 452; Rebecca J. COOK, State Accountability Under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN,
supra note 50, at 252.
58.
LUNZAAD, supra note 8, at 3-7; STAMATOPOULOU, supra note 56, at 38; HOSSAIN,
supra note 52, at 470; Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 649 (1990).
59. COOK, supra note 56, at 451-452; BAYEFSKY, supra note 56, at 352.
60. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Update, US Committee for
UNICEF: Wash. D.C., Winter 1997; The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:
A Call for Global Solidarity Through Local Action, ICCB NEwS 1, 1 (Winter 1996-1997).
61.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 76.

1998]

Askari

Finally, CEDAW was devised as an international Bill of Rights for
women.6 2 CEDAW was created to "equalize relationships between adult
men and women."' Girl's rights and women's rights are linked in many
respects. Inequalities during girlhood are the basis of discrimination during
womanhood.
The drafters of CEDAW overlooked this fact.
Consequently, rights under CEDAW are intended to apply to adult women,
not girls. The existence of a provision against child marriage in CEDAW
appears out of place and incompatible with the rest of the treaty. That is,
unless one interprets CEDAW article 16 as an article intended to equalize
spousal rights' to provide adult women the right to choose who they want
to marry, give adult women the right to make fertility and health decisions,
and not as a provision against early marriage. CEDAW article 16 then is
not so much about ending child marriages and protecting the rights of the
girl child as about granting adult women more rights over marital
decisions.
The ban on child marriages appears more akin to an
afterthought(' than the focal point of CEDAW article 16. An article
prohibiting early marriage would be more effective if present in a treaty
geared at children (CRC) than in one directed at adults (CEDAW).
Another human rights treaty that covers early marriage is the 1962
Marriage Convention. It too contains provisions aimed at ending child
marriages.
However, as with article 16 of CEDAW, the Marriage
Convention's efforts against child marriage are found lacking due to the
ambiguous and exclusionary wording of its provisions.
IV.

1962 CONVENTION ON CONSENT TO MARRIAGE, MINIMUM AGE FOR
MARRIAGE AND REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGES

Many problems plague the effectiveness of the Marriage Convention
as a ban against child marriages. For example, article 1 of the Marriage
Convention, article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and article 16 of CEDAW all require full and free consent of both
parties before a marriage is entered into. 66 Free consent of the marriage
partners in the presence of a competent authority is the centerpiece of the
1962 Marriage Convention. The notion that children should not be
pressured or allowed to enter into marriage thus became a codified part of
international law.67 However, what the provisions intend and what reality

62.
THOMAS, supra note 56, at 17; JANICE WOOD WETZEL, THE WORLD OF WOMEN:
IN PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1993).

63. Cohen, supra note 1, at 37.
64. Id. at 40.
65. See id.
66. Supra note 54, at art. 24; Anonymous International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 6 I.L.M. 360 (1966); Marriage Convention, supra note 17, at art. 1.
67.

Marriage Convention, supra note 17.
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provides are two different things. Equality of spouses in entering a
marriage (or for any other reasons) in most cultures is non-existent.
Requiring consent prior to entering into a marriage does not
necessarily translate into establishment of equality. A young child bride
can be tricked into consenting to marriage by being offered various
inducements. Equality has not been achieved because child marriage is
based on the notion of inequality; the male spouse enjoys a disproportionate
amount of power over the female spouse. Requiring prior consent likewise
does not usher in the end of child marriages. Instead, fulfilling the
.prerequisite of consent ensures that child marriages continue and do so
within the boundaries of international law.
Article 2 of the Marriage Convention, on advising States to prescribe
a minimum age at marriage is also a sham. The Marriage Convention asks
States to legislate a specific age at marriage and not recognize as legal,
marriages by persons under this age, with the exception that "a competent
authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in the
interests of the intending spouses.'
The competent authority such as a
religious leader may consider following cultural mores a serious reason for
allowing child marriages to continue. Therefore, the competent authority's
own prejudices could allow for the perpetuation of discriminatory
traditions. As a result, the Marriage Convention does not definitively ban
child marriages.
In addition, many states already have legislation that sets a minimum
age at marriage such as Sri Lanka, where the legal marriage age is twelve
years old.69 Article 2 goes on to ban marriages of persons under this age. 70
If Sri Lanka ratified the Marriage Convention and marriages below twelve
years of age took place, it would be in violation of international human
rights law.
However, marriage of twelve year old girls would be
recognized as legal under the terms of the Marriage Convention. At the
same time though, provisions of the Marriage Convention would conflict
with those of the CRC, which sets the end of childhood at eighteen years of
age.7
Under the CRC, a marriage of twelve year old is still a child
marriage and illegal, but it is legal from the point of view of the Marriage
Convention as it is currently worded. Consequently, it appears that the
Marriage Convention does more to encourage and support child marriages
than not.

68. See id.
69. O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 106; Savitri Goonesekere, Women's Rights and
Children's Rights: The United Nations Convention as Compatible and Complimentary
International Treaties, INNOCENTI OCCASIONAL PAPERS 14 (Child Rights Series NO. 1, Sept.
1992).
70. Marriage Convention, supra note 17, at art. 2.
71. CRC, supra note 3, at art. 1.
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V. CONCLUSION

Having examined provisions under the CRC, CEDAW and the
Marriage Convention it is apparent that they are unsuccessful in adequately
protecting the rights of girl children against child marriage. The CRC
lacks a provision against the practice of early marriage altogether.
CEDAW article 16 mainly focuses on adult marital relations and rights and
only peripherally bans child marriages. The 1962 Marriage Convention is
also weak because its ambiguous terminology allows the ban on early
marriages to be avoided.
A provision explicitly prohibiting child marriage needs to be added to
the CRC, an international law treaty focusing entirely and expressly on
children. The CRC is intended to include rights exclusive to children as
well as reemphasize rights found in other human rights treaties and make
them applicable to children. For the most part, the drafters of the CRC
have been successful in carrying out these dual goals. However, the
omission of an article banning early marriage renders the CRC incomplete
and unable to sufficiently fulfill its goals. The right against child marriage
is not only one that is exclusive to children' but it is also one that is found
in other human rights treaties (e.g., CEDAW, Marriage Convention). The
problem with the provision(s) against early marriage in these other
international law treaties is that they focus more on equalizing adult spousal
rights and less on the rights of the child. Adding a provision to the CRC
banning early marriage will reshift the focus of child marriage to the child
as the victim and as the party whose rights need to be protected and
promoted.
The CRC's near universal ratification and the fast rate with which it
went into force have served to over shadow the fact that the CRC is
deficient especially in its protection of girl children. The CRC is lacking
and prejudicial because it excludes certain violations which predominately
affect girls. For children and specifically girls to be sufficiently protected
against early marriage, something more is needed than vague and indirect
provisions inundated with loopholes that actually perpetuate rather than end
the practice of child marriage. What is needed is an article in the CRC,
that categorically identifies child marriage as a practice that violates
children's rights, identifies an exact minimum age at marriage7 3 and
obligates States Parties to ban these types of practices. Only when the
CRC is amended to include such an article, will it be beneficial to employ
72.
children.

Child marriage involves a situation in which one or both marriage participants are

73. Failure to identify an exact minimum age at marriage as evidenced in CEDAW
article 16 and the Marriage Convention allows room for States Parties to avoid their obligations
under these provisions and to set low minimum ages at marriage. A provision against early
marriage can be protected against these safeguards by not leaving this task to each individual
state's own discretion.
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supplementary provisions under the CRC (i.e., right to life, right to
education, etc.) to further strengthen the case against early marriage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the International Law Commission ("ILC") authored a Draft
Statute' in an attempt to help establish a permanent International Criminal
Court ("ICC"). Beginning in March 1996 the United Nations General
*
This article was written in June 1998, just prior to the Rome Diplomatic Conference,
which completed and adopted the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court. This article
discusses the expectations heading into the final diplomatic conference, and examines the statutory
debate, which had been undertaken prior to Rome.
Michael Bachrach represented the New York County Lawyers' Association at the August
1997 United National Preparatory Committee Meeting for the establishment of a permanent
International Criminal Court ("PrepCom"), and represented Redress Trust (UK) at the December
1997 and March-April 1998 PrepComs. He has also chaired conferences on the International
Criminal Court in New York City and Vienna. This report is based on the closed and open door
meetings that he attended during the Prepcoms, as well as research completed at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law in New York City, and at Oxford University in England.
1.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. DOC A/49/355, Sept. 1, 1994.
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Assembly held Preparatory Committee meetings ("PrepComs") ° in which
the representatives of the majority of the world's nations gathered to debate
the various aspects of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. 2 Each PrepCom lasted
between two and three weeks and was essentially a preparatory conference,
designed to facilitate debate and fine-tune each State's concerns.
The final PrepCom was held from March 16 to April 3, 1998. At this
final PrepCom the 1994 ILC Draft Statute was replaced by a new text, the
Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from January 19 through January 30,
1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands ("Zutphen Draft"), which formed the
basis of the remainder of the debate leading up to a Diplomatic Conference
which will take place from June 15 to July 17, 1998, in Rome, Italy
("Rome Conference"). 3 Furthermore, after the completion of the final
PrepCom, the official texts ("CRP's") were compiled into one document,
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Part I, Draft Statute for the International
Criminal Court.4 This final compiled document revised the Zutphen text to
reflect the Proposals of the March-April 1998 PrepCom, and will serve as
the basic draft text of the Rome Conference. "There is international
momentum, that by [June] we must establish an effective, efficient, and
independent International Criminal Court,"' the statute for which, it is
hoped, will be completed and ready for signature by the end of the
Diplomatic Conference.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the progression of some of the
key issues that have been under debate, in an attempt to help explain the
creation of the "last great legal edifice of the 20th Century. "6

2.
Although only State representatives have an official place in the negotiations,
participating on one level or another are representatives of various subsidiary organizations of the
United Nations such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as well as other international and non-governmental organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, Amnesty International, Redress, and the
Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights. Furthermore, this is by no means an exhaustive list of
the organizations involved in the PrepComs. For example, working under the umbrella
organization of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, over 450 non-governmental
organizations have lobbied for. the inclusion or exclusion of numerous proposals relating to these
debates.
3.
See generally, "Zutphen Draft," U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/L.13, (1998).
4.
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1832Add.1 (1988).
5.
Roy S. Lee, Director, Codifications, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations,
addressing the American Branch of the International Bar Association on Nov. 7, 1997 at its
International Law Weekend '97 during the panel "The Establishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Court: The Need, The Possibilities and the Legal, Political and Practical Realities."
6.
Richard C. Hottelet, A Forum for International Justice, THE CHRISTIAN SC.
MONrrOR, Aug. 26, 1997, p. 18.
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A.

The Purpose of the InternationalCriminal Court
For years lawyers, politicians, and lay persons have grappled with the
problem of what can be done when there is no justice left to be had. Over
the past fifty years some of the most horrendous atrocities in recorded
history have unfolded. With the creation of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, for the first time leaders and their peoples were
held individually accountable for massive violations of international
standards of conduct. Unfortunately, many States and individuals have
failed to learn from the mistakes of World War II and the Holocaust. Over
the past 50 years there have been approximately 250 conflicts, totaling over
170 million casualties-more casualties than World War I and World War
II combined.7 Most recently, in 1994 following the breakup of Yugoslavia,
Bosnians, Serbians and Croatians, entered into a war that practiced "ethnic
cleansing" in a manner not seen since the Holocaust.! Also in 1994, a civil
war ensued in Rwanda involving the killing of almost 500,000 people. 9 To
many it appeared that every inhabitant of Rwanda was transformed into
both a victim, and a butcher. The law cannot stand silent to crimes so
heinous that domestic judicial systems have no adequate solutions. "These
types of crimes cannot go forth without some form of accountability, some
form of punishment, at least for the most egregious crimes like aggression,
genocide, and ...torture."' 0
As the dawning of a new millennium quickly approaches, and
international atrocities continue to proliferate, the international community
continues to strive for new ways to bring peace and security to the world.
In 1993, Trinidad and Tobago suggested that a permanent international
criminal tribunal should be established to try international terrorists and
narcotics dealers. Although the international community did not agree
upon those bases of subject matter jurisdiction, there was support for a
court that would try violators of what many consider the most serious
breaches of international law: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Learning from the successes of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the
idea of a permanent ICC raised the hope of furthering international

7.
Dekar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998,
Dakar, 6 Feb. 1998; European Parliament Resolution on the International Criminal Court, Mar.
12, 1998.
8.

See generally, NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996).

9.

See generally, GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE

(1995).
10.

Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, Vice Chair, UN Preparatory Committee of the

Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, addressing the American Branch of
the International Bar Association on Nov. 7, 1997 at its International Law Weekend '97 during
the panel "The Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Need, The

Possibilities and the Legal, Political and Practical Realities."
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cooperation, thereby enhancing "the effective prosecution and suppression
of crimes of international concern.""
B.

Issues under debate
Almost every aspect of the proposed ICC is still being debated. These
issues range from the number of judges required for a quorum, to the
specific definition of crimes against humanity. However, the issues which
have garnered possibly the most debate are: the consent and triggering
process of the Court; the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court; the
balance between international and domestic judicial systems, known as
complementarity; the process of investigation; and the types of penalties
that the Court will have the authority to impose.
Although the specific definitions of the core crimes (the crimes that
shall comprise the Court's subject matter jurisdiction) are still under fierce
debate, the categories of core crimes which will be incorporated into the
Court's statute has been mostly determined. The ILC Draft Statute
proposed jurisdiction over genocide, aggression, war crimes, crimes again
humanity, and a list of treaty based crimes mostly relating to human rights
or terrorism.' 2 Although there will continue to be debate over the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court until a resolution is officially announced in
Rome, it appears that only genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
and of the others, only aggression still
humanity are certain to be retained,
3
retains even a minimal chance.'
On the other hand, the debates over trigger mechanisms, investigation,
complementarity, and penalties are still unresolved; it is these issues that
this paper will examine.' 4
II. TRIGGER MECHANISMS (PRECONDITIONS TO JURISDICTION)

Whenever a new situation arises where the ICC is the preferred forum
for adjudication, it will be necessary to "trigger" the Court into action.
For the ICC to preside over any given situation it must not only have
subject matter jurisdiction, but it must also have personal jurisdiction over
individual defendants. However, because this will be an international
court, as opposed to a domestic court, the hurdles necessary to acquire
such jurisdiction do not merely turn on the place of arrest or place of the
crime, but also on the broader concept of State consent.
See supra note 3.
11.
12. Art. 20, U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
13. Many conclusions such as this one are based not upon formal written proposals but
rather on oral interventions or informal comments. However, when possible, citations to written
proposals will be noted.
14. This paper will not discuss the specific definitional debate still undergoing over the
Court's core crimes; so much remains unresolved that any fair discussion would require a separate
paper of its own.

1998]

Bacharach

143

Under customary international law, there are several different bases of
maintaining personal jurisdiction through State consent:
(1) The Territorial Principle - All crimes, be them acts or
omissions, which were "committed (or alleged to have been
committed) within the [territory] of a State may, come before the
municipal courts and the accused if convicted may be sentenced.
This is so even where the offenders are foreign citizens; " 15 (2)
The Nationality Principle - "By virtue of nationality, a person
becomes entitled to a series of rights ranging from obtaining a
valid passport enabling him to travel abroad to being able to vote.
... The concept of nationality is important since it determines the
benefits to which persons may be entitled and the obligations
(such as conscription) which they must perform;" 16 (3) The
Passive Personality Principle
"[A] State will claim
jurisdiction to try an individual for offenses committed abroad
which have affect or will affect nationals of the State;" 17(4) The
Protective Principle - "[S]tates may exercise jurisdiction over
aliens who have committed an act abroad which is deemed
prejudicial to the security of the particular State concerned;s18 and
(5), The Universality Principle - Crimes of the most egregious
manner, such as piracy and war crimes, can be tried by any court,
because the international sphere as a whole is involved.' 9

15. M.N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1995). See The Lotus Case (France v.
Turkey), P.C.I.J., Series A, no. 10, 1927, 4 I.L.R. 153.
16. Shaw, supra note 15, at 404. See Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco Case,
P.C.I.J., Series B, no. 4, 1923, 2 I.L.R. 349 ("The question of whether a certain matter is or is
not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question, it depends upon the
development of international relations. Thus in the present state of international law, questions of
nationality are, in the opinion of this court, in principle within this reserved domain."). The
problem is that there is no consistent, accepted definition of nationality in international law and
only the conflicting descriptions of the different municipal laws of States, Shaw, p. 404. Civil
law States tend to claim jurisdiction based on all crimes committed by their nationals, whereas
common law States tend to restrict their claims regarding their nationals abroad to only very
serious crimes. Id. at 407. But see The Nottebolm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955
I.C.J. 4, 22 I.L.R. 349 (Nationality is "a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties.").
17. Shaw, supra note 15, at 408. See The Cutting Case, (1886), Moore, DIG OF INT'L
LAW, 1906, vol. 2, p. 228.
18.. Shaw, supra note 15, at 410. See Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946]
A.C. 347, 15 I.L.R. 91.
19. Shaw, supra note 15, at 411. See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v.
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961); The Barbie Cases (Matter of Barbie), [19831 Gaz.Pal.Jur. 710
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These five principles, as well as the obligations of treaties, have been
used by domestic courts to maintain jurisdiction over individuals which
have more than one State attempting to claim jurisdiction. However, an
international court, if its statute allowed, could also base jurisdiction under
these principles, or others specifically outlined in its statute or other
treaties.
According to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, the Court could exercise its
jurisdiction in several different ways. First, in a case of genocide, the
Court could exercise its jurisdiction whenever a State party to the 1948
Genocide Conventione" lodges a complaint with the Prosecutor which
alleges "that a crime of genocide appears to have been committed." 2'
Second, in the case of aggression, the Court could exercise jurisdiction if
the Security Council "has first determined that a State has committed the
act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint."' The Security
Council could also refer any other case to the Court, which it deemed
appropriate so long as the Security Council was acting under its Chapter23
VII powers to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Furthermore, the ILC Draft Statute provided that in any other case
charging one or more of the core crimes, the ICC could exercise its
jurisdiction when consent has been granted to the Court by the State which
has custody of the suspect ("the custodial State") and the State maintaining
territorial jurisdiction.
To some it appeared that the ILC Draft Statute offered a fair
distribution of power between the States, the Security Council, and the
ICC. However, many States objected to this formulation of the Court's
preconditions to its exercise of jurisdiction.
During the negotiations
several alternative proposals were offered which subtly yet drastically
changed the jurisdictional authority of the proposed ICC.
A.

The Role of the Security Council
Beyond what was mentioned above, the ILC Draft Statute also
included a very controversial provision relating to the consent process.
The ILC Draft Statute provided that "a complaint of or directly related to
an act of aggression," or any other breach of international peace and
security, could not be brought under the ILC Draft Statute unless "the
Security Council first determined that a State [had] committed the act or
(Cass.Crim. Oct. 6, 1983), 78 I.L.R. 78, 125, 136; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986).
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
21. Art. 25, U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
22. Art. 23(2), U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
23. Art. 23(1), U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
24. Art. 21, U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
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omission which [was] the subject of the complaint. "' In essence this
provision would allow the Security Council to prevent the ICC from
obtaining jurisdiction over any matter falling within the Security Council's
Chapter VII powers. This provision became one of the greatest areas of
dispute in regards to the ICC's jurisdictional procedure.
During the August 1997 PrepCom the United States took the position
that the Security Council should be the sole body with the power to
authorize or prevent any situation from being referred to the ICC. The
United States acknowledged that placing the triggering mechanisms of the
Court into the Security Council would be placing the burden of determining
jurisdiction into a political institution, but the United States also believed
that the same would be true if the consent process was left to
governments.26 The United States intervention hinted at the possible
expansion of the Security Council, and explained that this expansion would
help dilute the political pitfall that the institution currently maintained.
According to the United States intervention, "when the Security Council
reform process concludes, we expect that the representation of a much
wider cross-section of the global society will have been accomplished.
Any decision that the Security Council makes with respect to the referral of
a situation. to the ICC thus will reflect the considered judgment of that
larger and more representative group of nations. "27
Not surprisingly, other members of the Security Council shared the
US sentiment that the ICC's jurisdiction should be subordinate to the
decisions of the Security Council. The French delegate stated on 6 August
1997, that national courts should handle all crimes, and that this right
should only be taken away if the Security Council decides it is necessary to
refer the matter to the International Criminal Court.28 Furthermore, the
delegate argued that this would not be a step backwards, both legally and
politically speaking, because this was the method that had been employed
during the creation of all of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.
Germany made a proposal, which was much more expansive than the
proposal by France. The German delegation proposed that the ICC should
have jurisdiction through several methods: 1) a Security Council referral;
2) a complaint lodged by an interested State; or 3), if the Prosecutor
concludes that there is a sufficient basis for prosecution. 29 Furthermore,
for their proposal to be successful the German delegation believed it was

25.

Art. 23(2), U.N. DOC. A/49/355.

26. Report of the United States Delegation to the Preparatory Committee of the
International Criminal Court - Amendments to arts. 23, 25 ("Trigger Mechanism") (Aug. 8,
1997).
27.

id.

28.

Oral Intervention by French delegation on Aug.6, 1997.

29.

Modified German draft proposal of 1996, Aug. 6, 1997.
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necessary that all parties to the ICC Statute must accept the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to all of its core crimes.30
As might be evident, the role of the Security Council in respect to the
ICC continues to be hotly debated, but the proposals have turned more on
subtly than anything else. Throughout the debate, the two sides laid there
anchors either upon the stance initiated by the ILC Draft Statute, and
furthered by the five permanent members of the Security Council ("P5"),
that the Security Council must consent as a precondition to the ICC's
jurisdiction, or upon the broader belief that the Security Council was
merely one of several methods in which a matter could be referred to the
Court. Interestingly, it was Singapore, one of the smallest nations, that put
forth the proposal that has now gained the favor of the majority of States
including the United Kingdom3 (and possibly soon the United States32).
The compromise, appropriately dubbed, "The Singapore Proposal", states
that "no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with
under this statute where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, given a direction to that effect. "3
Here the importance of subtle changes is extremely evident. Under the P5
proposals the ICC could only have jurisdiction over a matter referred to it
by the Security Council. However, under the Charter of the United
Nations, any declaration by the Security Council can be vetoed by the
single vote of any of its permanent members. 34 Thus, if the United States,
United Kingdom, France, China, or the Russian Federation did not want
the matter to be referred to the ICC, any one of them could prevent it with
a simple veto. However, under the Singapore Proposal, the ICC has the
ability to act not once the Security Council so declares, but rather until the
Security Council declares otherwise. Therefore, under the Singapore
Proposal, a single vote of a permanent member would not be enough to
rescind the ICC's jurisdiction, rather a single .vote would be all that was
required to prevent the Security Council's interference.
It should be pointed out that in the debate over Security Council
referrals, most States have held strong to the belief that "the statute should
give to the Security Council the explicit competence to submit to the Court
situations involving threats to or breaches of international peace and
security and acts of aggression. '3 But, as Germany stated on the first day
30. Id.
31.
Proposal by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Trigger
Mechanism, U.N. DOC. AIAC.249/IWG.3/DP.1 (1998).
32. John M. Goshko, A Shift on Role of UN Court? Envoy Suggests US May Alter
Demands on Proposed Tribunal, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1998 at A2.
33. Non-Paper/WG.3/No.16, Aug. 8, 1997.
34. Article 27(3), Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153
(1945).
35. Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4, 1997.
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of the August 1997 PrepCom, "it would be in our view quite inappropriate
if the Security Council could submit individual cases or prevent the
investigation and prosecution of cases involving such situations." 36 The
distinction here by Germany is that the Security Council should be given
the ability to refer matters, issues, or situations to the Court, but that it was
the Court's responsibility to choose individual cases that arise out of those
broader referrals.
In the beginning of the final PrepCom in March 1998, the ILC Draft
Statute was replaced by a newer draft known as the Zutphen Draft (or
"Zutphen text"). However, by the end of the PrepCom much of the text
had been further revised, including the provisions relating to the role of the
Security Council in the consent and triggering process.
Regarding
aggression there was still much disagreement over an acceptable definition
and trigger mechanism, however, in relation to all of the core crimes, only
two options remain which explain the Security Council's role in the
triggering process. Both options were inserted as Article 10 paragraph 3.37
The first option stated that no prosecution could be commenced if the
Security Council decided there was a breach of international peace and
security, unless the Security Council consented to such prosecution. 8 On
the other hand, the second option reflected the input of the Singapore
Proposal, allowing the ICC to act without first requiring the consent of the
Security Council. The second proposal also stated that although the
Security Council could determine that a prosecution should not proceed, it
required that the Security Council act within a reasonable amount of time, 9
and if it failed to act within that time, the ICC could proceed without the
Security Council's consent.' °
B.

Interested States
As stated in the previous section, under a proposal submitted by
Germany during the August 1997 PrepCom, the Court could exercise
jurisdiction not only when the matter is referred to the Court by the
Security Council, but also if the complaint is lodged by an interested State,
or by the Prosecutor. 41 Although the role of the Security Council is
possibly the most potentially crippling portion of the Court's consent
process, easily the least controversial method occurs when the interested

36. Id.
37. Art. 10(7), supra note 4, art. 10(7).A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
38. Draft Statute Proposal to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.8, (April 2, 1998); supra note 4.
39. What totals a reasonable amount of time has not yet been determined; proposals have
ranged from 30 days to one year.
40. See supra note 38, A/AC.249/ICRP.8, (1998); supra note 4, A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
41.
Modified German draft proposal of 1996, Aug. 6, 1997.
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States consent to the Court's personal jurisdiction. But who are the
interested States and how many are needed to consent?
Initially, States such as France proposed that the interested States
could be: 1) the State on whose territory the acts were committed; 2) the
State of the nationality of the victim of those acts; and 3), the State of the
nationality of the person suspected of committing the acts.42 France's
proposal was based upon the jurisdictional theories of territoriality, passive
personality, and nationality, respectively. But soon it became evident that
other States might also warrant sufficient concern over the incident to
require their consent to the ICC's jurisdiction. The Russian Federation,
among other States, believed that custodiality should also be added as a
basis of necessary State consent.43 Custodiality, being defined as, "the
State which has custody of the suspect with respect to the crime.""
Furthermore, a majority of States believed that the existence of extradition
treaties might also form a basis of the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, by the
end of the August 1997 PrepCom the above four bases of jurisdiction were
included in the definition of interested States, plus a fifth, "if applicable,
the State that has requested, under an international agreement, the custodial
State to surrender a45 suspect for the purpose of prosecution, unless the
request is rejected."
In addition to the debate over which States could claim jurisdiction,
there was also debate over how many of these interested States should be
required to offer their consent before the ICC could maintain jurisdiction
over the case. For these issues to be settled, some questions needed to be
answered: is unanimous consent required, do only one or two States need
to consent, or should the Court have inherent jurisdiction over the core
crimes? Obviously, if every State consented to the Court's jurisdiction
then there would be no problem for the Court. Such broad consent,
however, is not always the likely scenario. Thus, there was great debate
over the minimum number of interested States that were required to
consent for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. There was universal
agreement that if consensual jurisdiction was utilized as the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction, it would be necessary to require more than one
concerned State to consent, but how many more was undecided. Israel and
France, for example, believed it necessary for the complainant State, the
custodial State, and the State of nationality of the accused, to all consent in
order for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction.4 As explained by the
42. France - Amended Proposals, arts. 21, 22 of the International Law Comm'n (Nonpaper/WG.3/No. 12) (Aug. 7, 1997).
43. Proposal of the Russian Federation on arts. (Non-paper/Non-Paper/WG.3/No.13,
Aug. 8, 1997.WG.3/No. 13) (Aug. 8, 1997).
44. Id.
45. Id.; supra note 38; see supra note 4.
46. Oral intervention made on Aug. 7, 1997.
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delegate from Niger, this proposal would seem the most realistic because it
would enable the investigation to be much more efficient than if the Court
were acting without the consent, or against the wishes, of one of those
interested parties.47 On the other hand, many other States believed that
such broad requirements would severely hinder prosecution at the most
formative stage of the proceedings. These States have advocated that it
should be up to the Office of the Prosecutor s to decide whether the Court
should or should not exercise its jurisdiction over a case, that the Court
should have inherent jurisdiction over its cases.
Before continuing, an important question must be addressed: What
exactly is inherent jurisdiction?
Simply put, the theory of inherent
jurisdiction means that by ratifying the ICC's Statute, States at that point
have accepted the automatic jurisdiction of the Court over all of the core
crimes, thus obviating the need to obtain further individual consent of all
the interested States. As stated by the representative of Ireland, "we
should rely on an old-fashioned concept, the concept of justice." 4 9
Essentially, the representative of Ireland proffered that by requiring States
accept the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC, as a condition to signing the
treaty, States would be prevented from allowing political considerations to
mar traditional notions of justice. Therefore, any State which would want
the protection of the Court, would also itself have to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court. Although many States seemed to believe that
inherent jurisdiction might make for the most effective court, political
concerns prevented them from fully supporting the idea. David Scheffer,
United States Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes, explained the United
States' position.
There is a reality, and .the reality is that the United States is a
global military power and presence. Other countries are not. We
are. Our forces are often called upon to engage overseas in
conflict situations, for purposes of humanitarian intervention, to
rescue hostages, to bring our American citizens from threatening
environments, to deal with terrorists. We have to be extremely
careful that this proposal does not limit the capacity of our armed
forces to legitimately operate internationally. We have to be
careful that it does not open up opportunities for endless frivolous
complaints to be lodged against the United States as a global
military poweri 0

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Also referred to as the Procuracy, see art. 12, A/49/355; art. 36, A/AC.249//L. 13.
Oral intervention made on Aug.7, 1997.

50.

Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painfid Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

13, 1997, at A10 (quoting David Scheffer).
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In Ambassador Scheffer's remarks, he highlighted an important
problem for these negotiations: supposedly neutral legal matters were
completely colored by political concerns. Thus, often times the debate
over appropriate preconditions to jurisdiction turned on which core crimes
were in question. As the United States pointed out, no one was arguing for
inherent jurisdiction over all of the core crimes, but with respect to
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, there was at least some
basis for discussion over whether inherent jurisdiction could be involved."'
The Russian Federation proposed that only genocide should be held to the
standard of inherent jurisdiction, whereas ICC jurisdiction over the other
core crimes needed the consent of the appropriate interested States."
Furthermore, the United States pointed out that the crime of aggression had
to be viewed differently from the other core crimes assuming it was
included in the Statute at all because jurisdiction over aggression could
never be based upon inherent jurisdiction without the precondition of a
Security Council referral; to ignore the Security Council in relation to
aggression would be in direct conflict with Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations which grants the Security Council the power to
determine when a breach of international peace and security has occurred,
and what actions should be taken to resolve the situation.53 Even Germany,
one of staunchest supporters of the idea of a fully independent ICC,
divided the crimes as follows:
the Court should have inherent (automatic) jurisdiction over the
three core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes, so that the Court can exercise, if necessary, concurrent
jurisdiction with each State party. The Court should also have
inherent jurisdiction with regard to the crime of aggression once
the Security Council . . . has 4first determined that a State has
committed an act of aggression.5
By the time the final PrepCom concluded in April 1998, it had become
apparent that the only crime that stood a good chance of being
characterized as a crime over which the Court had inherent jurisdiction was
the crime of genocide. This is because of all of the core crimes, only the
definition used for genocide has achieved the benchmark of customary
international law. Aggression has never been defined in a prospective
manner that States can agree upon, and although war crimes and crimes
51. Oral intervention made on Aug. 7, 1997.
52. Non-Paper/WG.3/No.13.
53. Article 39, Charter of the United Nations; Oral intervention made on Aug. 7, 1997.
This conclusion assumes that the Security Council would not agree to amend the Charter of the
United Nations so as to comply with the Statute of the ICC.
54. Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4, 1997.
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against humanity have been sufficiently defined by the Geneva
Conventions 5 and its protocols,56 the drafters of the ICC Statute felt it
necessary to modernize the language of those conventions when including
them into the ICC Statute. By modernizing the definitions of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, as opposed to merely incorporating the
language already accepted as customary international law, it becomes
harder to reach the universal consensus necessary for States to agree to
accept inherent jurisdiction over those crimes. The final text leading up to
the diplomatic conference leaves many of these issues greatly unresolved.
The five interested States defined earlier, were all included in the text, but
it was still unclear whether all or none would have to consent as a
precondition to the Court's jurisdiction. 7
C.

ProsecutorialReferral
The next method of trigger mechanism under consideration was that of
a prosecutorial referral. Initially, the Draft Statute did not provide for this
type of trigger mechanism. According to the ILC Draft the prosecutor
could only act for the purpose of investigation or otherwise, once the issue
had been referred to it by an interested State or the Security Council.5"
However, according to the Zutphen text and its revisions, the Court may
have jurisdiction with respect to its core crimes if the matter is brought by
the Prosecutor in accordance with information received through its own
investigations.59 Utilizing prosecutorial referrals as a trigger mechanism
could only work with regard to crimes over which the Court maintained
inherent jurisdiction, or over crimes which the situation and not merely
individual defendants, had already been consented and directed to the Court
by either the Security Council or the necessary States. Furthermore, for
States to agree to incorporate the Prosecutor as a trigger mechanism in the
ICC's statute, their decision will be highly dependent on what further
agreement can be made regarding the Prosecutor's ability to initiate its own
investigations. Most States will not agree to a trigger mechanism that
would provide for a Prosecutor with unfettered discretion.

55. The Four Geneva "Red Cross" Conventions of 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 75 U.N.T.S.
135; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (1949).
56. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977);
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
57. See supra note 38; see supra note 4.
58. Arts. 21, 23, and 26, A/49/355.
59. Arts. 6 and 46, A/AC.249//L.13 (1998); A/AC.249/CRP.8 (1998); arts. 6 and 12,
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
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III. INVESTIGATION

As is the case in any fair trial, either domestic or international, before
a suspect can be indicted by the Court an investigation must ensue which
concludes that sufficient evidence exists to show that a trial of the accused
is warranted.
Domestically, investigations are initiated by the local
governments through the prosecutor's office. Since the prosecutor is an
agent of the State, the State does not attempt to prevent or hinder the
investigations.
Internationally, this procedure is not so straightforward.
The Prosecutor of the ICC will not be working for the States, but for an
independent court. For an investigation to succeed a prosecutor will need
the consent of the States to enter their territory and pursue its
investigations. Sometimes States will cooperate, and sometimes States will
not. Thus, for investigations to be effective, the ICC Statute must include
provisions detailing what authorization the Prosecutor has in regards to
investigation and prosecution.
A.

The Role of the Prosecutor
According to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, the Prosecutor was
authorized to initiate investigations whenever a State party to the ICC
Statute, or the Security Council, issues a complaint requesting the
Prosecutor take action. 60 Furthermore, for the purposes of its investigation
the Prosecutor could "request the presence of and question suspects,
victims, and witnesses; collect documentary and other evidence; conduct
on site investigations; take necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality
of information or the protection of any person; as appropriate, seek the
cooperation of any State or the United Nations. "61
The assumption implicit in the Draft Statute is that any State
requesting an investigation will cooperate with the Prosecutor, and then so
too will any State upon whose territory the Prosecutor needed to search.
However, neither the assumption of the drafters, nor the language itself,
was acceptable to most States. Some States believed that this language
would require the Prosecutor to act like a blind monkey, ignorant of the
food blatantly in front of it, until another State was kind enough to bring
the atrocities to the monkey's attention. Other States believed that a
Prosecutor with the authority to investigate without State consent would
lead to overreaching and inappropriate investigations, which could
eventually turn into witch hunts. Thus, much debate has ensued over what
type of investigations the Prosecutor can and should be allowed to
undertake, and furthermore, what end the investigations should seek.
The delegations of Canada, New Zealand and Samoa issued a
joint proposal suggesting the necessity that the Prosecutor "take
60.

Arts. 25 and 26, A/49/355.

61.

Arts. 26, A/49/355 (sub-numbering omitted).
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appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in
so doing, respect the interests of victims and witnesses, including
age, gender, and health, and take into account the nature of the
crimes [particularly] [above all] where it involves sexual and

gender violence. "62
Furthermore, the participants of an inter-sessional meeting held in Vienna,
in April 1998, thought it important to highlight that the Court should "not
only ascertain the truth but also provide effective justice for victims, their
families, and assigns, " ' since victims are often survivors, and even when
not, victims are not merely the dead.
The Zutphen text and its revisions have ended up including similar
provisions as the ILC Draft Statute, but with numerous hurdles which the
Prosecutor would first need to overcome, such as notifying the States prior
to investigation that an investigation was to commence, and allowing States
one month to challenge the appropriateness of the Prosecutor's actions.'
Regardless, such provisions are almost all lacking consensus; they are
generally only favored by States that wish to hinder the independence of
the Court. Many other States believe that the Prosecutor should be able to
investigate whenever there is a need, and not merely when all States
consent. Much of this debate has also revolved around the appropriateness
of including into the text of the Statute one of two terms: ex officio or
proprio motu.
Proponents of the idea of a prosecutor with the authority to initiate
investigation on its own accord, tend to refer to the Prosecutor as acting
either ex officio or proprio motu. Germany, for example, stated that "the
Prosecutor of the Court should have the competence to initiate
investigations ex officio, on his or her own initiative, in any case where the
Court has jurisdiction. . .".65 Furthermore, at the inter-sessional meeting
in Vienna mentioned above, the participants entreated "that the Court be
led by a fully independent ex officio prosecutor, that can gather information
from any source."' The implication being proffered is that a prosecutor
acting ex officio would have the authority to take any action required in
order to proceed with a thorough and effective investigation.
62.

Non-Paper/WG.4/No.22, Aug. 14, 1997.

63. Vienna Declaration on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal
Court, The European Law Students' Association, United Nations Centre for International Crime
Prevention, Apr. 12-24, 1998, THE INT'L CRIM. CT. MONITOR, Issue 8, June 1998, at 12.
[hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
64. Art. 47[26], A/AC.249//L.13 (1998); A/AC.249//CRP.11 (1998); Apr. 1, 1998;
Art. 54, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
65. Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4, 1997.
66. Vienna Declaration, supra note 63.
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Article 46 of the Zutphen text states: "The Prosecutor [may][shall]
initiate investigations [ex officio][proprio motu]. [or] on the basis of
information [obtained] [he may seek] from any source, in particular from
Governments, United Nations organs [and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations]." 67 The structure of the Zutphen text implies
that any text in brackets represents one of two things: that the text has not
yet been agreed upon, or that it has yet to be determined which of two or
more alternatives should be used as the proper language for that portion of
the phrase. Regarding the ex officio v. proprio motu debate, the Zutphen
text lays the terms side by side in brackets, implying that one or the other
should be chosen. In the debates many States have used the terms as if
they were synonymous, but if the terms meant the same thing, then this
choice is merely a petty debate over writing style. Obviously, it seems odd
at this stage of the negotiations, for States to introduce and quibble over
synonymous language.
Although most States use the term ex officio when referring to the type
of independent prosecutor which they seek, a growing number of States
have been substituting ex officio with the term proprio motu. A translation
of the two terms in their context indicates that ex officio refers to the duties
arising out of "the office" of the Prosecutor, whereas proprio motu refers
to the duties particular to the individual prosecutor - this is a monumental
difference.' To put it another way, an ex officio prosecutor is empowered
with the duties granted to all of the prosecutors in the Office of the
Prosecutor combined, whereas a proprio motu prosecutor is confined only
to his respective duties.
Understanding the different meanings of these terms of art clarifies
why the United States tends to prefer proprio motu whereas Germany tends
to prefer ex officio; particularly in light of United States sentiment that it is
more concerned with the possibility of an unfettered prosecutor, than is
Germany. 69 However, regardless which term, if either, is chosen, many
States have made it clear that they believe even an independent
Prosecutor's powers should not proceed without some sort of check and
balancing system. To rectify this omission, the idea of a Pre-Trial
Chamber was born.

67.

A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).

68.

BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY,

(1990);

CASSELL'S

LATIN DICTIONARY,

LATIN-

ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-LATIN.

69. BetsyPisik, US Lobbies to Protect Citizens from World Court, THE WASH TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1998, at Al; James Bone, US Seeks to Limit War Crimes Court, THE TIMES OF LONDON,
Mar. 30, 1998, at 14; Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4,
1997.

19981

Bacharach

B.

The Role of the Pre-TrialChamber
During the August 1997 PrepCom, while States were arguing over the
Court's trigger mechanisms, and particularly whether the Prosecutor itself
should be empowered to initiate investigations on its own accord and thus
trigger the processes of the Court, the belief emerged that even a fully
independent Prosecutor needed some sort of check to keep its acts from
getting out of control. To combat this fear, the delegate of France
proposed the creation of an organ that would supervise the jurisdictional
matters of the Court. 70 The French delegate expressed the belief that the
Prosecutor needed to be supervised from the very outset of the
proceedings. 7' Furthermore, the delegate stated that a chambre d'examen
of some sort could strike a balance between the accused and the accusation,
thereby creating an office separate from the Prosecutor that could protect
the rights of the accused, and prevent proceedings from being opened at
too early a stage.7'
Initially, France's proposal met with both partial support and partial
dissent. The Canadian delegate, for example, agreed that a supervisory
chamber could be useful, but only to insure the equality of arms, and not to
interfere with the independence of the Prosecutor.'
Ireland's delegate
expressed his support for a chamber that would act as a check on the
unmonitored ex officio power of the Prosecutor, and affectionately dubbed
France's proposal the X-Chamber, since their was agreement on the
general concept, but not exactly what it should do or be called.7 4 The
Netherlands then countered with "Pre-Trial Magistrate" because there
seemed to be agreement that the chamber would not provide an
investigative judge, juge d'instruction, as allowed in civil law systems, but
would act to strike a balance between the prosecution and the defense
during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
Seeming slightly surprised
at how other States had interpreted its proposal, France quickly pointed out
that their idea of a pre-trial chamber was merely a suggestion for how to
deal with the direct proceedings of a prosecutor who intends to conduct
investigations within a State; the implication was not meant to be any more
or any less. 76 Regardless, the idea was alive that even though no one was
quite sure how exactly such a chamber could be incorporated into the
Statute, there seemed to be initial consensus that a supervisory chamber of
some sort might be in order.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Oral intervention made on Aug. 4, 1997.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oral intervention made on Aug. 4, 1997.
Id.

156

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 5:139

On August 5, 1997, the United Kingdom presented the first written
statement regarding the Pre-Trial Chamber. In the document, the United
Kingdom summarized its view of the initial debate:
a) Most delegations which spoke yesterday support the view that
a supervising chamber could be established to hold the balance
between the Prosecutor and the Defense in respect of certain
aspects of the investigation at the early stages of an investigation;
this would ensure equality of arms;
b) Many delegations which spoke yesterday oppose the
establishment of a chamber to supervise the work of the
Prosecutor, expressing the opinion that, if the Prosecutor is to be
independent, a supervisory role for the Court would tend to
undermine the Prosecutor's independence;
c) No clear view has emerged about whether a supervising
chamber should be set up in every case; and
d) Many delegations support the view that the rights of States
must be protected in cases where on-site investigations are to take
place. 77
Despite uncertainty concerning which powers the supervisory chamber
would be granted, references to it were quickly added to any proposal
which it might concern. In a note by the United States meant to explain a
proposal it made regarding the amendment or withdrawal of an indictment,
the commentary noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber was meant78 "to balance
the equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense. "
When the August 1997 PrepCom concluded, the idea of a Pre-Trial
Chamber was added to the official text of the proposed Statute, however,
the text was not entirely what was originally proposed by France, nor what
it will likely be in the end. According to the August 1997 official text, the
idea of the Pre-Trial Chamber contemplates that, "in exceptional
circumstances in which a unique opportunity appears to exist for the taking
or collection of evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber may be involved in order
to assure a fair trial/protect the interests of the defense. " 7 The text also
stressed that some States believed that "the Pre-Trial Chamber should only
intervene for the purpose of checking on the lawfulness of the Prosecutor's
conduct," however, others believed the Pre-Trial Chamber's role should be
77. UK Delegation, Supervision Chamber, Non-paper/WG.4/No.3 (Aug. 5, 1997).
78. U.S. Proposal regarding amendment or withdrawal of the indictment, art. 27, para. 4
(Non-paperlWG.4/Nd.7) (Aug. 8, 1997).
79. AIAC.249/L.8/Rev.1 (Aug. 14, 1997).
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expanded to reflect "the need to ensure the Prosecutor's independence and
the desirability of conferring a limited role on the Pre-Trial Chamber."'
For the most part, the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber has not been
revisited during the formal debate at the PrepComs. It has been reflected
in the informal discussions that delegations have conducted behind the
scenes, but the official text remained the same at the end of the final
March-April 1998 PrepCom as at the end of the August 1997 PrepCom8
Although there has been little formal debate on the matter, a recent
proposal submitted by Argentina and Germany received such strong
support that it appears the debate is not yet over, nor is it likely that the
official text will remain the same.
According to the Argentine/German proposal, when the Prosecutor is
acting upon the receipt of information submitted by sources other than the
Security Council or interested States, and the Prosecutor concludes that
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, the Prosecutor
"shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization" for an
investigation. 2 It would then be the responsibility of the Pre-Trial
Chamber to consider whether "there is a reasonable basis to proceed with
an investigation," and whether "the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court."8 3 A United States proposal which came out later
the same day, agreed that before the Prosecutor could commence
investigation of suspected criminals, "the Prosecutor must obtain a
preliminary ruling from a Pre-Trial Chamber confirming the Prosecutor's
If the Argentine/German proposal survives debate and
determination."'
ends up incorporated into the text of the Statute, then an effective means
will have been created to allow the Prosecutor to act as a third trigger
Furthermore, by incorporating the
mechanism for the Court.
would be entitled to initiate its
Prosecutor
Argentine/German proposal, the
own investigations, but at the same time the Pre-Trial Chamber would be
able to protect the rights of the defense and balance the independence of the
Prosecutor with the sovereignty of the States.
IV. COMPLEMENTARITY
Underlying every case brought before an international tribunal is the
tension between domestic and international claims over the same offenses.
This tension exists because of the universal agreement over the importance
80. Id.
81. Draft Statute Proposed to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.11, (Apr. 1, 1998); see supra note 4.
82. Draft Proposal by Argentina/Germany to the Preparatory Committee regarding a
Pre-Trial Chamber, U.N. Doc A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.35, (Mar. 25, 1998).
83. Id.
84. Art. 11 bis: Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, Proposal by the United
States Delegation, Mar. 25, 1998.
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of the prevention of double jeopardy, or non bis in idem,85 that no person
should be twice tried for the same crime. To rectify this potential problem,
each of the ad hoc international military and criminal tribunals were
granted supremacy over national courts' jurisdiction. In Nuremberg and
Tokyo supremacy was accepted to a great extent because the tribunals were
set up by the undisputed victors of World War 1.86 In the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda the tribunals were again granted supremacy over
domestic jurisdiction, this time not merely because of victors' will, but
rather to maintain and restore international peace and security to the
regions. The decision to implement supremacy clauses in all of these
instances was eased by the retrospective nature of the proceedings. The
tribunals were not being created to adjudicate possible future crimes, but
rather over specific instances that had already occurred, and where
agreement had already been reached that international tribunals would be
the best forum to adjudicate such crimes.
For the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court, the
retrospective nature of the prior tribunals is impossible to maintain, and
must instead be replaced by a prospective outlook. Indeed, the ICC will
not adjudicate crimes that have already occurred, but rather crimes that
may occur after the Court has been established.87 Because of this
difference in perspective, most States are unwilling to relinquish their
future claims to the jurisdiction of an international court, especially when
their domestic judicial systems are just and effective.
To balance the ICC's ability to maintain jurisdiction (when
appropriate), with national concerns over the importance of State
sovereignty, the concept of "complementarity" was developed.
The
general premise of complementarity is that the ICC would only have
jurisdiction to try an individual when the respective national criminal
justice systems were either unwilling or unable to try the case themselves.8 8
To paraphrase the delegate of Korea, the core of the principle of
jurisdiction is to find a nexus between the ICC and the national courts; it
should not be meant to define supremacy, but rather balance.89 Although it
is easy to give a general definition of complementarity, it has been much
harder for States to agree on a specific definition that should be included in
the Statute of the ICC.

85.

Also referred to as ne bis in idem, A/AC.249//CRP.20 (1988); art.

18,

A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
86.
Charles W. Alexander, JUSTICE AT NUERNBERG, (1946); TELFORD TAYLOR,
THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, (1992); DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S
WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
87.

Arts. 8 and 16, A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).

88.

Preamble, A/49/355.

89.

Oral intervention made on Aug. 5, 1997.
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The ILC Draft Statute proposed that the ICC could not have
jurisdiction when the crime in question:
has been duly investigated by a State with jurisdiction over it, and
the decision of that State not to proceed to a prosecution is
apparently well-founded; is under investigation by a State which
has or may have jurisdiction over it, and there is no reason for the
Court to take any further action for the time being with respect to
the crime; or is not of such gravity to justify further action by the
Court. 90
However, the ILC definition was considered to be much too broad.
At the beginning of the August 1997 PrepCom, Germany entreated,
"the Court itself should have the power to determine whether in a given
situation national trial procedures are not available or may be
ineffective." 9' Germany, joined by Canada, then issued a proposal in
which they suggested that a case would be inadmissible if "the case is
under investigation or prosecution by a State which has or may have
jurisdiction over the case, and the investigation or prosecution is being
diligently undertaken," or the diligent investigation resulted in the decision
not to proceed to prosecution, based on "well-founded . . .knowledge of
all relevant facts."
Italy proposed that in making a determination on admissibility, the
ICC should be entitled to consider whether:
there has been and continues to be unreasonable delay in the
conduct of national investigations or proceedings, or ...the said
investigations or proceedings ...were or are designed to shield
the accused from international criminal responsibility, or were or
are conducted with full respect for the fundamental rights 93of the
accused, and.., the case was, or is, diligently prosecuted.
The United States added that the burden of proof should be vented onto the
ICC, however, a dual burden is also on the States to handle the case
properly. 94
During the formal working groups some States proposed the inclusion
of the term, good faith, in the explanation of complementarity. But since
Art. 35, A/49/355 (sub-numbering omitted).
Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug.4, 1997.
Non-Paper/WG.3/No.3. Aug. 5, 1997.
Non-Paper/WG.3/No.4, Aug. 5, 1997.
94. Oral intervention made on Aug. 5, 1997. It was unclear from the comment made by
the US delegate whether the burden placed on States not to adulterate domestic prosecutions,
should be a legal onus or a moral responsibility.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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goodfaith was not a term utilized by, or familiar to, most civil law nations,
this too was rejected. A rolling text issued on the subject, stated that the
case would be admissible to the ICC if the relevant national criminal justice
systems were either "unable or unwilling to carry out effectively the
investigation or prosecution. " 95 The text then footnoted that phrase
"unable or unwilling" with the comment that "these terms attempt to reflect
the rationale underlying the issue of complementarity, and are suggested in
the absence of any other generally accepted phrase."'
Ironically,
however, this phrase stuck, and was included in the next rolling text' and
then in the final official text of the August 1997 PrepCom, 98 with only a
slight modification the ICC has jurisdiction over the case when "the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution. "9
Aspects of the complementarity principle surfaces in numerous
sections of the Statute of the ICC. However, the simple definition of
complementarity as laid out by the Zutphen Draft and its revisions, was as
follows:
1. Having regard to paragraph 3 of the preamble, the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible where:
a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
b) the case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
c) the person concerned has already been tried for conduct
which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is
not permitted under paragraph 2 of article 13; and
d) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action
by the Court.

95.

Informal Consultation on art. 35, Coordinator's Draft Consolidated Text, Aug. 6,

96.
97.

Id.
Informal Consultation on Article 35, Coordinator's Draft Consolidated Text, 11 Aug.

98.
99.

AIAC.24911WG.3ICRP.2 (1997).
Id.

1997.

1997.

1998]

Bacharach
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the
Court shall consider whether one or more of the following exist,
as applicable:
a) the proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court as set out in article 5;
b) there has been an undue delay in the proceedings which in
the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice; and
c) the proceedings were not or are not being conducted
independently or impartially and they were or are being conducted
in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court
shall consider whether, due to a total or partial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 0oo

Heading into the Diplomatic Conference in Rome, there appears to be
consensus that this definition of complementarity will survive any further
negotiations. On the other hand, a minority of delegations still hold to the
belief that the Court should not be granted complementary jurisdiction at
all, and that the Court "has no jurisdiction where the case in question is
being investigated or prosecuted, or has been prosecuted, by a State which
has jurisdiction over it."'t° However, as the delegate of Austria pointed
out, "complementarity constitutes a guiding spirit, " " and as the delegate
of Ireland concluded, complementarity might not be the strongest grounds
for the Court to rest on, but it might be the best. 103
V. PUNISHMENT AND REPARATIONS
Thus far this paper has dealt primarily with the processes of the ICC
leading up to a trial. However, underlying the entire process including the
trial itself, is what actions the Court should take once it has determined that
100. Art. 11, A/AC.249/L.13 (1998);
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
101. Id.
102. Oral intervention made on Aug. 6,1997.
103. Id.

A/AC.249/CRP.8

(1998);

Art.

15,
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a person was guilty of the crimes with which he or she was charged. Is the
purpose of this court merely to punish the world's most egregious
international criminals, or to offer satisfaction and redress to their victims
as well? To answer this final question it is necessary to examine the
possible punishments that the Court may be empowered to impose.
A.

Applicable Penalties
The ILC draft appears to have assumed that the penalties phase of the
proceedings would be quite simple and up-front. The ILC Draft stated that
the Court could impose a life sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment
for a specified number of years, and/or a f'me.'0 4 The fines could be
transferred by the Court to: the Registrar, "to defray the costs of the
trial"; 5 a State whose nationals were the victims of the crime in
question; and/or a trust fund "established by the secretary-general of the
United Nations for the benefit of victims of crime."" ° Furthermore, the
ILC Draft proposed that in determining the length of sentence or amount of
fine to be imposed, the laws of the passive personality State, the territorial
State, and the custodial State could all be taken under consideration.10 8
Although clear and concise, this draft had many holes.
The most glaring missing piece was the death penalty. Thus, upon
much political pressure the death penalty was added, at least for the time
being, into the official text as another possible penalty. The new text
explained that the Court could impose the death penalty, "as an option, in
case of aggravating circumstances and when the Trial Chamber finds it
necessary in the light of the gravity of the crime, the number of victims and
the severity of the damage."" °
However, the provision on the death
penalty was immediately placed in brackets, to indicate that it needed
further debate. After that, it was purposefully skipped over in the formal
debates, and left completely untouched leading up to Rome, except for one
minor change. The text relating to the death penalty was changed in the
Zutphen text to read as the first of two options, then the second option
merely stated, "No provision on death penalty." 1
Apparently the lines
had been drawn, but it was recognized that only the plenipotentiaries
meeting in Rome were the appropriate figures to attempt some sort of
compromise.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Art. 47, A/49/355.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A/AC.249/CRP.1 (1997).
A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).
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Another aspect that many felt was missing from the ILC Draft was a
provision relating to minors. It was proposed that the ILC Draft should be
amended to include a provision where anyone who committed the crimes
between the ages of 13 and 18 could not be sentenced for more than 20
years of imprisonment."' However, that same text also provided that the
Court could determine that the circumstances of the case could allow the
Court to take exception and ignore age as a mitigating circumstance,
allowing minors to be sentenced as adults." 2 This second provision met
with much opposition, particularly from non-governmental organizations
and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. The Zutphen text
removed the second provision, and stated that no person who committed a
core crime while under the age of 18 could be sentenced for more than 20
years of imprisonment." 3
Debate also ensued over the applicability of national legal standards to
the imposition of penalties, but the text remained essentially the same
heading into Rome. One provision was added in brackets, "In cases where
national law does not regulate a specific crime, the Court will apply
penalties ascribed to analogous crimes in the same national law."" 4
Regardless, the entire article has been footnoted to say that "the view was5
held that this kind of provision should be avoided altogether."'
Therefore, it seems likely that the Court will be allowed to set its own
international standards for appropriate penalties, and not be limited or
hindered by domestic norms. However, "A sentence may be appealed, in
accordance with the Rules, by the Prosecutor or the convicted person on
the ground of [significant] disproportion between the crime and the
sentence." 6
Finally, during the March-April 1998 PrepCom, victim's groups
lobbied for a reordering of the listing of the types of fines that could be
collected by the Court. The delegate of France seemed to agree with the
non-governmental organizations and then argued themselves that the listing
of fines should be rearranged to reflect the difference in the importance of
each type of fine. The final official text of the March-April 1998 PrepCom
stated that fines and possibly assets collected by the Court could be
transferred to one or more of the following: a trust fund, the State whose
nationals were victims of the crime in question, and the Registrar."' Also
added to the text in brackets was a point stressing that the listing was in an

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

A/AC.249//CRP.1 (1997).
Id.
Art. 68, A/AC.249//L. 13, (1998).
A/AC.249/CRP. 13 (1998); art. 78, A/CONF. 183/2/Add.1.
Id.
A/AC.249/WG.4/CRP.7 (1998); art. 80, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
A/AC.249/CRP.13 (1998); art. 79, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
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order of priority."' Furthermore, a footnote stressed that it was suggested
that there may be other options other than the first two listed, "as to the
manner in which fines or assets collected by the Court could be distributed
to victims."" 9
Reparations
The ILC Draft Statute did not include any provisions for reparations.
The closest the draft came to including provisions on reparations were the
references to how the fines collected by the Court could be distributed."2°
However, even there, the money was not going directly to victims, their
families or assigns, but rather to intermediary bodies, which could then
utilize the money in an undefined manner. To rectify this omission,
delegations suggested two areas where reparations could be incorporated
into the statute: first, as another applicable penalty; and second, as a
separate article dealing specifically with compensation to victims.
The formal debate over reparations was supposed to occur during the
Although formal
December 1997 and March-April 1998 PrepCorns.
debate did occur to some extent, most of the negotiations over reparations
occurred during informal, off the record, discussions and working groups.
However, without breaching any bonds of secrecy, it is still quite possible
to explain what developed through a look at the few official texts, which
did surface on the subject.
In the official text on the Decisions Taken by the Preparatory
Committee at its Session Held from 1 to 12 December 1997,121 the
Working Group on Penalties recommended that under the Applicable
Penalties article, a fifth penalty should be included, "Appropriate forms of
reparation." The suggestion meant that besides imprisonment, fines, and
possibly the death penalty, the Court should also be able to impose on the
convicted person the responsibility of paying reparations to victims, their
families or assigns. However, there was still much disagreement on not
only whether reparations should even be considered a penalty, but also if it
were, what wording should be used. The suggestion of the working group
read as follows: "[[without prejudice to the obligation on every State to
provide reparation in respect of conduct engaging the responsibility of the
State] [or reparation through any other international arrangement]
appropriate forms of reparation [[including] [such as] restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation]].""a This language was then inserted into
B.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Art. 47, A/49/355.
121. A/AC.249/L.9/Rev.1 (1997).
122. Id. The examples used to suggest forms of reparations (i.e. restitution, compensation
and rehabilitation), as well as the definition used to explain the term "victim", were made in
reference to the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of

1998]

Bacharach

the Zutphen text under the article on penalties and will debated more in
Rome." 3 However, not everyone was convinced that reparations were a
penalty, nor was everyone convinced that that brief explanation was
sufficient in explaining what type of reparations could be granted to
victims. Thus, another article was inserted into the Zutphen text, which
did not exist in the ILC Draft, Compensation to Victims."
The Zutphen text offered three proposals regarding Compensation to
Victims. The first proposal granted the Court with the binding authority to
declare the criminal liability of the person convicted, but granted States the
competence to determine issues of reparations." 25 The second proposal
stated that where necessary,
the Trial Chamber shall also determine the scope and extent of the
victimization and establish principles relating to compensation for
damage caused to the victims and to restitution of property
unlawfully acquired by the person convicted, in order to allow
victims to rely on that judgment for the pursuit of appropriate
forms of reparations, such as restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation either in national courts or through their
governments, in accordance with national law. 126
Essentially, this proposal allowed the Court to make recommendations as to
what it felt domestic courts or governments should award, but did not bind
the States to its judgment. Under the third proposal, it was suggested that
the Court itself should be able to order a convicted individual to issue both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary forms of reparations. 27 As could be assumed
about any text with so many different proposals, the text included in the
Zutphen Draft did not last very long before being modified.
On February 10, 1998, a joint proposal issued by France and the
United Kingdom shrunk the article into two proposals. The first, in very
broad language, granted the Court the ability to order both individuals and
States to pay reparations to victims, their families and assigns.' 12 The
second, suggested that the Court could only order a "monetary award, or
any other award by way of reparations," against an individual, but not
Power, ARes/40/34, Nov. 29, 1985, and the Revised Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17, May 24, 1996.
123. Art. 68, A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).
124. Art.66, AIAC.249/L.13 (1999); Art. 73, retitled, Reparations to Victims,
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. A/AC.249/WG.4/DP.19 (1998).
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against a State.'2 9 Furthermore, the monetary award could be comprised of
a punitive element, a compensatory element, or both, and the reparations
could include an order for restitution of property or "any other order which
the Court considers appropriate."1 30 Both proposals had their merits and
pitfalls. The first proposal allowed the Court to essentially order whatever
forms of reparations it considered appropriate, both against an individual
and a State, but did not allow for monetary awards, which is possibly the
easiest form of compensation that could be granted. On the other hand, the
second proposal allowed for monetary awards, but not from States, which
are the most likely and effective source of monetary awards and other
forms of reparations.
A rolling text issued on March 23, 1998 by the Working Group on
Procedures, combined the two proposals submitted by France and the
United Kingdom, into one text incorporating the better elements of both,
but unfortunately most of the text was still in brackets indicating lack of
consensus. In the rolling text there was agreement that the Court should be
authorized to make an order directly against a convicted individual for an
appropriate form of reparations, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation.'
The rolling text also seemed to indicate that there had
been agreement that monetary awards of reparations could be composed by
13 2
both an exemplary element and a compensatory element, or both.
However, it later turned out that such agreement had not in fact been
met. 3 Furthermore, included in brackets, and thus indicating a lack of
agreement, were references to the Court being able to "recommend that
Statesgrant an appropriate form of reparations to, or in respect of, victims
The final official text of the March-April 1998 PrepCom, mirrored
most of the language of the March 23,1998 rolling text. It included a
footnote explaining that the references to appropriate reparations was "to
be granted not only to victims but also to others such as the victim's
35 The official text also
families and successors (in French, "ayant-droit').1
explained, albeit in brackets, that orders of reparations made by the Court
against States could only be made "[if the convicted person is unable to do
so himself/herself; [and . . . the convicted person was, in committing the
offense, acting on behalf of that State in an official capacity, and within the
course and scope of his/her authority]]." 36 It appears that much of the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Art. 66: Reparations to Victims, Rolling Text, Mar. 23, 1998.
Id.
A/AC.249/WG.4/CRP.5 (1998); A/AC.249/WG.4/CRP.5/Corr. 1 (1998).
Art. 66: Reparations to Victims, Rolling Text, Mar. 23, 1998.
A/AC.249/CRP. 12 (1998); art. 73, A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
Id.
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debate that will continue with regard to compensation to victims, will be
centered on whether a monetary award could also be included as a form of
reparations, whether the ICC should compel States to make reparations,
and whether reparations should be considered a penalty, a separate form of
compensation, or both.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is cautious-optimism leading into the Diplomatic Conference in
Rome. Over 1700 sets of brackets remain in the proposed text, all of
which must be resolved before the treaty can be signed. Although many
people believe compromise can be met in time, almost as many wonder
what the cost of compromise will be. Still others are concerned that five
weeks in Rome will not be enough to hammer out the differences, and
future conferences will have to be held, possibly undermining support for
the creation of an International Criminal Court.
Much of the uncertainty exists regarding the outcome of the
negotiations because delegations are unsure where to draw the bottom line
in their compromises. Some scholars already believe that a fatal mistake
was incurred in the beginning of the PrepCois when States decided that
the Statute should not merely be the procedural creation of a court, but also
a redefinition and modernization of fundamental concepts of international
law, such as the definitions of aggression, crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
However, that choice was made, so heading into Rome
governmental and non-governmental representatives are proceeding under
the premise that both goals can be accomplished.
To help States decide what bottom line should now be drawn, many
State delegations have requested that non-governmental representatives
offer their advice as to what they see as a bottom line. No State wants to
sign a treaty that its citizens will reject. Amnesty International has
suggested sixteen fundamental 13principles for a "U]ust, fair and effective
International Criminal Court.
137.

Court,

Sixteen FundamentalPrinciplesfor a Just, Fairand Effective International Criminal

Amnesty

International,

AI

Index:

IOR

40/12/98,

(May

1998),

< http:l/www.igc.org/iccl >.

1. The Court should have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide...
2. The Court should have jurisdiction over other crimes against humanity...
3. The Court should have jurisdiction over serious violation of humanitarian law in
international and non-international armed conflict...

4. The Court must ensure justice for women...
5. The Court must have inherent (automatic) jurisdiction...

6. The Court must have the same universal jurisdiction over these crimes as any of its States
parties...
7. The Court must have the power in all cases to determine whether it has jurisdiction and
whether to exercise it without political interference from any source...
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Whether Amnesty International has highlighted the appropriate sixteen
principles is surely debatable, but at the same time their input was greatly
appreciated by the delegations. The importance of State cooperation,
respect for the principle of complementarity, and removal of political
interference from the Court, will hopefully receive unanimous acceptance.
It is beyond dispute that for the creation of the Court to be considered a
success, the ICC must be an independent, impartial, just and effective,
permanent judicial institution.
This paper has attempted to show the progression of the negotiations
on certain key elements concerning the creation of the permanent
International Criminal Court. This attempt is intended to help explain the
creation of, and how close we are to, mankind's greatest effort towards the
eradication of impunity. However, one of the biggest problems the
negotiations and the Court might face, is the basic redefinition of the core
crimes. It appears that most States are unwilling to sign onto a treaty that
does not explicitly lay out culpability. On the other hand, just as failing to
modernize the core crimes would have allowed these same States to limit
the jurisdiction of the Court to only historical frameworks, not allowing the
definitions to be reexamined in the future will limit the Court solely to the
notions of today. In 1928 no one ever dreamt of genocide. In 1948 no one
equated rape with a crime against humanity. What understandings will the
new millennium bring? Regardless of all of the obstacles we need a court
that can offer public acknowledgment of international crimes. To do so,
this Court must uphold and imbue the evolving face of international
8. The Court should be an effective complement to national courts when these courts are
unable or unwilling to bring to justice those responsible for these grave crimes...
9. An independent prosecutor should have the power to initiate investigations on his or her
own initiative, based on information from any source, subject only to appropriate judicial
scrutiny, and present search and arrest warrants and indictments to the Court for approval...
10. No political body, including the Security Council and States, should have the power to
stop or even delay an investigation or prosecution under any circumstances whatsoever...
11. To ensure that justice is done, the Court must develop effective victim and witness
protection programs, involving the assistance of all States parties, without prejudicing the rights of
suspects and the accused...
12. The Court must have the power to award victims and their families reparations,
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation...
13. The Statute must ensure suspects and accused the right to a fair trial in accordance with
the highest international standards at all stages of the proceedings...
14. States parties, including their courts and officials, must provide full cooperation without
delay to the Court at all stages of the proceedings...
15. The Court should be financed by the regular UN budget, supplemented, under
appropriate safeguards for its independence, by the peace-keeping budget and by a voluntary trust
fund...
16. There should be no reservations to the Statute...
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criminal law, humanitarian law and human rights. Through a permanent
International Criminal Court, not only will the world's most egregious
international criminals be relieved of their impunity, but their victims will
be allowed a vehicle for satisfaction and redress.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Children are undoubtedly the future of any society, and have the
potential for someday becoming incredible assets to the countries in which
they live. Major traumatic events that occur during ones youth assists to
mold individuals into the adults they become. Sexual abuse as a child is
one such traumatic event of such major proportion that impacts an
individual's life so profoundly the event carries over into adulthood by
aiding in the formation of ones adult personality and psyche. Children do
not possess the capability to address situations such as being the victims of
sexual abuse by adults. Children by their very nature are inexperienced
and vulnerable to adult persuasions. Adults are the authoritative figures in
virtually all societies throughout the world. Hence, children do not possess
the ability to handle themselves in adult situations regarding their own
sexual exploitation by adults.
Due to poverty resulting from lack of employment opportunities for
their parents, many children in Asia are forced to fend for themselves in
the adult world. Unfortunately, a myriad of children, both boys and girls,
turn to a life of prostitution. Although some choose prostitution, the
majority of them are forced into it through kidnapping. Often, children are
trafficked across borders. The traumatic experiences of these children are
so intense that rehabilitation is almost impossible. These victims are
generally left psychologically as well as physically scarred for life.
In Thailand, estimates of the number of prostituted children range
anywhere from 200,000 to 800,000.
Although Thai laws expressly
condemn sexual offenses against children, the laws have been relatively
ineffective due to poor law enforcement.' Despite the obvious inhumanity
1.

Patricia D. Levan, CurtailingThailand's Child ProstitutionThrough an International

Conscience, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 869, 869 (1994); RON O'GRADY, THE CHILD AND
THE TOURIST 24 (EPCAT 1992).

2.
Thail. Criminal Code, §§ 277, 286 (1989) (Thailand's criminal law which addresses
the punishment of any person who engages children in sexual activity).
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a girl who is not yet over fifteen years of age
and who is not his wife, whether or not the girl consents, shall be imprisoned four to twenty
years and fined eight thousand to forty thousand Baht.
If the commission of the offense according to the first paragraph is committed against
a girl not yet over thirteen years of age, the offender shall be imprisoned seven to twenty
years and fined fourteen thousand to forty thousand Baht, or imprisoned for life.
If the commission of the offense according to the first or second paragraph is
committed by participation of persons and such gird does not consent, or by carrying a gun
or explosive, or by using such weapons, the offender shall be imprisoned for life.
If the offender commits the act stated in the first paragraph against a girl over
thirteen years but not yet fifteen years of age with her consent, and the Court grants such
man and girl to marry together afterwards, the offender shall not be punished for such
offense. If the Court permits them to marry while the offender is in prison for such an
offense, the Court shall release such offender.
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of child exploitation, a number of countries in Asia have created an
international market for child prostitution: child sex tourism. Most of the
consumers are males from the industrialized nations.' Countries such as
Thailand and the Philippines are often chosen because they are havens for
organized sex tours. 4 Some are simply looking for a causal experimental
experience. Others are notorious pedophiles, representing a significant;
sector of the trade. 5
The first part of this note will focus on the national laws of the leading
providing countries providing child sex tourism, namely Thailand and the
Philippines, and the national laws of consumer countries, namely the
United States. It will concentrate on the implementation of national laws as
mandated by international law, and the likelihood of success of criminal
prosecution here in the United States of Americans committing sex offenses
abroad. The second part of this note will deal with suggestions for
enforcing national strategies here in the United States in order to eliminate
child sex tourism abroad. The third and final part of this note will address
the issue of how the emerging International Criminal Court may also play a
role in adjudicating matters of child trafficking and prostitution.

II. THE LAWS OF PROVIDER AND CONSUMER NATIONS OF CHILD SEX
TOURISM: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan are the countries
traditionally connected with child sex tourism, and all have serious child
prostitution problems. 6 Prostitution of a massive nature involving children
originated in Thailand and the Philippines in the late 1960s during the
Vietnam War.7 In Thailand, Burmese women and girls as young as 13 are
illegally trafficked across the border by recruiters, and sold to brothel
owners. 8 In the Philippines, many children are tricked into prostitution
after their parents sell them to recruiters with the promise of legitimate
work in the city. 9 The organization, End Child Prostitution in Asian
Tourism ("ECPAT"), has offered a 1994 estimate of 250,000 prostituted
children in Thailand alone.' 0 The Philippine government calculated the
number of child prostitutes in the Philippines at 50,000.11
Thail. Criminal Code, Title IX Offenses Relating to Sexuality, § 277, B.E. 2530 (1989) (Thail.).
3.
Paul Ehrlich, Asia's Shocking Secret, READER'S DIGEST, Oct. 1993, at 70.
4.
Id.
5.
O'GRADY, supra note 1, at 56.
6.
Id. at 91-106.
7.
Id. at 92-101.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. RON O'GRADY, THE RAPE OF THE INNOCENT 135 (1994).
11. Id.
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During the late 1970s and early 1980s, pedophiles from both Europe
and North America found a Shangri-La for sexual activity with minors in
Thailand and the Philippines.'" More than half of the overall sex tourists
are pedophiles, and approximately one-third of them are North American
or European."3
A. The ProviderCountries: The NationalLaws of Thailand and the
Philippines
Thailand has responded to the problem of child exploitation by enacting
laws criminalizing sexual activity with minors." Thai law prohibits sexual
intercourse with a child under the age of fifteen regardless of consent.15
Sexual activity with a child under thirteen may warrant life imprisonment. 6
The Philippine government has taken positive measures to curb child
exploitation by promoting the Special Protection of Children against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.' 7 The Act allows heavy
penalties to be applied against advertisers, clients, procurers, pimps, and
houses of prostitution."8 It has provided for the arrest and deportation of a
number of foreign pedophiles. 9
Although it is evident that the providing countries have passed
legislation that protects children from sexual exploitation, these laws are
often not enforced against tourists.' In Thailand, the sex tourism policy
has been a difficult force to rise up against.2' The sex trade has become a
major industry in both Thailand as well as in the Philippines, creating
resistance against the child sexual offenses laws.' The police have known
to guard brothels, as well as traffic or procure children for prostitution.'
12. O'GRADY, supra note 1, at 98-99, 103-104.
13. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 21.
14. See supra note 2, at § 277.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Laurie Nicole Robinson, The Globalization of Female Child Prostitution:A Call For
Reintegration and Recovery Measures Via Article 39 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of The Child, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 239 n.10 (1997) (citing to Vitit
Muntarbhorn, International Perspectives and Child Prostitution in Asia,. in Forced Labor, 23
(1996)).
18. Philippine Rep. Act No. 7610 88 Official Gazette, No. 30, Jul. 27, 1993 at 4851.
19. Robinson, supra note 17.
20. Vickie F. Li, Child Sex Tourism To Thailand: The Role of The United States As A
Consumer Country, 4 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 505 n.2 (1995) (citing Douglas Hodgson, Sex
Tourism and Child Prostitution in Asia: Legal Responses and Strategies, 19 MELB. U.L.REv.
512, 518 (1994)).
21.
Id. at 505.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Moreover, police officers also tend to be customers themselves, yet they
Child prostitutes are
are virtually never investigated or prosecuted.'
reluctant to cooperate with legitimate law enforcement officials for fear of
prosecution themselves.'
B. The United States' Role as a Consumer Country: Laws Enacted at
Home to Prevent Child Exploitation Abroad
On September 13, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("Crime Bill"). 26
The Crime Bill included the Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act of 1994,
which criminalizes travel to another country for the purpose of engaging in
sexual intercourse with a minor.27 The present act extends the Mann Act of
1910, which was originally passed to prevent the transport of women
In 1986, the Mann Act was
across state lines for sexual purposes.
amended to criminalize the transport of any person under the age of
eighteen either between states or abroad with the intent that the minor
engage in sexual activity. The current 1994 amendment criminalizes
traveling to foreign countries for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts
with a child less than eighteen years of age if that act would be in violation
of United States federal law.29 The legislation carries financial penalties or
imprisonment up to ten years, or both.' In addition, the law contains no
double criminality requirement. Therefore, the United States nationals who
commit sex offenses abroad may be prosecuted under federal law,
regardless of whether or not the act is considered a crime abroad.31
C. The Mandates of InternationalLaw on the United States as a
Consumer Nation
The most widely recognized development in international law
regarding the protection of children is contained in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter "UNCRC"].32 It was
24. Id. at n.10 (citing Aaron Sachs, The Last Commodity, Child Prostitution in the
Developing World, WORLD WATCH, July/Aug. 1994, at 24, 28).
25. Robinson, supra note 17.
26. Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2036 (1994) (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2258 (1988); 108 Stat. 2037 (1994) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C § 2423
(1988).
27. Id.
28. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1994)).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 14/25, U.N.
G.A.0.R. 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
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adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, and entered into
force in 1990. 33 Articles 34(a) and (b) of the Convention require all
signatories to take appropriate national, bilateral, and multilateral measures
to prevent the exploitation of children in unlawful sexual activities and
prostitution.34 Article 35 provides that states take measures in order to
prohibit the sale, abduction, or trafficking of children."
To date, 191 nations have ratified the UNCRC.36 However, the
United States has not yet done so." There are a number of reasons why
opposition to the ratification of the UNCRC exists in the United States. A
main concern is federalism. Many of the convention's enunciated rights
fall within areas, which have traditionally been left to the discretion of the
individual states.38 Under the United States Constitution, ratified treaties
become federal law. 39 Therefore, there is some apprehension that the
UNCRC would supersede a number of state laws, thus allowing for
prosecution in federal rather than state courts.
D. The Likelihood of Success of Prosecution of Sex Tourists in the United
States.
While these national laws demonstrate a progressive approach towards
abolishing sex tourism in providing countries like Thailand and the
Philippines as mandated by international law, the actual legal effect is
minimal.'
While providing countries have difficulty enforcing laws
against child exploitation within their borders, consumer countries like the
United States face the obstacles of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
evidentiary standards.41
International law recognizes five areas of
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.4 2 The United States adheres to the
principles of territoriality and nationality in order to establish federal
jurisdiction in criminal cases.43 Territoriality deals with where a crime is

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at art. 34(a) and (b), at 11, 218 I.L.M. at 1469.

35.

Id at art. 35, at 11, 28 I.L.M. at 1469.

36. As of this writing, there are 191 states parties to the CRC. U.N. Homepage (visited
Nov. 17, 1997), <http://www.un.orglDeptslTreatylfmal/ts2/newsfiles/part~boo/ivllhtml>.
37. Id.
38. Gary L. Bauer, Watch out for the Children's Rights Treaty, Family Research
Council, WASH. WATCH, Mar., 1991, at 4.
39. Id.
40. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the U.S. in the International Enforcement of
CriminalLaw, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 37, 57 (1990).
41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.
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committed." Therefore, the United States will rely on its territorial power
to try any criminal offenses committed within its borders. Nationality
provides for jurisdiction over United States nationals who commit criminal
acts abroad.4' The amendment to the Mann Act, which explicitly allows
for prosecution of United States nationals for traveling or conspiring to
travel abroad for purposes of engaging minors in sexual acts, permits the
United States to exercise federal jurisdiction based on the nationality
principle.'
Although they may overcome potential jurisdictional obstacles, United
States law enforcement officials may have problems meeting federal
evidentiary standards.4 Due to the novelty of the amendment to the Mann
Act, such problems have not yet arisen.48 However, retrieving admissible
evidence from foreign nations may prove to be an arduous task in
prosecuting sex offenders in the United States. It should be noted that
United States law focuses on the intent to commit a sex offense abroad
rather than the sexual act itself.49 This would otherwise indicate that
procuring admissible evidence from another country may be unnecessary,
since one could be prosecuted without ever having left the country.
Nevertheless, most offenders are likely to be apprehended in a foreign
country while engaging in the criminal act.5 0 This, in turn, will necessitate
collecting evidence abroad, which is admissible in a United States court of
law. In order to aid in this process, the United States and Thailand have
signed the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty [hereinafter "MLAT"]5 1 which
facilitates the gathering of admissible evidence from abroad. It guarantees
that the evidence collected corresponds with the constitutional and
evidentiary requirements of both countries.5 2 However, in sex offense
cases, the testimony of the victim may be inadmissible if not given in
person, due to hearsay objections.53
To date, there have been no prosecutions of United States citizens
regarding the amendment to the Mann Act which deals with travel with the
intent to engage in sex with a minor.54 The United States Department of
Justice has expressed interest in prosecuting operators of child sex tours,
44.

Nadelmann, supra note 40.

45.
46.

Id.
Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Nadelmann, supra note 40.

50.

Id.

51.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, Feb. 1994, U.S. - Thailand, Art. VII, 247 U.S.T.

52.

Nadelmann, supra note 40, at 37.

53.

Id.

54.
28, 1994).

National Coalition for the Protection of Children and Families, Press Release 1 (Sept.
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and the United States Customs Child Pornography Enforcement Program
has initiated investigation of those potentially liable under the new United
States law. 55
III. BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT: WHAT THE UNITED STATES MUST DO
AS A GLOBALLY RECOGNIZED PROPONENT OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN

ORDER TO ERADICATE CHILD SEX TOURISM ABROAD.
Child sex tourism is a lucrative business of international proportions. 6
Its suppression necessarily involves the participation of governments,
national and international law enforcement agencies, non-governmental
organizations, and international bodies such as the United Nations.5
National legislation of both provider nations, such as Thailand and the
Philippines, and consumer nations, such as the United States, are important
components in the effort to end child sexual exploitation abroad. The
United States must take additional steps in order to deter sex tourism
originating in the United States.
A.

Ratifying the UNCRC
The United States' position regarding the UNCRC Stands in stark
contrast to other consumer nations, such as Sweden and Australia, which
have not only ratified the convention, but have incorporated it fully into
their strategies against child sex tourism.5" Although the United States has
signed the convention, it appears unlikely that it will be ratified without
significant reservations denying the treaty binding power over United States
law.5 9 The United States' disposition regarding the ratification of the
convention leads other consumer nations to believe that the United States
holds itself above international treaties, while at the same time, the United
States seeks to bind provider nations to the mandates of international law.
This lack of support for the UNCRC weakens the effectiveness of the
United States' position against child sexual exploitation, and its capability
6
as a world leader to encourage respect for children's rights worldwide. 0
By becoming a party to the convention, the United States would
recognize the international human rights of children, including civil,

55. Id.
56. The author has arrived at this conclusion after researching numerous sources on the
subject.
57. Li, supra note 20, at 522.
58. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Status as at 31 Dec.
1993, at 193-194, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 and Supp. (1994).
59. Elizabeth M. Calciano, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Will it
Help Children in the United States?, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 515 (1992).
60. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, G.A. Res.
2200 A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 1211.
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political, social, cultural, and economic rights.6 '
Although there is
opposition to ratification on grounds of federalism, implementing a federalstate reservation clause so as to allow individual states to conform or not to
conform to the Convention in certain matters traditionally left to the states,
may serve as a tool to facilitate Congressional consent in ratifying the
treaty. Under international law, the United States may still become a party
to the treaty even with a federal-state reservation.'
B. Collaborationwith Foreign National Governments and Nongovernmental Organizations
In order to prevent sex offenders from further exploiting children in
providing nations, exchange programs between law enforcement officials
and community leaders of provider and consumer countries should be
fostered. Such programs would include tracking the behavior of United
States nationals where there is a threat to children of providing countries.'
This may be achieved by the exchange of information and data to trace and
track pedophiles and criminals who exploit children.'
A further way to stop the spread of sex tourism is through the use of
travel restrictions by both provider and consumer countries. For example,
governments should consider revoking the passports of convicted sex
tourists. In addition, opponents of the trade should promote campaigns that
enlist the support of national and international commercial airlines and
travel agents in order to guarantee that sex tour operators are identified and
prosecuted. This will help to deter travelers looking for casual sex with
children in foreign countries.' Withdrawing the licenses of travel agencies
promoting sex tours may also help to deter sex tourism.
There have been a growing number of national initiatives against child
sexual exploitation conducted by non-governmental organizations
[hereinafter "NGOs"] that have become increasingly coordinated in
networking to prevent child prostitution with effective media campaigns.'
Contrary to legal remedies, NGOs seek to attenuate the root causes of child
prostitution and to offer help where the problem exists.67 Projects include
61. Ron O'Grady, Keynote Speech, World Congress Against Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Children (Mar. 1995) (transcript available on web site <http://
www.childhub.ch/webpub/csechome/22d6.htm >).
62. Lawrence L. Stenzel II,
Federal State Implications of the Convention, CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS INAMERICA: THE UNCRC COMPARES wrrH U.S. LAW 57 (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard
A. Davidson eds., 1990).
63. Robinson, supra note 17, at 31.
64. Id.
65.
CONCETTA TALIERcIo, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF CHILD SEX
TOURISM INASIA: A CONTEMPORARY FORM OF SLAVERY? 3 (1993).

66.
67.

Robinson, supra note 17.
Id.
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helping families in social development, hot lines to help children in
difficulty, and emergency homes and shelters for abused and exploited
children.' NGOs cite education and awareness as the focal points of their
crusade against child sex tourism. 69
One notable campaign against child sex tourism is End Child
Prostitution in Asian Tourism [hereinafter "ECPAT"].T° ECPAT works to
influencing governments to eliminate tourist-related prostitution and to
comply with international conventions. 7
It has also been effective in
mobilizing action at the national level by initiating children's forums
against military bases, and advocacy against pedophilia and the exploitative
use of children in advertising in various countries. 72 In addition to
gathering data on sex tourism, ECPAT has brought this issue to the world's
attention and has mobilized _global concern regarding the exploitation of
these innocent child victims. ' By working closer with organizations such
as ECPAT, the United States will set an example for other consumer
nations as a global leader in effectuating an end to child sex tourism and
child prostitution abroad.
IV.

THE ROLE OF THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE PROPOSITION TO PROSECUTE TREATY CRIMES IN THE ICC.

The horrifying crimes against women and children in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia have prompted the international community to call for
the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court [hereinafter
"ICC"]. 74 The ICC will most likely be created by a multilateral treaty,
which will bind only state parties to the treaty. 75 There has been a broad
consensus that the ICC will try serious war crimes, genocide, and certain
crimes against humanity such as mass rape, and torture. 76 The inclusion of
treaty crimes, such as the exploitation and trafficking of children presently
remains under negotiation.
A. The Possibility of Including Treaty Crimes Such as Crimes Against
Children in the ICC Statute
The concept of expanding the jurisdiction of the ICC to include other
crimes, such as treaty crimes, has been met with much opposition. Many
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
O'GRADY, supra note 10.
Robinson, supra note 17, at 20.
Id.
Id.
[visited 10/13/97], <http://gn2.getnet.com/wfa/court.htm>.
Id.
Id.
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states, including the United States claim that an ICC would not be equipped
to adequately adjudicate treaty crimes.77 Moreover, State Parties fear that
broadening the powers of the ICC will infringe on the sovereignty of
national courts. However, the most recent draft statute of the ICC includes
the principle of complementarity.7 This means that the ICC would hear a
case only when no national court is available or willing to hear it.79 Thus,
State Parties would decide whether they were willing or able to try a case
in domestic courts, or whether the state would rather submit the case to the
ICC. The ICC could proceed only if consent to jurisdiction over that crime
had been given by the following: 1) the state in whose territory the crime
occurred; 2) the state with custody over the suspect; and 3) the state which
requested extradition of the suspect from the custodial state.8 0
International criminal law must be enforced if the perpetrators of the
most serious crimes in the international community are to be brought to
justice."' An ICC would not only enforce international criminal law, but it
would also serve as a model for other national criminal justice systems
around the world.8 2 If certain treaty crimes, such as those in violation of
the UNCRC, were to be prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal,
this action may prompt provider countries like Thailand and the Philippines
to deal with the exploitation of children within their borders more
vehemently.
Arguments have been made that the substantive provisions of the
UNCRC and its recognition of the need for coordinated efforts among
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies, offer significant potential
to help curb trafficking in children.8 3 The primary mechanism for
monitoring implementation of the rights in the UNCRC is the state
reporting procedure.'
The reporting mechanism is intended to expose
situations where a government may have adequate national legislation but
inadequate law enforcement.
However, infrequency of monitoring is a
significant drawback to the reporting mechanisms established under the
77. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court. An
Appriasal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665 (1996).
78. Id.
79.

Id.

80.

[visited 10/13/97], <http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/icc.html>.

81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83.
Stephanie Farrior, The InternationalLaw on Trafficking in Women and Childrenfor
Prostitution:Making it Live Up to Its Potential, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 232 (1997).

84. Maureen Moran, Ending Erploitative Child Labor Practices, 5 PACE INT'L L.REv.
287 (1993).
85. Timothy John Fitzgibbon, The United Nations Convention on The Rights of The
Child: Are Children Really Protected? A Case Study of China's Implementation, 20 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 325 (1998).
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treaty. States do not always provide reports which are in compliance with
the treaty, and oftentimes do not submit reports at all.86 Moreover, the
reporting mechanisms discussed in the treaty apply only to the states that
have ratified the treaty.
The implementation of national laws in provider and consumer
countries through mandates in international law ,from the treaty itself and
the collaboration with NGOs and foreign national governments are all
effective initial attempts to abolish child sex tourism. However, more must
be done to guarantee consistent and forceful application of existing laws.
The UNCRC treaty itself does not provide true enforcement measures in
case of violation. 8 Therefore, the inclusion of treaty crimes, such as
crimes against children, within the ICC statute is necessary in order to
command respect for the law.
B. The Possibility of Including Crimes Against Children in the ICC Statute
as Crimes Against Humanity
There are several obstacles to curbing the problem of child sex
tourism. First, there is an unwillingness to prosecute offenders in provider
and consumer countries. In provider countries, reluctance stems from the
economic benefits of child prostitution.8"
In consumer countries, the
reason for the reluctance is more elusive. Second, not all states are parties
to the UNCRC. Although many countries such as the United States have
signed the UNCRC, signatories still need to ratify the treaty in order to
prosecute violations of the treaty under the ICC. Finally, treaty crimes in
general have not yet been included in the ICC statute. Therefore, crimes
against children, such as child sex tourism and child prostitution, are more
likely to be dealt with if prosecuted under the auspices of crimes against
humanity.
Crimes against humanity have not yet been comprehensively codified
but, like genocide and war crimes, they are considered crimes under
customary international law. 9 One of the debates in negotiations on the
draft statute of the ICC has centered on whether crimes against humanity
should be linked to armed conflict." NGOs have argued that such crimes
should be separated from armed conflict because widespread and

86.
87.

Id.
Eric Thomas Berkman, Responses to the InternationalChild Sex Tourism Trade, 19

B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 397, 417 (1996).

88.
89.
90.

Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 70.
Nadelmann, supra note 40.
Jelena Pejic, What Is An International Criminal Court? As Negotiations On 7he
Establishment of an ICC Start, The Debate Heats Up, 23 FALL-HuM RTs 16 (1996) (an
American Bar Association publication).
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systematic attacks against a civilian population can, and have been,
committed in peacetime. ° '
In the event that a compromise cannot be reached regarding the
inclusion of treaty crimes within the ICC statue, the only solution may be
to include such crimes within the definition of crimes against humanity.
Due to the fact that crimes against humanity have not been codified, this
may allow for the definition to be structured so as to include crimes against
children, such as child trafficking and child sex tourism. This way, states
not party to the UNCRC will either have to try such an offense in domestic
courts, tender the case to another state willing to try it, or submit it to the
ICC.
V. CONCLUSION

The amount of children subject to prostitution and sex tourism is
astronomical. 9 The damage suffered by these children subject to such
sexual crimes is often times irreparable. Countless numbers of children in
countries like Thailand and the Philippines are grossly affected each day by
child sex tourism, which has flourished in part from the involvement of
industrialized nations such as the United States.
The international
community must acknowledge its role in fueling sex tourism and act
responsibly by implementing laws to reign in these violations. Enacting
national laws in order to facilitate criminal prosecution of sex offenders
abroad is a step in the right direction for the United States and other
consumer countries. However, much more can be done to deter child sex
tourism. Cooperation with foreign law enforcement officials and NGOs,
informational exchanges between countries, and educational campaigns are
all events that if implemented can assist to deter child sex tourism within
consumer countries. Of course the most effective mechanism may be to
prosecute offenders in the International Criminal Tribunal. This may be
done by including treaty crimes within the ICC statute, or including crimes
against children within the definition of crimes against humanity. This may
be the only way to circumvent the lack of criminal prosecution of
offenders.
Sex Tourism has stimulated the growth of the child sex industry,
making the sexual exploitation of children an international problem. The
international community cannot simply close its eyes to these grave
criminal offenses committed against children. It is obvious that the
measures taken by both provider and consumer countries have not been
very effective thus far. With the creation of an international criminal
court, the next logical step in solving a problem of treat international
proportions is to allow these offenses to be prosecuted on an international
level.
This would include owners, pimps and child trafficker from
91.

This is referring to the crimes during wartime only.

92.

See O'GRADY, supra note 1.
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provider countries. The international community must acknowledge the
seriousness of these heinous, senseless crimes and provide some sort of
recourse to past victims as well as protection to those who may be the
targets of such crimes in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nogales, Mexico is a city along the United States and Mexico border
that is often referred to as "Paradise Lost."' This once remote and
beautiful city, located at the corner of where Mexico meets Arizona, has
become home to poverty, disease and pollution.2 In the past twenty-five
years, over two thousand manufacturing plants, called maquiladoras, have
moved into the Nogales area creating jobs and economic opportunity, but
also creating a "cesspool and breeding ground for infectious disease" and
pollution.3 Nogales is no longer the beautiful place residents remember.
The maquiladora program was established by the Mexican
government to encourage United States companies to bring their plants to
the Mexican side of the border.4 These American companies are allowed
to import raw materials into Mexico without paying duties and to export the
finished product back to the United States, subject to a low value-added
customs duty. 5 Under this system, United States companies are able to
make goods at lower costs and Mexicans are able to find work. However,
the maquiladora plants have lowered their manufacturing costs by
circumventing mandatory environmental regulations. 6
A 1992 study
indicated that only five percent of these plants returned their waste to the
United States for proper disposal. In communities with maquiladoras,
people fear that hazardous conditions exist in the air, soil and water. 7
1.
Diego Ribadeneira, SIDEBAR On Mexico's Border, 'Prosperity' Has an Ugly Side,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1994, at 10.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.

Lawrence J. Rowe, NAFTA, the Border Area Environmental Program and Mexico's

Border Area: Prescriptionfor SustainableDevelopment?, 18 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 197,
198 (1995);
Some maquiladora plants are Japanese-owned as well. Lynn A. Stanton, A
Comparative Analysis of the NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement, 2 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 72 (1994).

5.
6"

Stanton, supra note 4, at 72.
Id.; Sanford E. Gaines, Bridges to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border

Institutionsfor Environmental Improvement in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARJZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAw 429, 430 (1995).
7.

Ribadeneira, supra note 1, at 10.
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Waste is returned to the United States because Mexico does not have
proper treatment facilities to treat the hazardous materials.'
This environmental pollution has damaging impact on Nogales,
Arizona. Air samples from Nogales show very high levels of carcinogens.
Also, there are high rates of cancer and lupus in the area. 9 In fact, there
were sixteen cancer cases in fourteen homes on one street in Nogales.' °
Since the creation of the maquiladorasystem in 1965," the border area has
become an environmental nightmare and attempts to remedy the situation
have little political support. To combat border area pollution, the United
States, Mexico, and Canada created the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation in 1993.2 This agreement was adopted to
promote environmental protection through cooperation between the three
member countries.
A.

InternationalCooperation
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation is an
attempt to restore a necessary balance between economic growth and
environmental protection. Nations are very dependent upon one another
for goods, services, investments, etc.' 3 It is these transactions solidified on
paper that keep the world economy flourishing. Examples include the
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA") and the
European Union (hereinafter "EU"), two international trade entities created
to promote economic growth and cooperation through few or no trade
barriers. 4 Also, international environmental agreements such as the
United States - Canada Air Quality Agreement and the Nordic Convention
show that one country cannot control and resolve all of its environmental
problems on its own.
The environment does not honor national

8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 198.
12. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature
Sept. 8, 1993, Ca.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. NAAEC is a side
agreement under the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Ca.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter the NAFTA].
13. NAFTA, supra note 12, at 447.
14. Beth Ann Bivona, What Price are We Willing to Pay for Our Environment?, 5 J.
INT'L L. & PRAc. 161 (1996); Christian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Economic
Community: New Power Under the Single European Act, 14 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 249,
251 (1991).
15. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Air Quality, March 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11783
[hereinafter Air Quality Agreement]; Denmark-Finland-Norway-Sweden: Convention on the
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boundaries. 16 Even though many countries create standards to improve
their environmental conditions, pollution in border areas is often the
responsibility of more then one country. These responsible countries need
to work together and cooperate in order to protect these areas. Economic
growth and environmental protection cannot be achieved without
international cooperation. However, with cooperation, strategies may be
adopted to help create a balance between the two.
1. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
The Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") has been a
central figure in international environmental protection.
The EPA's
mission is to promote human health and environmental protection along
with "sustainable economic activity in a cost-effective manner." 7 A key to
the EPA's achievement of its mission is international cooperation. 8 The
EPA provides training and information regarding environmental regulation
to other countries. 19 For example, the EPA has provided Mexico with
drinking water treatment technologies in order to make Mexican water safe
to drink.' The EPA's actions and the cooperation of other countries have
enabled this organization to make a significant difference regarding
international environmental concerns.
2. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
As illustrated in the introduction, the border area has become a serious
environmental concern. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the
National Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(hereinafter
"NAAEC") and its dispute resolution process. Recommendations will also
be provided regarding how this process may better serve the NAAEC's
goals.
Overall, the NAAEC provides an effective means of environmental
protection. However, this agreement is not perfect. In assessing the
NAAEC and recommending reforms, it is important to recall that this
agreement was created to address the problem of pollution in the border
area and the need to make Mexico enforce its environmental laws. Since
1889, the United States, Mexico, and Canada have attempted to create
environmental agreements to address environmental concerns. However,
Protection,

Feb.

19,

1974,

Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Sweden,

13 I.L.M.

591

[hereinafter

Nordic

Convention].
16.
Symposium, Managing InternationalEnvironmentalRisk: The Role of Private Parties
in Resolving Public Problems, 18 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L. 447-48 (1997).

17.
18.

Id.at 447.
Id.

19.

Id. at 450-51.

20.

Id. at 451.
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many of these plans have failed due to a lack of enforcement and
dedication on the part of all parties involved. The NAAEC is a product of
this period of trial and error and good intentions.
The NAAEC and the NAFTA were not created overnight. The
NAAEC provides a foundation to be built upon and altered in due time. It
is not something that can be severely altered in a short period. Change
needs to occur gradually in order to be accepted and successful. 2' Drastic
change often results in resistance. Major changes to the NAAEC, as many
critics desire, would threaten the foundation that the NAAEC represents
and would frustrate cooperation, which the NAFTA and the NAAEC stand
for. Therefore, the recommendations offered in this paper are classified as
short-term or long-term solutions, indicating their present feasibility. Also,
these recommendations are centered around the NAAEC goal of
cooperation.
This paper will begin with a background discussion to provide the
reader with a frame of reference. Next, a closer look will be taken at the
NAAEC's Commission on Environmental Cooperation (hereinafter
"CEC"), its composition, functions and potential reforms. Finally, the
paper will analyze the NAAEC's dispute resolution process and suggest
possible reforms.
II.BACKGROUND
A.

The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
In order to understand how and why the NAAEC was formed, it is
necessary to provide some background information regarding the NAFTA,
the environmental laws and prior agreements of the United States, Mexico
and Canada and the reasons for the NAAEC. The United States, Mexico
and Canada signed the NAFTA agreement in December of 1992 with the
goal of eliminating all restrictions on trade within fifteen years. 22 The
United States and Canada had always kept an arguably open border, but the
21. "Although the pace of legal and economic reform in Russia over the past six years or
so has been breathtaking, it would be naive to expect that formal changes of such magnitude
would be accompanied by similarly rapid changes in social attitudes or in the mindset of the
former Soviet bureaucratic apparatus." Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes In
Russia's Market Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 93 (1996); "China has approached its goal [a
socialist market economy] gradually, directly opposing the adopted policies of Poland and the
Soviet Union, the former implementing painful and fast shock therapy to change from a centrally
planned economy to a market based economy in one step, and the latter testing many immediately
effective political reforms in the face of economic crisis."
Lyndsey A. Erickson, Gradual
Economic Reform in China, (visited in 1997) <http://www.middlebury.edu/listarchives/ipewt97/0138.html > ; "China's gradual reforms have been the most economically successful." Id.
22. Joel L. Silverman, Note, The "Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A Blueprint to
Prevent Pollution Havens by Extending NAFTA's Unheralded "Eco-Dumping" Provisions to the
New World Trade Organization,GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 358 (1994).
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NAFTA forced "Mexico to abandon a legacy of protectionism and
economic nationalism."' In the early 1980s Mexico was facing impending
economic collapse and access to the United States markets was a major
factor in Mexico's economic reform.24 Fearing competition with Mexico
for investment in the United States, Canada decided to join the NAFTA. 5
Therefore, the NAFTA was created in order to promote cooperation and
economic growth.
Proponents of the NAFTA believe that the NAFTA will lower the
amount of pollution generated, improve Mexico's environmental laws and
increase wealth among the member countries. 6 Without the NAFTA,
proponents, mainly businesses, say that the maquiladoraswould increase in
number and continue to pollute.27 They argue that the NAFTA is necessary
in order to establish good relations and cooperation among the three
member countries. Proponents also argue that these good relations will
carry over into attempts to create environmental policy.a
The NAFTA opponents, such as labor organizations and
environmental groups, believe that free trade will increase the depletion of
natural resources and attract polluters to Mexico. 29 They also fear United
States environmental laws may be relaxed because they create trade
barriers and industries will challenge the validity of these laws.3°
Therefore, the NAFTA has created a search for a balance between
economic growth and environmental protection.
Despite these criticisms, the NAFTA does contain environmental
provisions. Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA prohibits the creation of a
"pollution haven" for economic advancement. Many countries felt lax
environmental law enforcement gave Mexico the economic advantage of
lower production costs.3"
Chapter Eleven adopted a "polluter pay
principle," which states a polluter should pay the costs of meeting
environmental regulations.32 In theory, this measure limits Mexico's use of
lax environmental enforcement to allow low production costs.

23.

Id.

24. Michael Robbins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Integration of the
Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 127 (1993).

25.
26.

Id. at 127-28.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 216.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Robbins, supra note 24, at 130.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 216-17.
Silverman, supra note 22, at 367.
Id.
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Other provisions in the NAFTA reflect environmental concerns.33 For
example, Article 904(2) states "each party may pursue its legitimate
objectives of safety or the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, the environment, or consumers. "14 However, the term "legitimate
objective" is rather vague and dispute panels have interpreted it narrowly.35
Therefore, despite the NAFTA's explicit concern for the environment,
these provisions do not mandate interventions in support of environmental
protection.
Nevertheless, the NAFTA was a step towards further
cooperation between these North American countries, and has provided
them with a basis upon which to address environmental issues.
B.

United States and Mexican EnvironmentalLaws
The environmental laws of the United States and Mexico indicate a
commitment to environmental protection. Although Mexico has been
labeled a lax environmental law enforcer, in 1988, Mexico enacted the
General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection
(hereinafter "General Law"), which greatly resembles United States law.36
The General Law recognizes that all citizens have a right to a safe and
healthy environment and in order to protect this right those citizens have a
duty to protect the environment.37 Mexican law provides guidelines for
33. "[I]f there is an inconsistency between NAFTA and the Convention of the
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes, and other agreements listed in Annex 104.1, then these
agreements shall prevail over NAFTA 'to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where a
party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such
obligations, the party chooses the alternative that is the lease inconsistent with the other provisions
of [NAFTA].'" Robbins, supra note 24, at 143-44.
34. Id. at 144.
35. Id.
36. Robbins, supra note 24, at 136; In the past it was commonly understood that Mexican
pollution was so pervasive because the industries' actions went unchecked.
Mexican
environmental laws were weak, compared to other countries, and further, governmental
corruption prohibited already ineffective enforcement. Therefore, it was believed that Mexican
pollution was also affecting U.S. air quality. Cameron A. Grant, TransboundaryAir Pollution:
Can NAFTA and NAAEC Succeed Where International Law Has Failed?, 5 CoLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 439, 440 (1994).
37. Robbins, supra note 24, at 136; The General Law gives the Social Development
Secretariat (the "SEDESOL") the responsibility of enforcing and implementing Mexican
environmental law. A 1993 report stated that SEDESOL was given $263 million for enforcement
but that $6.5 billion was needed to reach internationally acceptable pollution levels. Also, a 1992
Congressional survey found that none of the maquiladora plants chosen at random had met the
1988 law requirements and only 5 percent met the requirement to return hazardous waste to the
U.S. for disposal. Nevertheless, there are signs that Mexico is becoming more serious about
environmental protection. Mexico has taken measures to reduce led content in petroleum, closed
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creating regulations, but does not include a superfund program and does

not have the resources to enforce these laws.33 In addition, private citizens
are unable to bring toxic tort or citizen suits to demand enforcement of
environmental laws. 39
All environmental disputes are resolved in
administrative proceedings under Mexico's civil legal system.' °
United States environmental laws consist of independent statutes and
regulations regarding various environmental concerns.'a The EPA enforces
these statutes and creates environmental regulations and standards.4 2
Enforcement is handled through judicial proceedings, civil and criminal

litigation and administrative enforcement. However, the majority of
disputes end in settlement.43 In addition, the United States system, in
contrast to the Mexican system, encourages public participation." Even
though Mexican law differs from United States law, Mexico has shown that
it is concerned about the environment and with greater resources would
have better regulation.45
C.

PriorEnvironmentalAgreements

1. United States and Mexico
Since 1889, the United States, Mexico and Canada have created
several bi-national agreements regarding the environment. 46 In 1944, the
United States and Mexico established the International Boundary Water
oil refineries, is replacing smog producing fuel with natural gas and has increased its budget by
ten times for environmental protection since 1989. Also, the U.S. EPA is training the
SEDESOL. Silverman, supra note 22, at 355-57.
38. Rowe, supra note 4, at 200-01.
39. Silverman, supra note 22, at 357; The NAAEC requires each member country to
.ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have
appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of
the party's environmental laws and regulations." NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 6, 32 I.L.M. at
1484. However, private suits would not be considered "legally recognized" interests in Mexico.
40. Rowe, supra note 4, at 202, 204.
41. Id. at 200.
42. Id. at 204.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Canadian environmental law is very similar to United States law, Canada like the
United States is very experienced in environmental litigation. Grant, supra note 36, at 454.
46. Rowe, supra note 4, at 204-05. The major agreements adopted by the United States
and Mexico are: 1889: The Boundary Waters: Rio Grande and Rio Colorado Convention; 1944:
Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers of the Rio Grande Treaty; 1984: La Paz
Agreement, also known as the Cooperation for Improvement of the Environment in the Border
Area Agreement; 1992: the Border Agreement and the NAFTA; 1993: the NAAEC and; 1994:
the BECC/NADB Agreement. Id.
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Commission (hereinafter "IBWC"), which has the power to stop violators,
settle disputes and make recommendations.4 7 However, the IBWC lacked
power and has had little impact.4 In 1984, the La Paz Agreement was
created to promote cooperation between the United States and Mexico. 49 It
was not successful because it did not give the IBWC enforcement powers,
lacked resources and did not establish a dispute resolution process.5 °
Under the La Paz Agreement, the United States and Mexico were to ensure
"to the extent practicable" their environmental laws were enforced, but this
obligation was vague and never enforced. 5 Without a dispute resolution
process, and with vague provisions, the La Paz Agreement did not curb
pollution.52 In 1991, Presidents Bush and Salinas and Prime Minister
Mulroney had committed themselves to the creation of the NAFTA and
abandoned these prior agreements.53 Nevertheless, these prior agreements
indicate that environmental protection was a concern as early as 1889 for
the United States and Mexico.
2. United States and Canada
Past environmental agreements between the United States and Canada
have produced mixed results. First, in 1909 the Boundary Waters Treaty
was created to deal with the misuse and diversion of water along the United
States - Canadian border. 54 Under this treaty, the International Joint
Commission (hereinafter "IJC") was established to resolve disputes and it
still exists today.55 In the 1980's the United States and Canada entered into
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, but it has not been successful in
47.
M. Grace Giorgio, Transboundary Pollution Disputes Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 3 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 166, 178 (1994).

48. Id.
49. Idat 180.
50. Id.
51. Idat 182.
52. Id. at 178.
53. Gaines, supra note 6, at 430.
54. Giorgio, supra note 47, at 175.
55. Boundary Waters Treaty, opened for signature Jan. 11, 1909, Canada - United
States, The International Joint Commission and the Boundary Waters Treaty. Under Article IX,
the U.S. and Canada may submit a dispute to the UC regarding "questions or matters of
difference arising between them involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation
to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier between the United
States and the Dominion of Canada" Id. at 10. A submission under Article IX only permits the
UC to examine and report on the facts of the matter along with the ability to provide
recommendations and conclusions. Id. These reports are not decisions. Under Article X, the
same disputes can be heard as in Article IX, but if parties submit a claim under Article X, the IJC
is able to reach a decision and if it cannot, the U.S. and Canada select an umpire to resolve the
matter. Id.
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resolving water pollution disputes, namely because the IJC lacks
enforcement power.5 6 In 1986 the United States and Canada entered into
the Hazardous Waste Agreement in order to control the transportation of
waste. Similar to the La Paz agreement, each country was to enforce its
own environmental laws "to the extent possible." Unfortunately, there
were no enforcement procedures in place for failure to meet this
obligation. 7 The only remedy for injury under this agreement was an
insurance policy in which each member was required to insure waste was
being transported across the border. 8 The Air Quality Agreement was
created in 1991 and has been very successful because it encourages
settlements through alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and promotes
transparency of environmental laws, goals and techniques for
environmental regulation.59
As mentioned above, political leaders in the early 1990's did not
support environmental protection and shifted their attention to the NAFTA.
Nevertheless, the environmental agreements between the United States and
Canada, along with others, have strengthened relationships between the
United States and Canada. The Air Quality Agreement is an example of
how international environmental protection can be achieved through
cooperation.
D. Reasonsfor the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
In 1993, the United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the NAAEC,
to promote cooperation and to oblige each member country to enforce its

56.

Giorgio, supra note 47, at 176.

57.

Id. at 177.

58.

Id.

59.

Air Quality Agreement, supra note 15, art. IV, VI, VII, XI & XIII, T.I.A.S. No.

11783, at 2-5; The purpose of the Air Quality Agreement is "to address shared concerns regarding
transboundary air pollution." Both countries expressed the belief that a healthy environment is
necessary "to assure the well-being of present and future generations." Id. at 1-2; Both parties
developed specific objectives stated in the annexes and each party has the responsibility to develop
programs and to take the necessary measures to meet those objectives. Id.; If one party does not
agree with the other's proposals the dispute is resolved through consultations. Further, if one
country plans to engage in an activity likely to cause pollution, it must consult the other country.
Id. at 2-3; The parties are to do research to learn about transboundary pollution and how to

control it, and they must share this information with the other party.

Id. at 3; In dispute

resolution, the parties are to enter consultations and if no result is reached, to use negotiations.

Id. at 5; If that does not work, the parties are to submit the matter to the UC for either
examination or decision see Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at 10, or the parties may
agree on ADR. Id. at 5.
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environmental laws.'
The NAAEC was created as a result of the
tremendous pollution caused by the maquiladoraplants in the border area.
In the early 1990's, local residents and environmental advocates
pressured the NAFTA governments to create legal provisions and an
administrative mechanism that would integrate environmental protection
into the NAFTA. 6" These groups wanted a system that would create
obligations and commitments to the preservation of the environment.'
Overall, people wanted political leaders to take environmental protection
seriously because they were being injured and had no power to protect
themselves.
The NAAEC was also created to fill in the gaps of the NAFTA
environmental provisions, such as Chapter Eleven, and to provide a
balance between trade and environmental preservation.'
Mexico's
conspicuous absence of environmental law enforcement permitted low cost
production and the NAFTA's polluter pay principle was not enforced."
Under the NAAEC, each member must establish high levels of
environmental protection and enforce its laws.' Overall, the NAAEC was
created to promote cooperation between the three member countries and
effectuate environmental protection.
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION AND ITS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
A.

Motivations & Obligations
The NAAEC's objectives center on the general goals of environmental
protection, cooperation, public participation, balancing economic growth
with environmental protection, and promoting the enforcement of
environmental laws.'
Other important aspects of the NAAEC are that
60. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1483; In 1993, the United States and
Mexico created the Border Environment Cooperation Commission ("BECC") and the North
American Development Bank ("NADB"). The BECC directs and certifies environmental
protection projects while the NADB funds BECC approved projects. Federal, state and local
governments plus the private sector provide additional funding. Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States
Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North
American Development Bank, Jan. 1, 1994, Mex. - U.S., St. Dep't. No. 94-28; Rowe, supra
note 4, at 213-14.
61.
Gaines, supra note 6, at 432.
62. Id.
63. Bivona, supra note 14, at 161.
64. Id. at 163.
65. Id. at 164; NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M., at 1483.
66. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 1, 32 I.L.M., at 1483; NAAEC articulates ten major
objectives:
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each member must prepare reports on the state of its environment, publish
all environmental laws, and provide citizens with access to judicial or
administrative proceedings when a citizen has a legally recognized
interest.' Regarding interpretation of the NAAEC, the member countries
are to come to a mutual understanding on the agreement's meaning, and
settle any interpretation concerns through cooperation and consultations.'

In addition, each party is to notify any other party if the first party believes
its actions may affect the operation of this agreement or significantly affect
the other party's interests.'
These provisions promote accountability,
environmental protection, transparency and public awareness.

B.

The Commission

The NAAEC's dispute resolution institution is the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (hereinafter "CEC"). The CEC does not settle
a wide range of disputes but only determines whether there has been a

persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively enforce its
environmental laws. 70 Therefore, this process does not provide a private
right of action.7 1 The CEC consists of a Council, Secretariat, Joint Public
Advisory Committee (hereinafter "JPAC") and other committees.72 Each
actor has a distinct function within the NAAEC.

1) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of the
parties for the well-being of the present and future generations;
2) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive
environmental and economic policies;
3) increase cooperation between the parties to better conserve, protect, and enhance
the environment, including wild flora and fauna;
4) support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA;
5) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers;
6) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental
laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
7) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations;
8) promote transparency and public participation in the development of environmental
laws, regulations and policies;
9) promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures; and
10) promote pollution prevention policies and practices.
Id.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 4-6, 32 I.L.M. at 1483-84.
68. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 20, 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
69. Id. at 1489-90.
70. J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation:A Model for International Collaborationon Trade and the Environment, 5 CoLO. J.
67.

INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 298 (1994).

71.
72.

Giorgio, supra note 47, at 191.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1484.
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1. Council
The Council, as the governing body of the CEC, consists of cabinet
level representatives from each member country and oversees the
Secretariat.7 3 The Council is able to delegate authority and obtain
information from experts, private individuals and non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs").7 4 The Council provides a forum in which to
resolve environmental matters related to the NAAEC and makes
recommendations regarding the environment and pollution-prevention
techniques. 7' The Council encourages cooperation between the members
and helps each member improve its environmental laws by promoting the
exchange of information regarding methods used to establish or enforce
environmental standards. 6 The Council must also assist the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission ("FTC") in achieving the environmental goals in the
NAFTA.77 The Council has the duty to make recommendations regarding
the potential for cross-border suits by injured persons. However, Council
recommendations are not binding.78
The Council convenes a panel to resolve disputes when they occur.
The Council created a roster of persons willing to be panelists that it keeps
undated. 79 Roster member must have experience in environmental law, its
enforcement in the resolution of disputes under international agreements or
other relevant experience or expertise.' Each roster member must comply
with the Council's code of conduct and if a party believes a panelist to be
in violation of the code, the parties shall consult. If all parties agree, the
panelist will be removed and a new panelist will be selected."1
In the panelist selection process, the parties agree on a chair within
fifteen days after the Council votes to convene a panel.82 If the parties
cannot agree on a chair, the party chosen by lot must pick a chair within
five days.83 Within fifteen days after that chair is selected, the parties are
to choose two panelists who are citizens of the opposing party's country.84
If a party cannot make a choice, the panelists will be chosen by lot.
73. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 9 &10, 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
74. Id.
75. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1485-86.
76. Id.at 1486.
77. Id.
78. Id.at 1487.
79. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 25, 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
80. Id.
81.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 25, 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1491
82. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
83. Id.
84. Id.; Ifthere are three disputing parties, the panel shall still contain five members and
all three parties need to chose a chair within fifteen days after the Council agrees to convene the
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When a panelist is chosen who is not on the roster, any party may use a
preemptory challenge to remove that panelist."
2. Secretariat
The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Director who is chosen by
the Council for a three-Iear term. This position rotates among members of
each member country.e The Executive Director appoints a staff procured
from a list prepared by the member countries and the JPAC. The Council
can reject any appointment by a two-thirds vote.87
The Secretariat has a variety of functions. It provides technical,
administrative and operational support to the Council, submits the annual
program and budget for Council approval, and prepares an annual report
that is released to the public after Council review.8 8 This report may
include information about actions taken by each member country in
connection with its obligations under the NAAEC or data regarding each
member's environmental law enforcement.89 The Secretariat receives
submissions from private persons or NGOs asserting that a member
country has failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws." The
Secretariat may request a response from the other party involved if the
claim is well founded, but if the matter is pending in another court or
administrative proceeding, the Secretariat will not honor the claim.9 Each
claim must:
a) be in writing;
b) clearly identify the person or organization making the
submission;
c) provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat review
the claim;
d) promote and not harass industry;
panel. If the parties cannot agree on a chair, the party or parties chosen by lot shall choose a
chair within ten days. Within thirty days after selection of the chair, the party complained against
shall choose two panelists, one from each of the complaining parties. The complaining countries
select two panelists who are citizens of the party complained against. If any party does not pick a
panelist, the panelist will be chosen by lot based on the citizenship requirements stated above. Id.
85.

Id.

86.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 11, 32 I.L.M. at 1487.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 11, 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.

91.

Id.
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e) indicate that the matter has been communicated in writing to
the relevant authorities of the party and indicate the party's
response; 92 and
f) be filed by a person or organization residing or established in
the territory of a party. 93 If the submission warrants the making
of a factual record, the Secretariat notifies the Council and
provides reasons. 94 A two-thirds Council vote is needed to make
a factual record and another vote is required to make the factual
record public. 9

The Secretariat may be equated to that of an Administrative Manager'
because it collects all claims and undertakes the initial investigation to
determine if the claims are worthwhile. The Council then votes on the
Secretariat's determination of whether to publish these factual records and
annual reports. These procedures make the dispute resolution process
more efficient because the Council vote is a check on the Secretariat's

determinations, ensuring the Secretariat acts in an acceptable manner. In
preparing the factual record, the Secretariat will obtain information from
the submitting parties, the JPAC, independent experts, information it has
discovered and publicly available information.' The Secretariat, however,

has no authority to review a party's failure to enforce its environmental
laws.9"

3. Committees
The JPAC is made up of fifteen representatives, five from each

member country.'

The JPAC provides technical and scientific information

92. This is how a member country becomes involved in the suit. The NAAEC is not
clear on whether approval is needed or if notice to the member country is sufficient.
93. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 1488; When the Secretariat determines
that a submission meets the filing requirements, it must determine whether the submission merits a
response from the complained against party. The Secretariat considers:
1) if the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the claim;
2) if the submission raises issues whose further study would advance the goals of the
NAAEC;
3) if private remedies have been pursued under the party's laws; and
4) if the submission is based solely on media reports.
Id.
94. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 15, at 1488-89.
95. Id.
96. Often called a preparatory judge, case manger, civil prosecutor or judge de misc.
97. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 15, at 1488-89.
98. Grant, supra note 36, at 449.
99. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 16, at 1489.
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to the Secretariat and advice to the Council."t ' Each country may convene
a national advisory committee made up of members of the public and/or
governmental advisory committees made up of federal and state
representatives to advise on the implementation and possible alterations to
the NAAEC.0 1
C. Assessment of the CEC & Actors
The CEC employs a coordinate structure in which each actor has
separate functions, subject to checks on these functions. The Council is
involved in dispute resolution, recommendations promoting cooperation,
and helping the member countries create highly protective environmental
laws. The Secretariat investigates claims, creates factual records and
prepares other reports. All these actions performed by the Secretariat are
subject to Council review. The JPAC and other committees provide
services only when called upon by the Council or Secretariat.
The CEC also has a vertical or hierarchical structure. The Council is
the governing body and the Secretariat, and other committee functions, are
subject to Council oversight. The JPAC, subject to the orders of the
Secretariat and Council, is an information-providing source for the two
bodies, while the other national advisory committees are under the control
of each member country. In many ways this system shares characteristics
with the structure of the United States government in that each actor has
defined roles, similar to the separation of powers concept. Each actor in
the CEC is subject to a check or oversight, similar to the United States
checks and balances system. However, the Council is the one body in the
CEC whose actions do not appear to be subject to any checks.
Except for the selection process and criteria requirements for
panelists, the NAAEC is extremely vague regarding the selection of
Council members as well as the number appointed. It also does not
mention how many Secretariat staff persons are appointed or if an equal
number is selected from each member country. These vague provisions
create difficulty in interpreting the NAAEC.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (hereinafter
"Labor Side Agreement") provides greater detailed descriptions of these
selection procedures.' °" For example, the CLC Council is made up of
labor ministers from each member country.' 0 3 There should be a
requirement under the NAAEC that members of the CEC Council have
100. Id.
101. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 17, 18, at 1489.
102. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 9,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499; The Labor Side Agreement created a Commission for
Labor Cooperation ("CLC") containing a Council and Secretariat assisted by the National
Administrative Office ("NAO") of each party. Id. at art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
103. The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 9, 32 I.L.M. at 1505.
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environmental law experience or require that the Council be composed of
environmental ministers. These specialized representatives could provide
guidance and possibly better dispute resolution skills, than a representative
without environmental experience. The CLC Executive Director selects its
Secretariat staff while taking into consideration "the importance of
recruiting an equitable proportion of the professional staff from among the
nationals of each party." 1" Also, the Council is made up of fifteen staff
members.
The Council can change this number if they deem it
necessary. 105
These detailed selection provisions in the Labor Side Agreement may
be due to the fact that labor issues involve human rights. When dealing
with human rights issues, further protections are usually taken to avoid
violating an individual's rights. Adding these detailed descriptions of the
selection process of CEC intervenors would serve to clarify the NAAEC,
provide skilled decision-makers and avoid interpretation disputes.
The NAAEC does contain evaluation criteria. For example, the
Council may remove the Executive Director for cause, each panelist must
abide to a code of conduct and the filing party must meet certain initial
requirements to file, and the Secretariat's actions are subject to Council
oversight."°( These measures would appear to effectively check the actions
of Council members. However, the Council's power, in practice, appears
to be unfettered.
A check should be placed on the Council's authority, such as removal
of the two-thirds vote to deny a claim and the publishing of a factual
report. An apt replacement would be a frivolous claim standard that the
Council must apply accompanied by a requirement to provide reasons for
why a claim should be denied." ° There is little reason not to prepare a
factual record because the Secretariat has already done most of the research
and publishing the factual record promotes transparency and public
awareness."o If the Council denies a claim then decides not to publish the
factual record, a suspicion of cover-up will flourish that will undermine the
credibility of the CEC.' °9 Therefore, the Council's two-thirds veto power
should be restricted.
This power limitation would promote public
awareness and participation, create an incentive for enforcement of
domestic environmental laws and protect CEC credibility.
104. The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1506.
105. Id.

106. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 10, 11, 14, 25, 32 I.L.M. at 1485, 1487, 1488, 1491.
107. See infra pp. 34-35 for a further discussion of this concern.
108. David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment: Making the Side Agreement Work, 12
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603, 611 (1995); NAAEC does take into account confidential
information and will not make such information public. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 39, 32
I.L.M. at 1494.

109. Id.
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The Council gathers technical data, develops recommendations, and
encourages members to incorporate these recommendations into their laws
and policies. These actions have some political impact because they
encourage a member to alter its present laws and may infringe on a
member's sovereignty. However, because these Council recommendations
are not binding, they have little influence.
To make these
recommendations binding would give the Council too much power and
usurp the control of the member countries over their domestic
environmental laws, a power retained by the members under the
NAAEC." 0
In order to make this Council function more effective, the member
countries should have the right to vote on adopting a recommendation.
This procedure would promote cooperation because if a recommendation is
approved, the laws of the members will become more unified. Therefore,
although the Council has too much power in some areas, such as denying
submissions and the publishing of factual records, it seems illogical to give
the Council the power and resources to conduct research and make
recommendations if these recommendations have little weight. This is a
waste of resources. Council research and recommendations are very
important because they promote cooperation through the potential for
unification of law. Therefore, giving each member the right to vote upon
each recommendation would substantiate this function of the Council and
give the Council a quasi-legislative role. It would also be advantageous to
let Council members initiate legislation and vote on policy. In addition, the
members have their own research and environmental regulation
procedures, which may be attractive to other members. This sharing of
ideas can lead to additional cooperation between nations, and assist less
advanced nations by enhancing technology ideas and information.
D.

The CECDispute Resolution Process
Once the Secretariat accepts a submission, any party may request a
consultation with any other concerned party, whether or not there has been
a persistent pattern of failure by the other party to effectively enforce its
environmental laws.111 The request must be in writing and submitted to the
Secretariat and the other party."' A third party may participate in the
consultations if it believes that it has a significant interest in the matter.',"
The parties are expected to take every measure in order to reach a
resolution, but if no result is reached within sixty days, any party may
request a Council session."' The Council is to convene within twenty days
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. 1483.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
Id.
Id.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
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of receiving the request, and may utilize the assistance of technical
advisers, experts or other groups."
To assist the parties in reaching a
mutually satisfactory agreement, the Council may use conciliation and
mediation or make a recommendation. "' These procedures involve the use
of a neutral party to help the disputing parties reach a settlement. A
Council recommendation will be made public if approved by a two-thirds
Council vote." 7
If the dispute has not been settled within sixty days, the Council, by
written party request, shall convene an arbitrary panel to decide whether
there has been a persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively
enforce its environmental laws." 8 The panel bases its determination on the
submissions and arguments of each party, and the information presented by
experts. 19 Within 180 days, the panel must present an initial report to the
parties containing findings of fact, a determination of whether or not a
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental law has
occurred, and its recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. "2 Any
party may submit written comments to the panel and after considering these
121
comments, the panel will present a final report, which will be published.
If the panel decision is in the affirmative, the parties may mutually agree
on an action plan, which must conform to the panel decision and must be
presented to the Council and Secretariat.22
Under certain conditions, the panel may reconvene. If the parties, (a)
cannot agree on the action plan or (b) cannot agree on whether or not the
defending party has fully implemented an action plan chosen by the parties
or an action plan created by the panel, any party may request the panel to
reconvene."' If the panel is reconvened under (a), it will determine
whether an action plan proposed by the defending party is sufficient and if
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1490; A panel will only decide this
issue if the matter involves "workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or
provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the parties; or (b) that compete, in the
territory of the party complained against, with goods or services produced or provided by persons
of another party." Id. Therefore, it must be a trade-related issue.
119. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 28-30, 32 I.L.M. at 1492; The Council is to establish
rules of procedure that provide a right to at least one hearing before the panel and the chance to
make written submissions. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 28, 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
120. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 31, 32 I.L.M. at 1492; The punishment is an action
plan requiring the losing party to correct its non-enforcement. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 33, 32
I.L.M. at 1492.
121. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 31, 32, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
122. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 33, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
123. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 34, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
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so, it will approve the plan.' 24 On the other hand, if the plan is not
permissible, the panel will establish an action plan."~ The panel may also
impose monetary sanctions. 26
If the panel is reconvened under (b), the panel is to determine if the
offending party has fully implemented the action plan and if that party has
not done so the panel is to impose monetary sanctions. 127 The money from
these sanctions is used to improve environmental law enforcement in the
offending country." A party may again convene a panel to determine if
the opposing party has fully implemented the action plan.129 If a party fails
to pay a monetary sanction, the complaining party may suspend that party's
NAFTA benefits. 30 The sanctioned party may submit a written request
that the Council reconvenes the panel to determine whether the suspension
of benefits is excessive.1
132
These enforcement procedures are subject to Annex 34 and 36A.
Annex 34 states that a monetary sanction cannot exceed .007 percent of the
total trade in goods between the parties during the most recent year for
which such data is obtainable.13 Annex 36A states that if a panel
determines that Canada shall pay a sanction or fully implement an action
plan, the CEC will file the panel determination with a Canadian court with
competent jurisdiction and such panel determination will become a court
order. 134 This panel determination is35 binding on the court and it is not
subject to domestic review or appeal.
E. Assessment of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
This discussion will begin with an analysis of the vagueness 136 within
certain NAAEC provisions regarding compulsory/non-compulsory

124. Id. at 1493.
125.

Id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Stanton, supra note 4, at 76.
129. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493.
130. Id. at 1494.
131.

Id.

132. NAAEC, supra note 12, annex 34, 32 I.L.M. at 1496; Annex 36B also places limits
on the suspension of NAFTA benefits; NAAEC, supra note 12, Annex 36B, 32 I.L.M. at 1497.
133

Id.

134. NAAEC, supra note 12, annex 36A, 32 I.L.M. at 1497.
135. Id.
136. Although most international agreements do contain vague language, in order to form
an agreement that all parties will support, this language often creates disputes regarding
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jurisdiction, interpretation consultations, and the phrase "high levels." The
discussion will then shift to the actual dispute resolution process. First,
entry or access to the process will be discussed. This will include: the
party who submits the claim, who is involved in the suit, the issue decided,
and Council oversight. Second, party control, as a theme throughout the
entire process, will be analyzed, including the concepts of consensual
resolution and time restrictions for settlement. Third, the methodology of
the decision-making will be discussed, focusing on how decisions are made
and what is taken into consideration. Finally, the discussion will look at
the outcome, whether it is binding or non-binding, the enforcement of the
outcome and other related concerns.
1. Vagueness
The NAAEC does not specifically state if consent to jurisdiction is
compulsory or non-compulsory. In Article 22, after a party makes a
request for consultations to another party, there is no mention of whether
or not the requested party can deny the request. 37 This could be a problem
because parties may take vastly differing views on if and when consent is
needed. If the requested party is required to comply, that party is now
subject to the entire CEC dispute resolution process and possibly a binding
panel decision. If the party is able to deny the request the goal of
cooperation among member countries would be frustrated, which would
constitute avoidance which would be detrimental to the success of this
agreement and the members' relations.
Although non-compulsory
jurisdiction may have been the intent of the NAAEC's drafters, compulsory
jurisdiction is practiced because of pressure from member countries.
Compulsory jurisdiction is the best method for the NAAEC because it
forces the parties to meet and resolve their problems. The fact that a
binding panel decision may lie ahead is an incentive to reach a mutually
satisfactory decision as soon as possible. This provision needs to be
clarified in order to prevent future conflicts. Also, this change could be
made in the short-term because it would not change the nature of the
NAAEC but rather align the interpretations of the member countries. The
NAAEC fails to provide procedures for consultations when an
interpretation dispute arises. The NAAEC does not mention where the
parties are to meet; which issues are to be discussed; and how long the
parties have to resolve the matter through consultations. Also, the NAAEC
does not provide further procedures in the event a result cannot be reached
through consultations. When the members disagree on the NAAEC's
interpretation the parties must use "cooperation and consultations to resolve

interpretation. NAAEC contains several provisions with vague language creating difficulty in
determining precisely how the dispute resolution process operations.
137.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
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any matter that might affect its operation. "138 This provision provides little
guidance.
The Labor Side Agreement, provides explicit procedures regarding
disputes over interpretation. 139
A National Administrative Office
(hereinafter "NAO"), which serves as a contact point for each member and
the Secretariat, may request consultations with another NAO. Any party
may request, in writing, consultations with another party regarding any
matter within the scope of the Labor Side Agreement.1" If the matter is
not resolved through consultations, a party may request the establishment
of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (hereinafter "ECE"). The ECE is
selected in a manner similar to the CEC panel, which will create a draft
report to which the parties can submit comments and then publish a final
report.'
The Council is able to keep the matter under review. 4 2 These
procedures provide a framework and promote cooperation, unlike the
confusion the NAAEC provides. Specific procedures, like those in the
Labor Side Agreement, could be added to the NAAEC in the short-term.
These procedures would be a positive addition because they would reduce
or eliminate interpretation disputes and promote cooperation through
consultations.
Another vague provision in the NAAEC is the obligation that each
member country must create environmental laws, which provide high levels
of environmental protection. "43 The meaning of high levels in the United
States differs from its meaning in Mexico. Each member has a different
view of what the definition of high levels of environmental protection is.
In addition, the NAAEC does not provide a check to make sure that each
member's laws meet this standard. Overall, this provision has little weight
because of its vagueness and lack of enforcement.
After the NAAEC becomes more influential, it would be beneficial to
establish specific environmental standards that apply to all members.
Specific standards would give this provision a purpose while creating a
basis of measurement to determine whether or not each party has met the
standard.
This reform would change the CEC's threshold issue of
determining whether the standards have been met instead of whether each
member has enforced its own laws. However, domestic law should still
cover the methods used to obtain these standards. This would be a longterm goal since the NAAEC is new and such a drastic change would limit
sovereignty.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 20, 32 1.L.M. at 1489.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 20-26, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-09.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 21, 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-08.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 26, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
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Overall, an international agreement with gaps or vague language
causes disputes and could impair cooperation.
However, too much
specificity could be detrimental and impede approval. Except for the third
one, the aforementioned measures do not significantly alter the agreement,
and would only improve interpretation and compliance.
2. The Process
Access into the process has several positive and negative features. It
is easy for a private individual or an NGO to submit a claim and to have
the Secretariat make a factual record, so long as it meets the requirements
stated earlier.'" These requirements are read liberally in order to ensure
that the process provides much public participation, a goal of the
NAAEC.' 5
On the downside, the parties making the submissions are not the
parties to the suit; rather the member countries are the parties to the suit.'"6
Therefore, it seems as though private individuals and NGOs would be
discouraged from making a claim since they cannot recover damages
through this system. However, since the CEC is the only institution
providing an environmental dispute resolution process regarding the
border, private individuals and NGOs are more likely to submit claims in
order to make their member country aware of another member's failure to
enforce its laws.
Another concern limiting access is that the CEC dispute resolution
process only resolves one issue. That issue is whether or not a party has
shown a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental
laws.' 47 This is a difficult issue to prove because it may require technical
information that an individual or NGO does not have access too. Also, the
determination of this question is based upon how the actors involved in the
dispute resolution process perceive what does and what does not constitute
a persistent pattern of failure to enforce environmental laws. Therefore, a
subjective method is used which may prohibit impartial decision-making. 4
In addition, limiting access to one issue, denies injured individuals
with valid claims against a polluting party, access to an international
environmental dispute resolution process. Mexico does not allow citizens
to bring private actions to demand enforcement of environmental laws.
Therefore, the NAAEC requirement that each member provide a right of
action for citizens with a "legally recognized interest", would not apply to
Mexican citizens who were injured. 49
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
Baron, supra note 108, at 608.
Id.; see supra note 144.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
See infra pp. 37-39 for a further discussion of this issue.
Silverman, supra note 22, at 357; NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 6, 32 I.L.M. at 1484.
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Supporters of cross-border suits believe that although suits may be
filed across borders today, government corruption severely restricts the use
of this option. 0 Thus, cross-border suits under the NAAEC would
provide injured persons with a means by which to seek remedy against the
government, and to participate in the movement toward environmental
protection and accountability.
The Nordic Convention of 1974 between Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden is an environmental agreement that allows cross-border
suits."' Any person affected by environmentally harmful activities in
another contracting state has the right to bring a claim to the appropriate
court or administrative authority regarding the permissibility of such
activities." 2 An individual may appeal the decision and has the same legal
rights as a person of that country in which the harmful activities are taking
place. 'a One critic of the NAAEC believes that cross-border suits need to
be added to the NAAEC because there is no private right of action." 4
Also, since the United States is very skilled at environmental litigation,
United States citizens and organizations could effectively sue in Mexican
courts and receive the remedies due. 5 5 However, critics suggest that
cross-border suits would infringe upon each member country's
sovereignty. 5 6 Mexico holds sovereignty in high regard and would likely
In
withdraw from the NAAEC if cross-border suits were established.'
addition, this change would force member countries to alter their standing
laws giving up more sovereignty.5' The United States and Canada are
very experienced in environmental litigation and cross border suits would
result in a flooding of Mexican courts which would be grossly unfair to
Mexico and would frustrate cooperation. 5 9 Additionally, it has been
argued that since the present CEC does not permit private individuals to
directly sue polluting, factories for damages, there is a diluted impact on
the actual polluters, since the member country of the polluter is the one
who is punished."° While this argument is very persuasive, the NAAEC is
150. "Any member country is free to place burdensome restrictions to recognizing a right
of action for citizen or non-citizen suits." Stanton, supra note 4, at 79; "Ensuring a right of
action to citizens would not be enough on its own if citizens fear that corruption of the system
may put their lives or liberty in danger by exercising that right". Id.
151. The Nordic Convention, supra note 15, art. 3, 13 I.L.M. at 592.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Stanton, supra note 4, at 76.
155. Id.
156. Grant, supra note 36, at 452.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 454.
159. Id. at 455.
160. Id.
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not prepared for cross-border suits. However, such a process may be
desirable in the future.
Cross-border suits would require substantial change in a limited
time. 6 ' It would limit sovereignty and force member countries to change
their domestic laws. The member countries would not be willing to give
up this much control so soon after the NAAEC's adoption. Before making
a large revision to the NAAEC, the member countries would want to
analyze the NAAEC's impact and success in its original form. After the
NAAEC establishes itself, problems will be easier to locate and such a
reform, as a cross-border suit, may be implemented.
Another measure, such as the creation of a commission to oversee
suits, could be implemented to provide injured individuals with a right of
action against polluters. The NAAEC could support a commission to deal
solely with private individual and organization claims against polluters.
This commission, containing representatives from each member country,
would use ADR to give the parties a chance to resolve their issues. If a
result cannot be reached, the court could then hold a trial type hearing and
reach a dichotomous decision. It is important not only to punish the
member county for not enforcing its laws, but also to punish the polluter
for ignoring the laws and injuring innocent people.
Another potential solution is to allow the CEC to settle private
disputes, thus increasing the number of issues the CEC can resolve.
However, this solution has several weak points. First, if the CEC resolved
public and private international disputes it would be burdened with a huge
caseload. Second, this suggestion would involve restructuring the CEC
and its dispute resolution process. Third, this procedure would give the
CEC too much power. Therefore, creating a new commission for private
suits would make more sense. It would be comparable to the United States
Tax Court in that it would be a specialized court only hearing cases related
to private and organization disputes, just as the Tax Court only hears tax
related cases.
A third possible reform would be to allow the United States and
Canadian citizens and organizations, experienced in environmental
litigation, to file suits against United States plants in the border area.
Thus, eventually full cross border suits could be enacted. Although this
process sounds good, it is discriminatory since United States plants would
be subject to pay damages when Japanese or Mexican plants located near
the United States plants are able to pollute. In addition, since pollution
knows no boundaries, the pollution from another factory could make its
way to a United States plant's section of the river, soil or air, making that
United States plant liable for the pollution from other plants. United States
161. Even though the Council has the authority to make recommendations to the member
countries about cross border suits, these recommendations are not binding and nothing in my
research suggests that cross border suits are being considered at this time. NAAEC, supra note

12, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
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plants would have to pay higher production costs and this would clearly
interfere with free trade under the NAFTA. This system would not be
successful and would not promote cooperation.
Unlike the European Union (hereinafter "EU"), the United States,62
Mexico, and Canada do not want to become entirely interdependent.'
They cherish their sovereignty while supporting cooperation through the
NAFTA and the NAAEC. Therefore, a commission solely for private suits
would be the best solution since a forum is needed for individuals injured
by pollution are able to seek redress from the polluters.
Another aspect of the CEC that denies access is the Council's power
to deny a claim even if the Secretariat believes that the claim meets the
stated requirements and merits a factual record. The Council can deny this
action by a two-thirds vote, and can also deny making a factual record
public by a two-thirds vote. 163 This Council power is too great and
impedes the NAAEC goal of public participation. If a claim is based on
incorrect information and is unfounded it should not be considered.
However, if the Secretariat expends the time and money to investigate a
claim and provides good reasons for making and publishing a factual
record, the Council should approve the submission. Therefore, a frivolous
claim standard, similar to the United States rules of summary judgment or
failure to state a claim should be adopted. This would promote public
participation, continue to put a check on the Secretariat along with
restricting the Council's vast authority to deny claims, even when the
Secretariat fully believes the claim is well supported. Publishing the
factual record would provide parties with an incentive to enforce their laws
and would also promote public awareness.
3. Party Control
162. The EU was created in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome with the purpose of creating a
unified economy and environmental issues were not considered an economic concern at this time.
Robbins, supra note 24, at 144-45; In 1987, the Single European Act [hereinafter "SEA"], Title
VII, often called the Environmental Title, gave the EU the express power to consider
environmental protection as an essential factor in all economic and social policy-making. Id.;
The SEA established the following objective: "to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the
environment, to contribute towards protecting human health and to ensure prudent and rational
utilization of natural resources."

WILLIAM RAWLINSON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: A

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 263 (2d. ed. 1994); The EU Court of Justice has jurisdiction over a wide
range of issues and has recognized environmental protection as an EU objective since 1985.
Zacker, supra note 14, at 264; Therefore, if an EU member violates EU environmental law, the
Court of Justice will punish that member. EU members are able to create their own
environmental laws, but EU law supersedes member law with a few exceptions. Symposium, The
European Community in 1992: An IntegratedApproach to Economy and Ecology, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1759, 1779 (1990). EU members have a desire to be unified economically and in other
ways, but the NAFTA and the NAAEC members do not want such interdependence.
163. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 15, 32 I.L.M. at 1488-89.
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The CEC process provides the parties to the dispute with much control
over how the dispute will be resolved." The parties initiate the procedures
by requesting a council or panel session, or by reconvening a panel after a
panel decision is made.' 1 This procedure gives the parties control over the
resolution of their dispute and promotes cooperation because it would be in
the parties' best interests to reach a resolution before they go to a panel and
have the matter decided for them. Party control also exists in the selection
of the intervenor because the parties appoint cabinet level officials from
their respective countries to serve on the Council and also select the
panelists. '6
Party control extends into the Council session. The Council may use
a variety of procedures to settle the dispute and may also make
recommendations to assist the disputing parties in reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution.' 67 However, prior to being subject to a Council
decision, the parties have a chance to reach a resolution in a nonadversarial way, thus avoiding a dichotomous decision and promoting
cooperation.'6' The parties must weigh the costs and benefits of resolving
the dispute through the CEC and may choose ADR outside the CEC. In
the future, the parties may be able to resolve some disputes through cross
border suits. The Council has the duty of making recommendations to the
member countries regarding the possible implementation of such

164. Party control is a theme found in NAFTA and the Air Quality Agreement.
165. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 23-24, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1490-91, 1493.
166. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 9, 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1484, 1491.
167. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
168. "Cooperative resolution of disputes by the parties themselves is a laudable goal, and
the Agreement provides ample opportunity to pursue that end." Baron, supra note 145, at 612;
The dispute resolution process of the Labor Side Agreement is almost identical to the CEC dispute
resolution process, thus promoting party resolution of disputes before being subject to a binding
determination. The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 141, art. 27-41, 32 I.L.M. at 1509-12;
The NAFTA dispute resolution process has the goal of enhancing relations between the parties and
a great commitment to reaching an agreement at the consultations stage rather then at the FTC or
panel stage. GILBERT R. WINHAM, AssEsSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS 256 (Steven

Globerman & Michael Walker eds., 1993); Article 2022 says that each party must encourage the
use of arbitration and other ADR and that each party should establish procedures to observe
agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce arbitration decisions. The NAFTA, supra
note 12, art. 2022, 32 I. L. M. at 698; Therefore, the NAFTA process seems even more rigorous
in forcing members to resolve disputes on their own. The Air Quality Agreement also places
extreme emphasis on party resolution of disputes. The parties must go through consultations and
negotiations before they may submit their matter to the UC. The Air Quality Agreement, supra
note 11, art. XI, XIII, T.I.A.S. No. 11783 at 4-5; In addition, the parties are not bound to submit
matters to the UC and are encouraged to use ADR. Id. Therefore, it can be inferred that much of
the CEC dispute resolution process is taken from the NAFTA and the Air Quality Agreement.
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procedures with the possibility that such measures may be included in the
NAAEC in the future."
Another aspect of party control is the fact that the CEC dispute
resolution process limits the length of consultations and Council sessions to
sixty days. 70 This is a good safeguard to make sure the parties approach
ADR seriously and work rigorously to reach a result. The limitations
provide an incentive to reach a settlement quickly because the parties may
be subject to a binding panel decision which one or all parties may not find
advantageous.
Overall, as in NAFTA and other agreements, the CEC dispute
resolution process strongly promotes party control over the resolution of
disputes through the use of ADR. This process promotes cooperation and
provides the members with skills that will be useful in the future for
making additional changes or additions to the NAAEC and other
agreements..
Methodology of Decision
Since the NAAEC is a relatively new agreement, the CEC does not
have pre-existing law upon which to base its decisions. The CEC decisionmakers make determinations based on what they believe constitutes a
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental laws.
With members from all three countries on the Council and panel, reaching
this conclusion may be difficult and result in inconsistent conclusions.
There is no prior law and the issue to be decided is a factual question.
Therefore, the method used in decision-making is a subjective test. Results
are based upon the interests and perceptions of the intervenors and not
upon a body of law. The interests of these intervenors should be to
promote environmental protection and to make sure each member country
enforces its laws. However, there is no check on the discretion of the
decision-makers, so other interests interfere with objective reasoning.
Since each member is represented on the Council and panel, the decision
seems fair because each party is equally represented, but the subjective test
prohibits impartiality.
NAAEC critics claim that the CEC should be composed of
government and non-governmental organizations, environmental and health
experts, environmental organization members, the public, interested local
and regional environmental, industrial, and development organizations in
A more inclusive
order to better serve the needs of the border areas.'
CEC would promote public and expert participation, community
"An increase in local
involvement and local bi-national cooperation."
F.

169.
170.
171.
172.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 23, 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 228.
Id.
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public participation should promote equitable consideration of maquiladora
community residents' needs, acknowledge both economic and social
considerations, and reduce environmental racism."" 7
Therefore, one
solution to biased decision-making may be to make the CEC more diverse.
In addition to diversifying the CEC, an objective test standard should be
created to be applied to each dispute. An objective test will reduce biased
decision-making by applying the same standard to each case. 74
The NAAEC does take into consideration Customary International
Environmental Law, which states that each country has the sovereign right
to control the use of resources within its boundaries unless or until such
activities harm an area outside the country's territory. 75
Bilateral
international agreements regarding the environment create broad principles
and domestic law is required to enforce these international principles. 7 6
The domestic law of each member country must provide high levels of
environmental protection in order to meet the objectives of the NAAEC.'7
G.

Outcome and Enforcement
The NAAEC provides extremely effective procedures for enforcing
panel determinations. The NAAEC is new and the United States, Mexico,
and Canada have never created an environmental commission like the
CEC. Therefore, decisions must be enforced in order to ensure the
NAAEC is complied with while giving the CEC respect and clout.
1. Binding
Panel decisions are binding due to the enforcement procedures that are
initiated by party request. 7 8 Under this new dispute resolution process,
Mexico can no longer use the excuse that it is too costly to enforce its
environmental laws. Under the NAAEC, it is too costly not to enforce
those laws because if a member has not fully implemented an action plan or
has not paid a sanction, the panel may suspend NAFTA benefits or institute
173.

Id.

174. The objective test may entail the following analysis: 1) the complained against
party's law enforcement practices since the NAAEC's enactment; 2) the extent of injuries to
private individuals and any organizations involved; and 3) an analysis of the severity of actual
land, water or air damage keeping in mind that a large amount of environmental damage may
result from one sudden and unexpected event. These three steps will be based on a reasonableness
standard similar to the U.S. system. Therefore, even if many of the Council representatives are
biased toward a party, they will have to provide reasons for why there is a persistent pattern of
failure to enforce environmental laws and cannot make a decision solely because of personal
beliefs.
175.

Giorgio, supra note 47, at 168.

176. Id. at 170. These broad international principles are called "soft law."
177.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.

178.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 34, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1492-94.
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monetary sanctions.'7 These enforcement procedures provide an incentive
for a member country to enforce its laws and for disputing parties to
resolve the matter through ADR, consultations or Council sessions.
Overall, these procedures have a deterrence effect and are imperative for
the NAAEC's success.
2. Non-Binding
Alternatively, consultations and Council session determinations are
non-binding. The rational is that parties will be less likely to agree to
participate in these procedures if decisions are binding and rigidly
enforced."i ° If a resolution is reached through consultations, Council
session or ADR, the decision is not binding per se because it is mutually
agreed upon and assumed the parties will comply.
Nevertheless, some check should be imposed to make sure nonbinding decisions are followed. One possibility would be to require the
parties meet one year after the decision is reached to ensure the decision
has been complied with. If after one year the parties are satisfied with the
results of the decision, no further meetings are necessary. If there is noncompliance, the parties should be allowed to re-enter the CEC dispute
resolution process, use other ADR to reach a new solution, or decide how
to achieve the old solution. This would promote cooperation by forcing
compliance. If a party will not comply with the settlement, they are
frustrating the goals of the NAAEC and must be forced to, comply or else
asked to withdraw from the NAAEC.' 8 1 This additional procedure to
ensure that non-binding decisions are complied with would make the
NAAEC stronger, and indicate a true commitment by the parties to
environmental protection and cooperation.
3. Party Comments
Although the CEC process does not provide for appeals, the panel is
able to change its initial determination. After the panel makes an initial
report, the parties are able to submit written comments that the panel
considers in reaching its final determination.1 12 At this stage it is possible
for the panel to change its decision if a party comment points to an error in
the initial report. This procedure is good because it forces the panel to
review its prior determination and correct any inconsistencies. An appeals
179. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 34, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493 & 1494.
180. NAAEC provides further proceedings, that are party initiated, in which the panel
reconvenes to determine if the losing party has fully implemented the approved action plan, and if
not, that party will pay sanctions or have its NAFTA benefits suspended. NAAEC, supra note 12,
art. 34, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493-94.
181. Each member is able to withdraw from the NAAEC six months after submitting a
written notice of withdrawal to all members. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 50, 32 I.L.M. at 1495.
182. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 31, 32, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
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process would increase the CEC caseload and cause delay. Environmental
issues need quick determinations in order to avoid further pollution. This
two step procedure provides a review of the prior determination plus allows
for quick decision-making.' 83 The CEC enforcement procedures are
comliance aand make sure that each member
effective because they force
laws.
environmental
its
enforces
H. Justificationsfor Outcome
The final determination is based on evidence presented by the parties
to the proceedings, the parties who submitted the claim, experts, and the
Council and Secretariat. As mentioned above, the decision is not based on
a standard, but rather on what the CEC decision-makers and the parties
believe constitutes a persistent pattern of failure to enforce one's
environmental laws. However, the NAAEC does provide objectives and
goals that provide guidance for making decisions. Also, the NAAEC
incorporates International Environmental Customary Law as a basis for
decision-making. This customary law principle is that each country is able
to use their resources and pollute their land until it harms another
country."rs Therefore, the NAAEC provides some framework to be
applied in decision-making, but an objective standard needs to be imposed
to avoid biased decisions.
The power of the CEC panel to issue sanctions and suspend NAFTA
benefits is a very effective way to encourage compliance. The NAAEC
needs this power in order to be successful, ensuring compliance to the
sanctions. "'
IV. SOCIETAL FACTORS
Several societal factors challenge the NAAEC's success. First, each
member has a very different history and ideology. Mexico appears to be
changing its old belief that economic growth and environmental regulation
183. Within 180 days after the last panelist is chosen, the panel must issue the initial
report and within sixty days after the initial report's issuance, a final report must be presented.
These time limits force the panel to work efficiently and to reach a decision as soon as possible.
Id.
184. This feature of the NAAEC sets this agreement apart from the various United StatesMexico and United States - Canada bi-national environmental agreements mentioned earlier.
Outcome enforcement is a key factor for a successful agreement.
185. Giorgio, supra note 47, at 168.
186. Each member country may have different interest regarding environmental
protection, but with the NAAEC, they are able to combine their interests through cooperation.
Through cooperation, under the NAFTA and the NAAEC, the members are able to determine
how far they want to go with free trade and how far they want to go with environmental
protection. By reaching these determinations together, they are strengthening relations, creating a
better environment, and encouraging economic growth.
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can not go hand in hand. Based on the General Law, Mexico is becoming
concerned about pollution in the border area and the rapid spread of
disease that has resulted." 7 People living on the border are being injured
by the maquiladora pollution and have no recourse under Mexican law.
The United States on the other hand, is economically advanced and has a
lot of experience with environmental law, legislation and litigation. 8 ' The
United States environmental laws provide a safe environment for its
citizens, plus the right of action in the United States court system if a
citizen is injured.' 89 Canada is very similar to the United States and has
strengthened relations with the United States through several successful binational environmental and trade agreements.' "
One of the biggest
obstacles for the NAAEC will be trying to get three different countries to
interpret and comply with the NAAEC in a similar manner. However, the
NAAEC would not be in existence if not for the commitment of the United
States, Mexico, and Canada to environmental protection through
cooperation.
Second, the border area is a unique area because there are many
socially and economically linked communities called sister cities on each
side of the border.' 9 ' These communities are a result of the border area's
disparate division. The West Side of the border was divided and plotted by
surveyors without concern for mountains, rivers, and other terrain. "9 The
East Side'was more naturally divided and, before 1848, the Rio Grande
was entirely in Mexico, but it was later divided so that parts of the river
were in both countries. 19 This has created a challenge for the NAAEC
because the United States and Mexico suffer from the same environmental
problems but have very different cultures, laws and economic conditions."
In addition, the border area contains many different ecological zones, such
as, mountains, deserts, rivers and ocean making environmental protection
more complex. 9" Therefore, in order to protect the environment, the

187. However, Mexican citizens are very poor and many have moved to the boarder area
for work and believe they are better off now then they were before. Ribadeneira, supra note 1, at
10.
188. Stanton, supra note 4, at 76.
189. Robbins, supra note 24, at 136.
190. "The friendly relationship between the United States and Canada has been responsible
in large part for the successes in negotiating agreements over transboundary issues, such as
pollution and water boundaries, because many of these agreements rely on voluntary negotiations
to work out disputes." Stanton, supra note 4, at 78-79.
191. Gaines, supra note 6, at 435.
192. Id. at 436.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 435.
195. Id.
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NAAEC needs to promote cooperation so that the member countries can
work together in solving the environmental problems they encounter.
Overall, the three member countries realize the need to protect the
environment on border areas. Mexico has come to understand that a stable
environment is necessary for economic growth. Through the NAAEC,
private individuals and NGOs are able to bring forth claims to encourage
accountability, to make others aware of how laws are or are not being
enforced and to clean-up the border area where Mexican and American
citizens live and work. Despite the obstacles involved, the NAAEC, as
does the NAFTA, stands for cooperation and indicates the potential for
further unification in the future.
V. CONCLUSION

Since the NAAEC is rather new it is difficult to fully analyze its
impact or success. The NAAEC was a necessary addition to the NAFTA
in order to protect the environment against economic growth. Although the
NAAEC was created in response to the border area pollution, this
agreement governs all environmental issues involving the United States,
Mexico and Canada.
The recommendations provided above serve to clarify vague
provisions, provide private individuals with a forum in which to seek
damages, limit the Council's unfettered power and to make the CEC
dispute resolution process advocate cooperation."
The United States,
Mexico and Canada must establish specific environmental standards for
each member to attain, that is objective and reasonable for all parties and
that do not create trade barriers.
The future holds two challenges to the NAAEC and to international
environmental protection in general. In May of 1998 the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment may be ratified. 9' This agreement threatens
environmental protection because it would prohibit governments from98
imposing certain restrictions on foreign businesses and investors.
Canada and twenty-eight other countries are involved in the agreement.'99
Many believe "the MAI will [not] provide anything more then token
environmental protections.""
The challenge is not only a limit to
196. As mentioned earlier, international cooperation is essential for international
environmental protection. Despite prior unsuccessful environmental agreements, the NAAEC
members are committed to environmental protection. They have no choice. If the United States,
Mexico, and Canada want economic growth they must protect the enforcement also.
197. Ruth Abramson, Paying the Polluters?: A New Treaty Could Bring Investors and
Controversy, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 1, 1997 at 68.
198. Id.
199. Id. "The lack of public discussion, combined with the complexity of the 175-page
MAI draft, means that most Canadians are still in the dark about its contents."
200. Id.
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environmental regulations on foreign businesses, but also Canada's
membership in the MAI. Canada will be bound to the MAI and also to the
NAAEC and the NAFTA, which supports economic growth along with
environmental protection. This could frustrate relations with the United
States and Mexico, while restricting Canada's ability to meet NAAEC
obligations.
A second important concern for the future is the Kyoto Protocol. This
agreement will require the United States to cut emissions by approximately
eighteen percent."' It could ultimately result in the United States building
new nuclear power plants and eliminating the use of coal.'
Industry
leaders are concerned because the Kyoto Protocol "doesn't allow enough
time to reduce emissions without inflicting massive damage on the
economy." 2 3
Rapid change is often unsuccessful and may cause
resistance. Some suggest that industry and the government should work
together to develop the technology required to meet the Kyoto Protocol
standards. 2' Therefore, this agreement also presents the tension between
environmental protection and economic growth.
The international world will always have the problem of balancing the
industrial world with the needs of the environment. However, cooperation
between nations is necessary, in order to responsibly protect the
environment while promoting economic growth. The world may never
find the ultimate balance, but by establishing strategies through cooperation
it is making progress.

201. Martha M. Hamilton & Curt Suplee, The Price of Achieving Kyoto Goals; U.S. to
Consider Range of Options, Technologies if Pact Advances, THE WASH. POST., December 12,
1997, at § A.
202. Id. Coal provides over half of the nation's electricity.
203. Id.
204. Id.

REVIEW ESSAY - THE RELUCTANT SHERIFF

IVAshton*
Dr. Haas sums up his basic approach as follows: "I propose that the
United States adopt a foreign policy based on the notion of regulation."
That theme is one of several things that makes this an important book. The
theme and the title go right to the heart of the challenge for United States
foreign policy in the post cold war world. As important, they do it in a
way that is easy to understand, thereby enhancing the possibility that larger
segments of the American public will rise to the challenge. This is not a
heavy treatise built on a foundation of jargon making it accessible only to
specialists and international relations of international law. Instead, it is
brisk, direct, and makes effective use of the regulation, sheriff, and posse
metaphors to frame the important questions.
Appropriate political structures, in Dr. Haas' view, are necessary for
an effective American foreign policy and for a peaceful world. Political
structures represent a kind of "regulation" in the international arena. The
cold war provided a bi-polar political structure that offered a place for
almost all nation states and provided a compass for American foreign
policy. The end of the cold war, with nearly 200 nation states adrift, made
American foreign policy directionless.
The absence of a political
framework for small or less powerful countries increases the risk of
anarchy. The absence of a coherent foreign policy erodes the basis for the
necessary political support for any kind of international engagement by the
United States.
"The reluctant sheriff" explains that all of the post cold war empirical
evidence suggests that the United States must exercise leadership. In order
for this to happen, there must be an intellectual framework within the
United States from which coherent foreign policy directions can be
extracted, and there must be a reasonable political consensus supporting
international engagement by the United States.
Coherence in either the intellectual framework or the actual foreign
policy requires simple and understandable goals.
Dr. Haas suggests
stability as the central goal of a post cold war American foreign policy.
Pursuit of this goal will, on occasion, justify United States intervention,
which sometimes will take the form of military intervention, which

*
Mr. IV Ashton is the Director of Institutional Projects and Special Assistant to the
Dean at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. This is a book review of
Dr. Richard Haas's book: The Reluctant Sheriff, written by Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dean and
Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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sometimes will take the form of military intervention. When this is
appropriate, the United States will act in the role of a sheriff.
The posse metaphor signifies that while the United States is the
preeminent military power, it is not sufficiently powerful to act effectively
alone. It needs participation by other states to support any military
intervention. Thus, the United States as sheriff can act effectively only by
persuading others to join its "posse."
The stability goal means that use of force in the international arena
must be opposed.
The implications of Dr. Haas' second central goal, free trade, is less
clear.
Whether major threats to free trade would justify military
intervention is doubtful. Presumably the means used to promote free trade
would range up to, but not beyond, economic sanctions. There also, the
United States could play the role of sheriff but could not act effectively
alone and must enlist others in its posse.
Dr. Haas erroneously distinguishes sheriffs from police officers,
asserting that police officers, but not sheriffs, need explicit legal authority
to perform their law enforcement functions. On the contrary, the duty of a
sheriff in Anglo-American law traditionally was to execute writs (specific
orders in specific cases) issued by courts. A sheriff acting without such
judicial authority would be no different from an ordinary citizen in his legal
capacity and would be subject to civil liability for conversion of property,
trespass, battery, and false imprisonment.
In one respect, that is a mere lawyer's quibble over a metaphor. The
metaphor provides firm support for Dr. Haas' essential point, which relates
to the role of the posse and the sheriffs relationship with it. In the wild
west, the sheriffs legal authority from a writ issued by a court, typically
an arrest warrant, did him little good as a practical matter. In order to
effectuate his authority, he needed sufficient physical force to overcome the
resistance of the subject of the writ. The posse provided that coercive
supplement to the sheriff. As a theoretical matter, all citizens were
obligated to obey the sheriff's command to join a posse. In fact, however,
whether the sheriff could form a posse was a political matter and depended
on persuasion and collective interest rather than the law.
This is exactly the relationship between international law and peace
enforcement in the post cold war world. In theory, and under international
law, the United States' role as organizer and leader of peach enforcement
efforts depends on legal authority - a United Nations ("UN") Security
Council resolution, or the privilege of self defense under customary
international law and article 52 of the United Nations charter. But the
existence of these sources of legal authority are hardly sufficient, they do
little more than the arrest warrant did for the sheriff in the wild west.
What really matters is the political practicability of organizing a posse, and
that depends on collective self-interest and on persuasion at the political
level.
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But to stop there understates the role of international law, just like Dr.
Haas' book understates the role of the writ for the wild west sheriff.
The sheriff in the wild west faced a law suit and damages if he acted
and organized a posse without a writ. But that was not the important point.
What is important about the antecedent of the metaphor is that the sheriff
would not be able to organize a posse as a political matter without a writ.
He had no legitimacy without a writ. A posse, whether or not organized
by the sheriff, was a lynch mob unless there was a writ authorizing its
formation and activity. Lynch mobs of course formed from time to time,
but the sheriff had stronger rhetorical leverage and thus was more
persuasive when he could say to potential posse members, "Do your duty.
We must enforce the law and order" rather than saying, "Join my lynch
mob." Similarly, in the post cold war international arena unilateral action
occurs, and to be sure, it is not subject to the obrobrium attached to the
Nevertheless, sources of legitimacy found in
term "lynch mob."
international law play a major role in the rhetoric leading up to the modern
form of a posse. The United States had a stronger moral position and thus
could be more persuasive in desert storm because it had Security Council
resolutions. Similarly, in Bosnia, the United States organized North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Implementation Force was more practicable
because there was a source of legitimacy both in peace keeping UN
Security Council resolutions and in the privilege of self-defense because the
signatories of the Dayton Accords. Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia had
requested NATO assistance, thereby triggering the privilege of self-defense
under Article 52 and customary international law.
The intellectual challenge for students of international law and
international relations, and the policy challenge is to work out the
relationship between the United States role as sheriff and the appropriate
metaphor for the writ in the post cold war world. As Dr. Haas points out,
the mechanisms for obtaining international writs, the UN Security Council
Its performance in Bosnia was
process especially, is convoluted.
disgraceful.
But there may be a richer array of choices than Dr. Haas suggests.
There may be intermediate possibilities between waiting for a UN Security
Council resolution sufficiently explicit to represent a writ authorizing
military action, and unilateral action by the United States without any basis
of authority in international law. One obvious possibility is commitments
by regional authorities. More needs to be done to understand why NATO
succeeded where the UN failed in Bosnia. Even if regional possibilities for
issuing post cold war writs can be worked out, that source of authority
must be reconciled with the UN Security Council's authority under Article
53. Controversy has swelled for years around the issue whether entire
Security Council authority is necessary for regional action (most people
think not) and whether the absence of post action authority negates the
legitimacy of continued regional action.
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The need for legitimacy is just as great with respect to the posse
engaged in application of economic sanctions as with one engaged in
military intervention. The recent uproar over application of Helms-Burton
and the Iran Sanctions Act to punish those violating the United States'
economic sanctions against Cuba and Iran are examples. The rest of the
world does not consider extra territorial application of United States' law to
be legitimate in the absence of some kind of imprimatur under international
law (and maybe even with such an imprimatur).
The most immediate problem is for the United States to decide what it
will do if the World Trade Organization ("WTO") decides' adversely to it
in Helms-Burton or Iran Sanctions Act cases. There will be a concrete
decision under international law. There will be not question of the United
States' obligation to comply with it. In the long run, compliance will
enhance the stature of the WTO institutions. In the long run stronger WTO
institutions will enhance free trade. But the United States. has, in the
international trade arena as in the military arena, sufficient strength to act
unilaterally. It is possible for it to ignore the "writ", though in this case as
the target of the posse rather than its leader.
Second, there should be a clearer understanding of the role of
international law as a mechanism for crystallizing political positions
through rhetoric.

PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES

I. ARDEN'S REFUSAL To EXTRADITE TERRAQ FULLY COMPLIES WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

A.

Terraq Will Not Receive a FairTrial in Remorra.
Under customary international law, criminal defendants have a
fundamental right to a fair trial.' A state may refuse to extradite a fugitive if

there is "substantial ground for believing that the individual will not receive a
fair trial. "'2 In Barcelona Traction, Power and Light Co., this Court

characterized the protection of fundamental human rights as obligations erga
omnes--owed by all states to all persons. 3 In Soering v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights suggested that the requested state may be
liable in an extraordinary circumstance where extradition would expose the

fugitive to4 a risk of "a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting
country."
This case presents the Court with such an extraordinary circumstance.
Remorra's actions demonstrate its resolve to exact revenge. The Remorran

Intelligence Service violated Nylesia's territorial integrity by orchestrating a

predawn raid on Terraq's home.5 International condemnation
of state-7
6
sponsored abduction in the aftermath of the Eichmann and Alvarez-Machain

cases demonstrates that international law does not permit invasion of a state's
territorial sovereignty to kidnap a fugitive. 8 In its zeal for revenge, Remorra
1.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 10, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), 71, U.N. Doc. A/810; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2.
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 476, cmt. h
(1987) [hereinafter Restatement]; see Soering v. United Kingdom, 28 I.L.M. 1063, 1101 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1989); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 2 InternationalCriminalLaw 415 (1986).
3.
Barcelona Traction, Powerand Light Co. (Second Phase) (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 32-33.
4.
Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1101.
5.
Comp. 23.
6.
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmam, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Isr. Sup.
Ct. 1962).
7.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
8.
See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 868 (1960); Report of the
Working Group on ArbitraryDetention, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item
10, at- 139-140, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/27 (1993); Inter-American Juridical Committee Legal
Opinion in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 32 I.L.M. 277 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1993).
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executed three members of the NPA's Revolt Planning Committee without even
indicting them.9 Although Remorran criminal procedure provides a right to an
appeal that usually takes about nine months, all three were executed
immediately after the court's verdict.' ° The next day, a Remorran
spokesperson declared, "Your government promises that Terraq will be tried
and punished for his crimes. The blood of our martyrs will be dishonored
unless such criminals receive the justice they deserve!""' The politically
explosive context of this case provides "substantial ground" for Arden to
believe that Terraq will not receive a fair trial. Accordingly, Arden properly
denied Remorra's extradition demand.
In complying with customary international law, Arden is not vindicating
Terraq's right to a fair trial purely for the sake of the right itself. Rather, the
prospect of any lasting peace is inextricably linked to the neutral, evenhanded
disposition of justice.
B. Arden Must Deliver Terraq to the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the Former Integra Pursuantto Its U.N. CharterObligations.
As a member of the United Nations, Arden must implement U.N. Security
Council enforcement measures and cooperate with subsidiary organizations
created to enforce those measures.12 These obligations supersede any other
international law duty. 13 The Statutes of both the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Tribunals illustrate the obligation of all U.N. members to cooperate
with criminal tribunals established by the Security Council. 4 The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations reinforced this obligation by mandating that any
request by the Yugoslavia Tribunal to surrender an individual shall be
considered to be a binding enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the
Charter.' 5 This Court has held that all U.N. members must carry out Security

9.
Comp. 25; Clar. 16; see also ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14(3)(a).
10. Clar. 2; Comp. 25.
11. Comp. 31.
12. Comp. ISSUES/CLAIMS; see Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, arts. 25,
29, 39, 48, 49, 24 U.S.T. 2225 [hereinafter Charter].
13. See Charter, supra note 12, art. 103.
14. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 29, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doec. S/25704
(1993) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art.
28, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter Rwanda Tribunal Statute].
15. See Report of the Secretary General Pursuantto Paragraph2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1188 (1993); Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 I.L.M. 32, 43 (Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber
1996) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber].
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Council decisions,
which "prevail over . . . any other international
16
agreement[.]"
Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council established
ICTFI17 which, in turn, formally requested that Arden surrender Terraq to its
custody.'" Arden's Charter obligations mandate compliance. If Remorra
opposes the Security Council's executive decision, Remorra's quarrel is with
the Security Council, not with Arden.
1. ICTFI Represents a Legitimate Exercise of the Security Council's
Chapter VII Powers.
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression," and shall take appropriate
measures to maintain international peace and security. 19 The Security Council
acted properly under Article 39 of the Charter because the Integran conflict
threatened international peace2 ° The Integran war claimed the lives of over
120,000 people and the killing temporarily ceased only after a regional force
from an association of neighboring states disarmed most, but not all, of the
combatants. 2' Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the regional association of
neighboring states reacted to a flood of refugees2 into their own states, or out
of fear that the Integran conflict would spill over into their territories.
Remorra's attempt to label this war as an "internal armed conflict" does
not bar the Security Council's authority to determine a "threat to peace."23 The
Security Council, with the support of the General Assembly, found that the
civil wars in the Congo, Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda constituted threats to
international peace and security.' The Appeals Chamber for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber")
recognized that the practice of the U.N. membership at large reflects a common
understanding that a "threat to peace" may include internal armed conflicts.'
Article 41 lists non-forcible implementation measures of the Security
Council, but the list is not exhaustive.2 The Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber held
16. See Questions of Interpretationand Application of the 1971 Montreal ConventionArising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126.
17. Comp. 22.
18. Comp. 33.
19. Charter, supra note 12, arts. 39, 41, 42.
20.
See Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 42-45.
21. Comp.
15, 16.
22. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S.
137; 1 Oppenheim's InternationalLaw § 399 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter Oppenheim].
23. See Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 43.
24. Id.; S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
25. See Yugoslavia Appeals Oamber, 35 I.L.M. at 43.
26. See id. at 44-45; Charter, supra note 12, art. 41.
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that "the establishment of an International Tribunal falls squarely within the
powers of the Security Council under Article 41."27 This Court has never

struck down a Security Council resolution as a violation of the Charter."
In this case, the maintenance of a lasting peace depends on the neutral
disposition of justice. The Security Council acted within its discretion to
maintain peace by establishing ICTFI. 29 Even the cessation of hostilities does
not bar the invocation of Chapter VII 3
2. ICTFI Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Terraq's Crimes.
The former Integra was and Arden is a party to the Geneva Conventions
32
and Protocols. 3 At the time of Terraq's alleged crimes, Integra still existed

and these treaties were in force. Even if the Court characterizes the Integran
war as "internal," Common Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva

Conventions govern this conflict.33 As demonstrated in the International

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, violations of Common Article 3 and Protocol

H, which proscribe, inter alia, torture, taking hostages, and pillage, are subject
to individual criminal culpability.' The international community has realized
that individual responsibility for such offenses should not hinge on whether the

atrocities occurred technically within a country's boundaries. 3

Customary humanitarian norms prohibiting crimes against peace and
humanity apply equally to internal conflicts.36 Those slaughtered in civil wars
deserve no less protection than those killed in international conflicts. 37 In

27. Id. at 45.
28. Geoffrey Watson, The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:
Jurisdictionin Prosecutorv. Tadic, 36 Va. J. Int'l L. 687, 703 n.120 (1996).
29. See Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 44.
30. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
31. Clar. 19.
32. Comp. 16.
33. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Civilian Convention]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; see Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua(Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-114.
34. Rwanda Tribunal Statute, supra note 14, art. 4; see Theodor Meron, International
Criminalizationof InternalAtrocities, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 554, 558 (1995).
35. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994);
Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 64.
36. See id. at 69-70, 72; Report of the Secretary-General, 35 I.L.M. at 1173.
37. See Richard Goldstone, Symposium: ProsecutingInternationalCrimes: An Inside View,
7 Transnat'l L. & Contemporary Probs. 1, 4 (1997); G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
1922nd plen. mtg., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35
I.L.M. at 63.
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establishing ICTFI, the Security Council ensured that the atrocities in the
former Integra would receive the full attention of the international community.
3. Delivering Terraq to ICTFI is Consistent With Its
Complementary Jurisdiction.
ICTFI's jurisdiction is "complementary" to that of Remorra.38 The
International Law Commission's Draft Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal ("ILC Draft") uses the same "complementary" jurisdiction
language.3 9 The ILC Draft preamble provides "the [International Criminal
Tribunal] is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems
in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be
ineffective."4° Although the Draft Statute is silent on what "unavailable" or
"ineffective" means, one commentator defines "ineffectiveness" as either
"(1) the forum provides a standard of guilt or punishment which is
incompatible with international norms; or (2) the State in question has not
demonstrated an actual intention to prosecute or to conduct a full and prompt
investigation." 4' Extraditing Terraq to Remorra would violate Arden's
obligation to safeguard his fundamental right to a fair trial.42 Remorra's lust
for revenge renders its judicial process ineffective and undercuts its primacy
claim.
II. DELIVERING TERRAQ To IcTFI DoEs NOT BREACH ANY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS.
Extradition depends on the existence of a treaty obligation.43 Absent a
treaty, aut dedere, autjudicare,try or extradite, is a moral obligation rooted
in comity." Even assuming that Arden does have a duty under international
law to investigate and try alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity,45
Arden is complying with this obligation by sending Terraq to ICTFI.'

38.
39.
U.N. Doc.
40.
41.

Comp. 22.
See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
A 49/10 (1994).
Id. atpmbl.,
3.
Jeffrey Bleich, Complementarity, 13 Nouvelles Etudes Penales 231, 238, 241 (1997).
42. See supra part I.A.
43. See Geoff Gilbert, Aspects of ExtraditionLaw 157 (1991).
44. Id.; see Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 17.
45. See Velasquez Rodriguez, Judgment of July 29, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 291 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
1989); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
PriorRegime, 100 Yale L. J. 2537 (1991).
46. See Kenneth Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants Before the International
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 Crim. L. F. 557, 569 (1994).
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A. The Extradition Treaty Between Arden and the Former Integra Does
Not Survive Integra's Dissolution.
Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to
Treaties ("Succession Treaty"), a successor state assumes the treaty obligations
in force that apply to its territory at the time the successor state separates from
an existing state. 47 The Succession Treaty is not a codification of the law of
state succession and does not reflect state practice.4 8
Article 7 of the Succession Treaty limits its application "to a succession
of States which has occurred after the entry into force of the Convention except
as may be otherwise agreed. , 49 Remorra signed the Peace Treaty and formally
assumed the governmental responsibility over its territory no later than April
1996.50 Because the Succession Treaty entered into force on November 6,
1996,"' its provisions do not apply in the present case.
Even if this Court finds that the Succession Treaty applies, Arden has not
yet ratified the Succession Treaty,5 2 and therefore is not bound to recognize
Remorra as a successor to the extradition treaty between Arden and the former
Integra. As a signatory to the Successor Treaty, Arden is cognizant of its duty
not to defeat the object of the Succession Treaty.53 Arden's refusal to
recognize Remorra as a successor to the extradition treaty, however, does not
defeat the Succession Treaty's goal of "ensuring greater juridical security in
international relations." 54 Arden objects to Remorra's succession claim because
of the intimate, predominately political nature of the bilateral extradition treaty.
Without such an agreement, no state could obtain jurisdiction over a fugitive
located in another state without violating that state's territorial sovereignty. 55
The decision to enter into a bilateral extradition agreement is a deliberate
exercise of autonomy based on the consent of the sovereign governments
involved.

47. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, art.
34, U.N. Doc. AICONF.80/31 [hereinafter Succession Treaty].
48. Detlev Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers' View, 33 Va. Int'l L. 275, 294-95 (1993).
49. Succession Treaty, supra note 47, art. 7(1).
16, 20.
50. Comp.
51.
MultilateralTreaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,Status as at 31 December
1996, at 878, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/15 (1997).
52.
53.

Comp. ISSUES/CLAIMS.
Id.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S.

331.
54. Succession Treaty, supra note 47, pmbl.
55. See R. Governorof Brixton Prison, exparte Soblen, 33 I.L.R. 255, 277-78 (Eng. 1963);
Ivan Shearer, Extradition in InternationalLaw 28-29 (1971).
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There is a distinction between "personal" and "dispositive" treaties in the
area of state succession. 56 "Personal treaties," such as those involving judicial

cooperation, military alliances, or economic aid, are fundamentally contractual
in nature and premised upon the continued existence of the contracting
parties." "Dispositive treaties," such as those establishing borderlines, run
with the land and are intended to be permanent.5 8 Because extradition treaties
are analogous to judicial cooperation treaties, they are "personal" and do not

survive the dissolution of a contracting party. State practice supports this
conclusion. When Czechoslovakia emerged as a new state after the dissolution
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was neither bound nor entitled to claim the
benefits of the personal bilateral treaties of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 9

Similarly, when Singapore seceded from the Federation of Malaysia, it did not
succeed to any prior bilateral extradition treaty absent mutual consent of
Singapore and third parties. 60 Absent mutual consent, Remorra does not
succeed to the extradition treaty between Arden and the former Integra.
B. Even Assuming That the Extradition Treaty Applies, the Political
Characterof Terraq' Offenses JeopardizesHis Right to a FairTrial.

Extradition requires a state to balance the need to ensure that no serious
crime goes unpunished with the concern that persons accused obtain a fair
trial. 61 A primary justification for the political offense exception is to safeguard

the accused's right to an impartial trial.62
States have drawn distinctions between "pure" and "relative" political
crimes.' "Pure" political offenses are acts against the State including treason,
sedition, and espionage.' Individuals accused of such crimes traditionally have

56. See 3 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or The Principles ofNatural Law § 203
(James Scott ed. & Charles Fenwick trans., 1758 ed.) (1916); Daniel O'Connell, The Law of State
Succession 15 (1956) [hereinafter State Succession].
57. See State Succession, supra note 56, at 15; Daniel O'Connell, State Succession in
Municipal Law and International Law 212 (1967); Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 63.
58. See State Succession, supra note 56, at 49.
59. Shearer, supra note 55, at 46.
60. Succession of States in Respect of Bilateral Treaties, Study Prepared by the Secretariat,
[1970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 122, 118.
61. Restatement, supra note 2, § 476, cmt. a.
62. See Christine Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition 3, 203
(1980); Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Political Offences in International Law 28 (1977).
63. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-96 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1986); In re Campora, 24
I.L.R. 518, 521 (Chile Sup. Ct. 1957); In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Fr. Ct. App. 1947);
In re Ockert, 7 Ann. Dig. 369, 370 (Switz. Fed. Trib. 1953).
64. See Manuel Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition
of Political Offenders, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 927, 942 (1964); Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793-94.
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received protection from extradition.(' States, however, apply three distinct
tests to determine "relative" political transgressions.' The Political Incidence
Test centers on two primary elements: whether the act occurred during a
political uprising and whether action was incidental or in furtherance of that
uprising.67 The Proportionality Test focuses on the predominance of the actor's
underlying political motivation, 68 and the Objective Test focuses on the identity
of the victim and the nature of the rights harmed.'
Here, Remorra charged Terraq with treason, sedition, and murder. 70
"Pure" political offenses include treason and sedition and are nonextraditable. 7' The alleged murders happened during a political uprising.7 2
Although Terraq's political motivations do not absolve him of accountability,
they affect his right to a fair trial and must be considered.
The U.N. panel of experts accused Terraq of personally killing the Mayor
of Telfin and ordering the torture of two ethnic Remorrans that resulted in their
death.' These constitute political incidents because they occurred during a
political revolt whose objective was to transform the Remorran dominated
power structure into one dominated by Nylesians.74 The Mayor openly
opposed the NPA and his death occurred in furtherance of a bona fide political
power struggle. In the Castionicase, 75 a British Court refused to extradite a
fugitive to Switzerland for killing a state council member during the course of
a politically motivated riot because his conduct met the requirements of the
Political Incidence Test. 76
The charges regarding Terraq's alleged ordering of torture causing the
death of two Remorrans are similar to the Artukovic case.' Artukovic ordered
the slaughter of more than 200,000 people in concentration camps in the former
Yugoslavia. 78 From 1951 to 1959, U.S. courts refused to grant the former
65. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793-94; Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. 145; Manuel Garcia-Mora, Treason,
Sedition and Espionage as PoliticalOffenders Under the Law of Extradition,26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 65,
65 (1964).
66. See Gilbert, supra note 43, at 120-29.
67. See, e.g., Quinn, 783 F.2d at 795-96.
68. See, e.g., Della Savia v. Ministere Publicde la Confederation, 72 I.L.R. 618, 625 (Switz.
Fed. Trib. 1969).
69. See, e.g., Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. at 145-46.
70. Comp. 33.
71. See supra note 65.
72. Comp. 33.
73. Comp. 21.
74. Comp. 19.
75. In re Castioni, 1. L.R.Q.B. 149 [1891].
76. Id. at 150, 153.
77.
United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383, 383, 388 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
78. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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Yugoslavia's request for extradition because the complaint failed to demonstrate
that Artukovic committed "murder" and, alternatively, because such conduct
fell within the scope of the Political Incidence Test. 9 Pursuant to a renewed
extradition request charging him with "war crimes," a U.S. court ultimately
extradited Artukovic to the former Yugoslavia in 1986, but the court
acknowledged that Artukovic's right to a fair trial was a factor in deciding
whether to extradite.'0 About 45 years had elapsed between the time Artukovic
was initially charged with murder and his extradition. The passage of time and
the subsequent change in the former Yugoslavia's political climate significantly
decreased the likelihood of an unfair proceeding.
The political character of Terraq's alleged crimes in this case, combined
with the highly charged political climate in Remorra, ensure that Terraq will
be denied a fair trial. His political motivations impact his right to a fair trial.
C. As an Enemy of All Humanity, TerraqInjured the International
Community and Should Be Held Accountable Before ICTFI.
The decision to extradite a fugitive must also consider the substantial
interest of the international legal order to make sure that serious atrocities are
punished. 8 ' The U.N. expert panel branded Terraq as an enemy of all
humanity for violating international humanitarian law.' The Security Council
unanimously adopted the panel's report accusing Terraq of expelling
Remorrans from their homes in Telfm; setting them out to sea without food,
water or fuel; killing the Mayor of Telfm; ordering the torture of Remorran
prisoners that caused their deaths; and seizing weapons and food from
Remorran homes in Telfin. 3 As an enemy of all humanity, Terraq injured not
only Remorra, but the entire international community,' and should answer for
his actions before an international tribunal. Universal crimes that shock the
conscience of the international community do not lie within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any one state.' If Remorra's objective is lasting peace, a neutral
disposition of justice is critical to its goal. Accordingly, the best interest of
79. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. at 389, 392-393.
80. Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1986).
81.
Restatement, supra note 2, § 476, cmt. a.
82. Comp. 21.
83. Comp.
20-22.
84. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity and International Criminal Law 51213 (1992); Jordan Paust, Universality and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law:
No U.S. Sanctuaryfor Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 11 Hous. J. Int'l L. 337, 340 (1989).
85. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Aug. 10, 1995,
42-43, available on World Wide Web at http://
www.igc.apc.org/tribunal; see Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 78, 80 (1993); Draft Articles on the Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 22(2)(a) at 50, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 238-50,
U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
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both the international community and Remorra demands that Terraq obtains a
fair proceeding before ICTFI, an international trier of fact in a neutral
location. 6 In light of Arden's compliance with international law, questions of
state responsibility and reparation do not arise.
III. ARDEN HAS No DUTY To MAKE REPARATIONS To REMORRA.
The duty to make reparations for international law violations is only
triggered when an act or omission of a state, direct or imputable, breaches an
international duty, the breach causes injury, and, in the case of injury to
individuals, local remedies are exhausted. 7 Here, Arden has violated no
international duty; 8 this Court should decline to award compensatory damages.
A. InternationalLaw Does Not Require Reparationsfor InternationalLaw
Violations Resulting in Direct Injury to States Absent Actual Damages.
"[T]here is no compelling authority to support the claim that a mere
breach of international law without injury to nationals or material damage to the
state should be met by an award of damages by a tribunal."89 Although some
publicists suggest that "a government is always entitled to some damages...
irrespective of whether the breach has caused any actual material damage or
pecuniary loss[,]"' they disagree as to a state's right to reparations absent
actual loss.9 "Moral" or "political" damages are difficult to ascertain and
rarely awarded.'
The crystallization of international law requires both repeated conduct and
opiniojuris.3 Persistent objection by one or more states prevents conduct from

86. Clar. 15.
87. See Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.)(Jurisdiction), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, 21;
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.)(Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 21-3, and 44-5 (sep. op. J. Alvarez);
International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, July 25, 1980, arts. 1, 3, 8(a),
11(1), 22 U.N. Doc. A135/10 (Shabtai Rosenne, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter State Responsibility
Articles]; A. A. Cancado Trindade, The Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies 7-13 (Robert Jennings
ed., 1983).
88. See supra part I.B-C.
89. Christine Gray, JudicialRemedies in InternationalLaw 91 (1987); see Parry [1956] 2
Hague Recueil des Cours 653, 657, 671-95.
90. G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Case of The I'm Alone, [1936] Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 82, 109; see
also Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (Part 1)236 (1983) [hereinafter
Brownlie on State Responsibility].
91. Gray, supra note 89, at 85-92.
92. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 44-7 (sep. op. J. Alvarez); Gray, supra note 89, at 84;
Brownlie on State Responsibility, supra note 90, at 236.
93. North Sea ContinentalShelf(F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 51; Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law 6-9 (4th ed. 1990); Barry Carter & Phillip Trimble,
InternationalLaw 143 (2d ed. 1995).
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crystallizing.' Because no custom exists in this regard, this Court should
decline awarding such damages.
B. Remorra Cannot Seek Representative Damages Because It Cannot
Prove the Nationality of the IndividualsHarmed or the Extent of the Harm
Suffered.
Before it can provide diplomatic protection, a state must prove that the
person concerned is its national.' This Court has dismissed claims when a
state could not prove that the individual was its national.' Nationality is
determined by domestic law with one caveat--the determination must not violate
international law.' Citizenship is traditionally determined by descent from a
national or by birth within state territory.9" With regard to state succession, the
successor states "determine to what extent former nationals of the extinct state
acquire their nationality."'
Such determination is binding, so long as a
genuine link exists and the successor states provide for the possibility of
naturalization for those having a substantial connection with the territory.I"
Here, Remorra and Nylesia properly provided for citizenship by place of
birth and naturalization within five years. 1 By the middle of the 20th century,
a large number of ethnic Remorrans had migrated to the inland capital of
Nylar, where they gradually took economic and political control of Integra. 2
Although during the war many Remorrans fled to former, traditionally
Remorran areas, Nylar, their birthplace, was included within the new territory
of Nylesia.' 03 Upon the facts of the Compromis, one may infer that many
ethnic Remorrans are Nylesian citizens. Remorra's inability to prove the
Remorran citizenship of all of the harmed individuals makes it virtually
impossible to prove the extent of the harm suffered.
Restitution remains the accepted basis for damages in international law.°4
When damages are asserted, the Court must determine "the extent of the
94. Carter & Trimble, supra note 93, at 143.
95. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 59 (dis. op. J. Guggenheim); Greece v.
Bulgaria,7 I.L.R. 91, 95 (1933-34); Oppenheim, supra note 22, §§ 150, 158; Richard Lillich & Bums
Weston, InternationalClainu: Contemporary European Practice 1-3 (1982).
96. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 26.
97. Tunis andMorocco NationalityDecrees (U.K. v. Fr.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.4, 2425; Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 20-21; Brownlie, supra note 93, at 381-84.
98. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 56; Brownlie, supra note 93, at 387.
99. Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 63.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 23; Oppenheim, supra note 22, §§ 62, 151.
Comp. 17.
Comp.
6-8.
Comp.
4, 14, 21.

104. Chorzow Factory (Indemnity), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, 47; Marjorie Whiteman,
Damages in InternationalLaw 80-82 (1937).
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damage." '5 To make this determination, a claimant must demonstrate an
actual loss reasonably certain and ascertainable. " In Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, this Court's predecessor dismissed the claim for indemnity
because no loss had been proved."° This Court has awarded damages in only
two cases involving claims for non-material harm: the S.S. Wimbledon and
Corfu Channel cases--both of which involved substantial evidence of actual
harm.'08 Evidence of actual damages stemming from Arden's alleged breach
of international law is at best inferential. Because Remorra cannot establish
actual loss caused by Arden, this Court cannot award Remorra compensation.
Punitive DamagesAre Not Commonly Awarded in InternationalLaw.
Punitive damages conflict with the principles of restitution and
sovereignty, °9 and "imposition of such damages goes beyond the jurisdiction
International tribunals traditionally decline to impose
conferred on the ICJ.
punitive damages."' Although regional and domestic tribunals award modest
moral or non-pecuniary damages," 2 these awards do not begin to reach the
amount requested by Remorra. An award of US$100 million would be
excessively punitive and should be denied.
C.

The Requested Damages Are Inappropriateand Premature.
As the adjudicative arm of the United Nations, this Court must enforce the
spirit of the U.N. Charter and support the Security Council's decision to
establish ICTFI." 3 In establishing ICTFI, the "Council struck a meaningful
D.

105. Gray, supra note 89, at 79.
106. Mavrommatis PalestineConcessions (Greece v. U.K.)(Merits), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
5, 40; FisheriesJurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 203-05.
107. MavrommatisPalestine Concessions, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5, at 39-40.
108. See S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., Fr., Italy, and Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No .1,
18-32; Corfu Channel(U.K. v. Alb.)(Compensation), 1949 I.C.J. 244, 247-50; see also Gray, supra
note 89, at 77-78, 83-84.
109. See G. Schwarzenberger, InternationalLaw as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals 674 (1957); Bin Cheng, GeneralPrinciplesof Law 235-36 (1987).
110. Eduardo de Arechega, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century, [19781 159
Hague Recueil des Cours 1, 287.
111. See Whiteman, supra note 104, at 716-23; FisheriesJurisdiction,1974 I.C.J. at 203-05;
Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Adv. Op.), 1949 I.C.J. 174, 186;
Lusitania, 1 R.I.A.A. 17, 25-32 (1924).
112. Schonenberger & Durmaz v. Switzerland, (1989) 11 EHRR 202, III.A; Velasquez
Rodriguez, 28 I.L.M. at 328-29; Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 32 I.L.M. 106, 108 n.4 (U.S. 1993); Letelier v. Republic of Cile,
31 I.L.M. 1, 11-15 (Chile-U.S. Claims Comm'n 1992).
113. See supra part III.C.
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blow against impunity."" 4 Awarding damages so Remorra can establish a
Truth Commission will constitute a ruling that ICTFI was improperly
established. Indeed, withdrawal of support will be a license "to commit war
crimes with impunity.""5
Apart from the Truth Commission in El Salvador," 6 Truth Commissions
have been "resolutely domestic""' and have never been funded by a third-party
or awarded by an international tribunal. "Truth commissions have the greatest
chance of success in societies that have already created a powerful political
consensus behind reconciliation.""'B Here, the lack of political consensus
within Remorra indicates that a Truth Commission is premature. The
Remorran people thirst for a criminal prosecution. "' Not until its prayer for

relief does Remorra offer the Truth Commission as an option. As ICTFI is
valid and the Truth Commission lacks consensus, Remorra's request must be
denied.
IV. ABSENT CLEAR EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF AND

TITLE
To THE BANK FUNDS AND ACCOUNTING, ARDEN MUST PROTECT THE

FUNDS.
A. The Conflicting Evidence in the Compromis Does Not Establish a Clear
Duty on Arden's Partto Transfer the Funds or Accounting to Remorra.
The Compromis fails to delineate from whom the Nylesian separatists,
associated with the NPA, obtained the US$20 million, later diverted to Arden.
2
°
The money may be private property seized during the war,"' war booty,1 '
114. Richard Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth Commissions and
InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 485, 499 (1996).
115. Goldstone, supra note 114, at 499.
116. Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commissionfor El Salvador, 27 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 497, 498 (1994); see also Paul Marquardt, Law without Borders: The Constitutionality
of an InternationalCriminal Court, 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 73, 92 (1995); Jon Van Dyke &
Gerald Berkley, Redressing Human Rights Abuses, 20 Deny. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 243, 256 (1991-92).
117. Azanian Peoples Organizationv. Presidentof the Republic of South Africa, 91 Am. J.
Int'l L. 360, 364 (1997).
118. Goldstone, supra note 114, at 496.
119. Comp.
23-25.
120. See Civilian Convention, supra note 33, art. 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, art. 18, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol II, supra note
33, art. 4(2)(g); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, arts.
46-8, 52, 53, 55, 56, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; 2 Oppenheim's
InternationalLaw: Disputes, War and Neutrality §§ 137-45 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
[hereinafter Oppenheim on War]; Tencer v. Mining & Industrial Corp., 4 I.L.R. 561, 561-62 (S.Ct.
Pol. 1927); Mazzoni v. Ministry of Finance, 4 I.L.R. 564, 564-65 (Italy 1927).
121. See Hague Regulations, supra note 120, arts. 4, 14, 53; Oppenheira on War, supra note
120, § 139.
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property of a de facto provisional

government,' or property of an ethnic people seeking self-determination. 24
In addition, if collected for a public purpose, the bank accounting may be
viewed as state archives.'5
If this Court deems the funds private, Arden may have a duty to transfer
them to ICTFI, in light of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunal statutes,
which enable the return of property and proceeds to their rightful owners. 126 If
this Court deems the funds public, under the broad definition of state
property,' 27 Arden must protect them under principles of state succession.
Although few well established principles of international law apply to state
succession, 128 "state property located in third countries must be distributed
equitably among the successor states in accordance with an agreement to be
reached among them. "1 29 Similarly, the Austrian Supreme Court recently held
23

that surrendering property to only 30 one successor state amounts to an
expropriation without compensation. 1

122. Hague Regulations, supra note 120, arts. 49-51; Oppenheim on War, supra note 120, §§
146-48; L Vetek v. N. Durnbacher& Co., 4 I.L.R. 566, 566-67 (Hung. S.Ct. 1927).
123. International Law Commission Draft Articles on Succession of States: Succession in
Respect of Matters Other than Treaties, March 24, 1970, art. 8, cmt. § Ill(E), (F), U.N.Doc.
A/CN.4/226, (Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter State Succession Articles];
Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 167; see Irish Free State v. GuarantySafe Deposit Co., 222 N.Y.S. 182,
188 (1927).
124. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, Op. 2, 4 (1992); United Nations Conference on
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, 22 I.L.M. 298, 305 (1983);
see Application of the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 343.
125. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts, April 8, 1983, art. 20, 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983) [hereinafter Property Convention]; State
Succession Articles, supra note 123, art. 7, cmts. II, III(B).
126. Rwandan Tribunal Statute; supra note 14, art. 23(3); Yugoslavian Tribunal Statute, supra
note 14, art. 23(3); Charter, supra note 2, arts. 25, 29, 48, 49, 103.
127. See Property Convention, supra note 125, art. 8; State Succession Articles, supra note
123, art. 1, commentary; P. K. Menon, The Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, State
Property,Archives, and Debts 79-82 (1991); Lillich & Weston, supra note 95, at 122; see also supra
notes 36-40.
128. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Documentation on the Arbitration
Commission under the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference: Advisory Opinions Nos. 11-15 of the Arbitration
Commission, 32 I.L.M. 1586, Question 4, 1 (1993) [hereinafter FYAC]; Menon, supra note 127,
at 79; Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 68.
129. FYAC, supra note 128, at Question 6, 1; see Property Convention, supra note 125, art.
18; Republic of Croatiav. GirocreditBank A. G. Der Sparkassen, 36 I.L.M. 1520, 1529 (Aust. Sup.
Ct. 1997); see also Oppenheim on War, supra note 120, § 316.
130. Girocredit,36 I.L.M. at 1529; FYAC, supra note 128, at Question 6, 4.
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Both Remorra and Nylesia have interests in the funds and accounting,
whether deemed public or private. Absent clear evidence regarding the origin
of and title to the bank funds and accounting, 3 ' Arden must protect these funds.
Lacking any clear international duty to send the funds and accounting to
Remorra, Arden may properly uphold its domestic laws.
B.

Arden Has No Duty to Provide the Funds or Accounting to Remorra.

Arden does not wish to keep the money for its own purposes, but it is not
bound by international law to deliver the accounting or funds to Remorra.
Arden is not a party to any international agreements regarding the disclosure

of private bank information in civil, criminal or tax contexts. Although several
states have signed treaties proscribing illicit drug transfer and related money
33
laundering,' 32 customary international law does not require such disclosure. 1
Moreover, numerous states have enacted bank secrecy laws prohibiting the
disclosure of private bank information.' 34 Even existing mutual 3assistance
5
treaties give broad discretion in refusing or postponing disclosure. 1
Under international law, states have a sovereign right to decide what laws
to enact within their own territories. 136 As present state practice is inconsistent
and no applicable international law obligations exist, Remorra's accounting and
funds request must be denied.
Absent admission of responsibility, ratification, adoption, or lack of due
diligence, states are not responsible for the acts of private parties. 117 Arden has
131. See generally Kwstammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 20 I.L.M. 1122 (U.S. 1981), aff'd
by 21 I.L.M. 773 (U.S. 1982).
132. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991);
Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, December 14, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1419
(1991).
133. Richard Preiss, Privacy of FinancialInformationand Civil Rights Issues: the Implications
for Investigating and ProsecutingInternationalEconomic Crime, 14 Dick.J. Int'l L. 525, 537 (1996).
134. See Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Banks, arts. 47(1)-(2) (Switz. 1934), as
amended Federal Law of March 11, 1971; Penal Code, art. 273 (Switz.); Banks and Trust Companies
Regulations Act (Amendment), No. 3, § 2 (Bahamas 1980); Confidential Relationships (Preservation)
Law, No. 16 (Cayman Is. 1976) (amended No. 26, 1979); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Can.
Rev. Stat. Ch. 49, § 5(1) (1985); Law of July 16, 1980, L. No. 80-538, arts. 1-3, 75 Am. J. Int'l L.
382, 383 (1981), amending Law of July 26, 1968, L. No. 68-678, 1968 J.O. 7267, 1968 D.S.L. 248
(Fr.).
135. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 132, arts. 7(12), 7(15), 7(17); European Money
Laundering Treaty, supra note 132, arts. 9, 18(1)-(8).
136. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.), No. 9, 18-21; Barcelona Traction,
1970 I.C.J. at 249-50; Restatement, supra note 2, § 403; Brownlie, supra note 93, at 41, 287, 291;
Oscar Schachter, InternationalTheory and Law in Practice254 (1991).
137. See U.S. Diplomaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 56-7;
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 18, 21; Restatement, supra note 2, § 702, cmt. N, and reporter's note
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13
neither condoned, ratified nor been complicit as an "accessory after the fact"
in Terraq's actions. Instead, Arden has detained Terraq and intends to
transport him to ICTFI. 139 Arden pursued possible claims regarding the
suspicious funds and is now acting under court order in compliance with certain
provisions of its bank secrecy laws, enforced by the privately-owned bank."o
The actions of Terraq and the bank cannot be imputed to Arden.

C. Arden Can Decline Recognition and Enforcement of the Default
Judgment.
Individuals have a duty to exhaust local remedies before a state can
institute international proceedings on their behalf. 4 ' Arden originally
impounded the questioned accounts as suspicious. Remorra then failed to come
forward when Arden advertised the accounts 42 and brought no claim for the
accounts within Arden. Remorra cannot now claim the funds. Furthermore,
absent a treaty obligation, international law requires no state to recognize or
enforce foreign judgments. 143 Indeed, under principles of comity, states may
decline to enforce foreign judgments that violate international law, conflict with
their fundamental public policy principles, or represent the public law of a
foreign state, such as revenue, penal or confiscatory legislation.'"
Arden and Remorra are not parties to any international agreements
regarding the recognition of foreign judgments or legal instruments. Here, the
Remorran court entered a default judgment only 21 days after proceedings were
instituted, indicating a lack of fairness to Terraq and implicating public policy
concerns. Thus, Arden may decline recognition and enforcement of the default
judgment against Terraq.
V. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF.

11; Brownlie on State Responsibility, supra note 90, at 161-62; see also Orentlicher, supra note 45,
at 2583.
138. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the GeneralAssembly, [195012 Y.B.Int'l
L. Comm'n 364, 374-77; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 398 (1992).
29, 45.
139. Comp.
140. Comp. 40; Clar. 1 4.
141. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27; C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in
InternationalLaw 45 (1990); Trindade, supra note 87, at 7-13; Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 153.
142. Comp. 39.
143. Michael Akehurst, Juisdiction in InternationalLaw, [1972-73] 46 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 145,
238; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 229 (1895); Godard v. Gray, 6 L.R.Q.B. 139, 148 [1870].
144. See Brussells Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 27, 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1424 (1990); Inter-American
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, art.
2(h), 19 I.L.M. 1224 (1979); In re GrandJury Proceedings, Marsonerv. United States, 40 F.3d 959
(9th Cir. (Ariz.) 1994) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Oppenheim, supra note 22, §§ 113, 143.
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For the reasons stated above, Arden respectfully asks this Honorable
Court to declare and adjudge that:
Arden's decision to surrender Terraq to ICTFI and its
(1)
jurisdiction over Terraq are supported by the U.N. Charter and
customary international law;
(2)
The 1965 Extradition Treaty between Arden and the former
Integra is no longer in effect, and that Arden's refusal to extradite
Terraq to Remorra is consistent with international law;
(3)
Arden has no duty to make reparations to Remorra or fund
a Truth Commission; and
(4)
Under international law, Arden need not transfer the funds
or accounting to Remorra or recognize the US$20 million default
judgment rendered in Remorra.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Arden

